Thresholds in logistics collaboration decisions: A study in the chemical industry. by Visser, L.J.
Thresholds in Logistics 
Collaboration Decisions































































Hierbij nodig ik u uit voor het 
bijwonen van de openbare 
verdediging van mijn proefschrift 
met als titel: 
Thresholds in Logistics 
Collaboration Decisions
De verdediging zal plaatsvinden 
op vrijdag 18 juni om 14.15 uur  
in de aula van de Universiteit 
van Tilburg. De aula bevindt zich 
in het Cobbenhagengebouw 
(gebouw C), Warandelaan 2  
te Tilburg.
Voorafgaand aan de verdediging 
zal ik om 14.00 uur een korte 
toelichting geven op mijn 
onderzoek.
Na afloop van de verdediging  
is er aansluitend een receptie  
in de nabijheid van de aula. 
U bent van harte welkom!
Lenny Visser
06-54657258
l.visser@fontys.nlThresholds in Logistics Collaboration Decisions
A Study in the Chemical Industry
Visser-bw-v7 preflight.pdf   1 14-5-2010   13:44:40Visser-bw-v7 preflight.pdf   2 14-5-2010   13:44:41Thresholds in Logistics Collaboration Decisions
A Study in the Chemical Industry
PROEFSCHRIFT
ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de Universiteit van Tilburg op gezag van de 
rector magnificus, prof. dr. Ph. Eijlander, in het openbaar te verdedigen ten overstaan 
van een door het college voor promoties aangewezen commissie in de aula van de 
Universiteit op vrijdag 18 juni 2010 om 14.15 uur door
LEONARDA JOSEPHA VISSER
geboren op 9 januari 1979 te Tilburg.
Visser-bw-v7 preflight.pdf   3 14-5-2010   13:44:41PROMOTOR:
Prof. Drs. Kees Ruijgrok
This PhD project has been financially supported by the Fontys University of Applied Sciences.
Visser-bw-v7 preflight.pdf   4 14-5-2010   13:44:41| 5
Preface
This PhD thesis is the result of four years of research. Now the thesis is finished, it is 
the moment to look back and realize that this thesis would never have been completed 
without the help and support of many people. First of all, I would like to thank my 
promoter Kees Ruijgrok without whom I would never have finished this journey. During 
our discussions, I always had the feeling you were already two steps ahead of me. As a 
result, your valuable ideas, comments and feedback helped me to find the finish line. 
Furthermore, your positivism and enthusiasm always gave me the conviction that this 
project would succeed.
I would also like to thank Henk Betlem. Henk was the initiator of this project at Fontys 
University of Applied Sciences in his role as lector supply chain management. Henk also 
levelled the path for me at Fontys and was a stable factor in a sometimes turbulent 
environment.
Furthermore, I would like to thank Lorike Hagdorn, Walther Ploos van Amstel and Jos 
Vermunt for their valuable comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this manu-
script. These were very helpful to further improve the quality of my work. I also thank 
the other committee members, Gerard de Jong and Bart Vos, for their time to read and 
comment on this thesis.
Additionally, I am grateful to Marco Kouwenhoven and Eric Kroes from Significance who 
taught me the basics of stated preference research and supported me in the design of 
the experiment and the data analysis.
Of course I would also like to thank Fontys, especially the departments Financial Man-
agement and Engineering and Logistics. They provided me all the facilities, time and 
financial resources that were needed for the completion of this project. 
Various other people have also helped me to finish this PhD project. I would like to thank 
my respondents of the different companies and branch organizations for their time and 
willingness to share information. This information was crucial to find an answer for the 
defined research questions. I am also grateful to my colleagues at Fontys. Especially the 
colleagues at the Financial Management department in Eindhoven as well as my former 
colleagues at the Engineering and Logistics department in Venlo, I would like to thank 
for their interest and support. Special thanks to Marianne, it was inspiring and motivat-
Visser-bw-v7 preflight.pdf   5 14-5-2010   13:44:416 |
Preface
ing to have the possibility to share my research experiences with someone in my direct 
working environment. I also thank the other Fontys PhD candidates, especially Anne-
mie, Marije and Yvonne, it was good to have people around you that are in the same 
position.
Finally, I would like to thank my family and friends for their respect for the choices I 
made, their interest in my work and their endless support. However, deepest gratitude 
goes out to Harm. You gave me the final encouragement that was needed to start this 
journey and you unconditionally supported me during the entire process. When there 
was any doubt from my side on how to continue the project, you were always there 
(where ever you were on the globe) to express your faith in my capabilities. Now I have 
finished this thesis and you have finished travelling and studying, there should be more 
time to spend together. I am looking forward to that!
Lenny Visser
Tilburg, December 2009
Visser-bw-v7 preflight.pdf   6 14-5-2010   13:44:41| 7
Glossary of terms and abbreviations: 
Before getting started, the central terms used in this dissertation are defined 
below. Next to this, also the abbreviations and symbols used in the different 
chapters are explained.
Terms:
Arm’s length. Gulati and Kletter (2005) have defined a relationship ladder to identify 
different levels of supply chain collaboration. These different levels are: arm’s length, 
bundling, integration and strategic partnering. Arm’s length is used to refer to a rela-
tionship in which a company purchases each product or service as an isolated transac-
tion.
Attributes. In a stated preference experiment alternatives are presented to the respon-
dents who are asked to choose the most preferred one. These alternatives are described 
as bundles of variables known as attributes. 
Between mode experiment. Two types of a stated preference experiment are distin-
guished: between mode and within mode experiment. In a between mode experiment 
respondents are asked to make choices between alternative product descriptions that 
are based on different concepts (f.e. train and bus). In a within mode experiment re-
spondents are asked to make choices between alternative product descriptions that are 
based on the same concepts (f.e. two train types). The alternatives differ in the values 
attached to the attributes that are included in the alternatives.
Bounded rationality. The term used to refer to the limited capacity of human beings to 
formulate and solve complex problems.
Bundling. Gulati and Kletter (2005) have defined a relationship ladder to identify dif-
ferent levels of supply chain collaboration. These different levels are: arm’s length, bun-
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dling, integration and strategic partnering. The level bundling is characterized by a rela-
tive low level of integration and trust. 
Collaboration. Collaboration is in this research is defined as an effective, voluntary, 
mutually shared process where two or more actors work together, have a mutual under-
standing, a common vision, share resources, and achieve common goals. 
Choice. A decision making process consists of different phases: problem recognition, 
generation of alternatives, alternatives evaluation, choice and implementation. Choice is 
the outcome of a decision making process. 
Commitment. In this research commitment is defined as the belief that participating 
actors are loyal and tolerant and do not worry about being replaced.
Commodities. The chemical industry is roughly segmented in commodities and special-
ties to identify the diverse range of products supplied by the chemical industry. The term 
commodities is used to refer to raw materials and basic chemicals.
Confidentiality. In this research confidentiality is defined as the belief that a partner will 
not harm the interests of the counterpart.
Costs. In this research the term costs refer to the price a shipper pays to a LSP.
Driver. Force, inside of outside the organization, that supports logistics collaboration.
Economies of scale. Refers to the reduction in average costs per unit through higher 
efficiencies resulting from an increased scale of operation. 
Economies of scope. Refer to the reduction of per-unit costs through the production of 
a wider variety of goods or services.
Full rationality. Decision makers have well-defined stable preferences, know and under-
stand all existing alternatives and are only guided by financial incentives. This definition 
is based on the neo-classical and new-institutional economic tradition.
Homo economicus. A term used to refer to a person who in his choice is only guided 
by financial incentives and has full knowledge of all options and consequences upfront. 
This definition follows the neo-classical and new-institutional economic tradition.
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Horizontal collaboration. Supply chain collaboration exists in different forms. Collabo-
ration between parties that are at the same level between resources and final products 
is called horizontal collaboration.
Impediment. Force, inside of outside the organization, that impede logistics collabora-
tion.
Inertia. Term used to refer to the resistance to change of individuals and organizations.
Integration. Gulati and Kletter (2005) have defined a relationship ladder to identify 
different levels of supply chain collaboration. These different levels are: arm’s length, 
bundling, integration and strategic partnering.
Lateral collaboration. Supply chain collaboration exists in different forms. A combina-
tion of horizontal and vertical collaboration is called lateral collaboration.
Lead Logistics Provider. A lead logistics provider is responsible for the coordination of 
logistics activities (f.e. transport) that are outsources to different logistics service provid-
ers. 
Logistics. Logistics is the design and operation of the physical, managerial, informa-
tional and financial systems needed to allow goods to overcome space and time.
Logistics collaboration. Collaborative relationship between a shipper and logistics ser-
vice provider.
Logistics outsourcing. The provision of single or multiple logistics services by an exter-
nal vendor on a contractual basis.
Logistics service provider. A company that provides logistics service on request and 
payment of an external firm.
Non-full rationality. Decision makers are guided by both material and immaterial incen-
tives. 
Operations research. Discipline that is focused on the application of mathematical 
techniques and methods to support decision making.
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Package density. Term used to express the number of colli per unit of volume being 
handled in a particular process. 
Procurement. The complete process of ordering products or services from an external 
supplier. This process includes supplier selection, ordering, receiving and evaluation. 
Revealed preference analysis. Research method that analyzes actual behavior of deci-
sion makers. 
Service. In this research service is defined as the number of shipments that are delivered 
on time by the LSP.
Specialties. The chemical industry is roughly segmented in commodities and specialties 
to identify the diverse range of products supplied by the chemical industry. The term 
specialties is used to refer to intermediates and end-products. 
Strategic partnering. Gulati and Kletter (2005) have defined a relationship ladder to 
identify different levels of supply chain collaboration. These different levels are: arm’s 
length, bundling, integration and strategic partnering. At the strategic partnering level 
a company turns its activity completely over to its supplier. The supplier takes ownership 
of all related decisions and actions. This collaboration has a long term horizon.
Supply chain management. The co-ordination and management of the flows of goods 
and information from supplier to the end-consumer.
Stated preference analysis. Research method that analyzes hypothetical choice behav-
ior. Stated preference use interviews or questionnaires, in which respondents are asked 
to make choices between alternative product descriptions, to reveal how respondents 
value different attributes.
Switching costs. Term used to refer to the costs incurred when switching to a different 
logistics service provider. These costs include the costs for tendering, implementation 
and terminating the relationship with the old service provider.
Technical service. Some chemical companies support their customers to install produc-
tion machinery in such a way that the product performance of the sourced product is 
most optimal. This type of service is called technical service.
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Threshold. Term used to refer to aspects that prevent decision makers to choose a spe-
cific (collaboration) alternative. 
Transparency. The term transparency refers to the openness between operating parties 
in terms of communication and measurability of service elements. 
Trust. Trust is defined as the belief that a partner will not harm the interests of the 
counterpart.
Utility  maximizing.  Decision  makers  can  use  different  decision  rules  to  make  their 
choice. In case utility maximizing is used, it is assumed that the decision maker compares 
a set of alternatives and choose the alternative that maximizes his utility.
Value density. Term used to express the value of products per m3.
Vertical Collaboration. Supply chain collaboration exists in different forms. Collabora-
tion between parties that succeed each other in a particular generation process and 
therefore have different activities is identified as vertical collaboration.
Within mode experiment. Two types of a stated preference experiment are distin-
guished: between mode and within mode experiment. In a within mode experiment 
respondents are asked to make choices between alternative product descriptions that 
are based on the same concepts (f.e. two train types). The alternatives differ in the val-
ues attached to the attributes that are included in the alternatives. In a between mode 
experiment respondents are asked to make choices between alternative product descrip-
tions that are based on different concepts (f.e. train and bus).12 |
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Abbreviations:
BU:    Business unit
D.O.F.    Degree of freedoms
EDC:    European distribution centre
GDC:    Global distribution centre
KPI:    Key performance indicator
LL:    Log-likelihood
LLP:    Lead logistics provider
LSP:    Logistics service provider
MNL model  Multinomial logit model
N.A.:    Not Applicable
RDC:    Regional distribution centre
RFI:    Request for information
RFQ:    Request for quotation
SLA:    Service level agreement
SP:    Stated preference
RP:     Revealed preference
VAL:    Value added logistics
Symbols:
ß:    Represents the coefficients in an utility function
Δ LL:    Represents delta in the log-likelihood
e    Exponent
ε:    Represents the error component in an utility function
μ:    Represents mean
P:    Represents probability a specific alternative is chosen
σ:    Standard deviation
U:    Represents utility
X:    Represents the independent variable in utility function
X2:    Represents chi-square| 13
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1.   Introduction 
1.1   Research background
Logistics is the design and operation of the physical, managerial, informational and fi-
nancial systems needed to allow goods to overcome space and time. Until the nineties, 
the logistics field was focused on the internal processes of a company in such a way 
that the profitability was maximized. Later on supply chain management builds upon 
these processes and seeks to achieve linkage and co-ordination between the processes 
of other entities in the pipeline and the organization itself. The focus of supply chain 
management is on the management of up- and downstream relationships with suppliers 
and customers to deliver superior customer value at less cost to the supply chain as a 
whole. This development of the logistics field is influenced by general business develop-
ments like increasing customer requirements, globalization, technological innovation 
and focus on sustainability (Christopher, 2005). 
In a context of the mentioned developments, an increasing part of the value adding 
activities is placed outside the boundaries of a firm (Christopher, 2005; De Man, 2004; 
Skjott-Larsen, 2000; Vermunt and Binnekade, 2000). Companies concentrate on their 
core competencies and non-core activities are outsourced to specialized manufactur-
ers and providers. Logistics is one of the activities increasingly identified as a non-core 
competence, and for that reason outsourced to specialized service providers: Logistics 
Service Providers -LSPs1 (Canete, 2005; Jafaar and Rafiq, 2005; Razzaque and Sheng, 
1998). This outsource decision is the starting point for a collaborative relationship be-
tween shipper and LSP. 
The collaboration with LSPs becomes increasingly important for shippers for two reasons. 
First, shippers not only decide more often to outsource logistics activities to external 
providers, but simultaneously the complexity of the outsourced activities is increasing. 
Nowadays, logistics services are more often not bought in isolation, but as a package 
of logistics services and more varied activities like value adding services and IT services 
1  LSP is a company that provides logistics services on request and payment of an external firm (Lambert et al. 
1998)18 |
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are included in the package of services bought (Van Laarhoven et al., 2000; Berglund, 
2000; Andersson and Norrman, 2002). Second, the last decades shippers have become 
more aware of the impact that logistics can have on the costs of doing business and 
on the degree the customer is serviced. This ongoing awareness has led to an ongoing 
rationalization in the supply chain. As a result the average total logistics costs as a per-
centage of sales have declined from 12.1% in 1987 to 6.1% in 2003 (A.T. Kearney, 2009). 
Figure 1 makes visible that since 2003 the average logistics costs are slightly increasing. 
One reason can be found in the fact that more value added services are included in the 
logistics scope. Nevertheless, there is still a constant need for companies to increase the 
economies of scale and scope in logistics networks to keep their competitive position in 
the market. One of the possibilities to reach such economies is collaboration with a LSP. 
Figure 1:  Logistics costs as percentage of sales (1987 – 2013) (A.T. Kearney, 2009)
Also from a LSP’s perspective, collaboration between shipper and LSP becomes increas-
ingly important, because LSPs are facing hard times. There are several causes for this 
fact: fierce competition in the global market, high fixed cost, fragmentation of transport 
flows, rising fuel and labor prices, increasing expectations of customers in terms of both 
service and price (Cruijssen et al, 2007; Groothedde et al, 2005). Since costs in terms 
of price is the most important criterion in selecting a LSP (Laarhoven et al, 2000; Lynch 
2004), competition at price level increases and profit margins decrease. Therefore service | 19
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providers also focus on efficiency by achieving economies of scale and scope. As a result, 
during the last decade the providers’ industry is characterized by mergers and acquisi-
tions (Carbone and Stone, 2005; Lieb and Bentz, 2005). Beside mergers and acquisitions, 
also LSPs can reach economies of scale and scope by closer collaboration with the ship-
pers (Groothedde, 2005). 
The potential of collaboration between shippers and LSPs, in terms of cost and service 
advantages, has been been shown by several researchers (Cruijssen, 2006; Groothedde, 
2005). Especially, there are opportunities when shippers and LSPs are willing to share 
responsibilities at a tactical or strategic level. Nevertheless, in practice, the majority of 
the collaborative relationships between shippers and LSP remain at an operational level 
and only focus on the operational execution of the outsourced activities (Selviaridis and 
Spring, 2007). Min et al. (2005) conclude that impediments and resistance to change do 
exist in practice, which prevents a certain proportion of logistics collaboration being ini-
tiated. As a result, it might be concluded that despite the potential of and even necessity 
for logistics collaboration between shipper and LSPs, thresholds prevent the potential 
benefits from being exploited fully in practice. 
1.2   Relevance and contribution
Previous research in the logistics and supply chain management field has widely dis-
cussed the topic of logistics collaboration between shipper and logistics service provider. 
Nevertheless, there are some reasons to define an additional research project. Current 
publications about logistics collaboration emphasize that human factors like trust and 
commitment are important impediments for collaboration between shipper and LSP 
(e.g. Mentzer et al., 2000; Simatupang and Sridharan, 2002; Verduijn 2004). Neverthe-
less, these publications do not quantify the impact of these human factors or prove that 
they significantly impact a logistics collaboration decision. Quantifying the impact of hu-
man factors will help to understand why potential benefits of logistics collaboration are 
not exploited in practice. This understanding is a necessary condition to provide recom-
mendations for removing or at least reducing the thresholds of logistics collaboration. 
Next to this, operations research models, which are used to prove the potential of logis-
tics collaboration, typically have relied on the assumptions of the neoclassical theory or 
the new institutional economic theory. As indicated by Carter et al. (2007) these models 
have significantly enriched the theoretical and grounded frameworks which have been 
developed in the field of supply chain management. The theories regard decision makers 
as a “homo economicus”. In the neoclassical and institutional economic tradition this 
means that each decision maker maximizes his utility, is only guided by financial incen-20 |
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tives, and has full knowledge of all options and consequences (Folmer, 2007). Neverthe-
less, there is abundant evidence in the decision making behavior literature that decision 
makers often violate this rationalistic paradigm that is found in some economic streams, 
and that decisions lead to suboptimal results (Simon, 1957; Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979; Bazerman, 1998). The impact of behavioral aspects has received little attention or 
is even ignored in the available models (Carter, 2007; Hopp, 2004; Mantel et al. 2006). 
As a result, Mantel et al. (2006) conclude that the integration of operations research 
and decision making behavior literature can contribute to closing the research gap in 
understanding collaboration decisions within the logistics field. Quantifying and proving 
the significant impact of human factors will be a first step to enhance the precision and 
rigor of the existing models and their outcomes.  
1.3   Research scope and focus
Collaboration  has  been  examined  the  last  decades  by  practitioners  and  researchers 
across disciplines including sociology, psychology, marketing and supply chain manage-
ment. This research focuses on collaboration in the field of supply chain management. In 
this context Simatupang and Sridharan (2002) distinguish three types of collaboration: 
vertical, horizontal and lateral cooperation. They define vertical collaboration as collabo-
ration between parties that succeed each other in a particular generation process and 
therefore have different activities. Horizontal cooperation is used to refer to concerted 
practices to share private information, facilities or resources to reduce costs or improve 
service between companies (competing or unrelated) operating at the same level(s) in 
the market. Finally, Simatupang and Sridharan (2002) define a lateral cooperation as a 
combination of vertical and horizontal cooperation, e.g. to synchronize shippers and 
LSPs of multiple companies in an effective logistics network (see e.g. Tavasszy et al. 
2003). In this project we only focus on a specific form of vertical collaboration: the 
dyadic relationship between shipper and LSP. In this relationship, the shipper is the out-
sourcing entity. As a result, in this research we mainly focus on the shipper’s perspective. 
Logistics outsourcing is widely used and still increasing, but services most frequently 
outsourced are those with a more operational, transactional and repetitive character 
(Lieb and Bentz, 2005; Lieb and Randall, 1996; Selviaridis and Spring, 2007). As a result, 
the focus in the collaborative relationships between shippers and LSPs is also on the 
operational execution of the outsourced activities (Lieb and Bentz, 2005; Selviaridis and 
Spring, 2007). Shippers are still reserved to increase the level of collaboration by trans-
ferring more responsibilities to a service provider (Min et al. 2005). However, previous 
research has shown that there are opportunities, in terms of cost and service advantages | 21
Introduction
when shippers would be willing to share responsibilities at a tactical or strategic level 
(Cruijssen, 2006; Groothedde, 2005). Therefore, this study focuses on the shippers’ deci-
sion to intensify the level of collaboration with their LSPs and not on the initial outsourc-
ing decision. 
Decisions made within organizations are about issues or problems of a varied nature, 
are derived from a variety of situations and need to be worked on by various groups 
or departments. A common way to cluster these different decisions is to position them 
in a hierarchical model. Traditionally, in such hierarchical model three levels of decision 
making are distinguished: strategic, tactical and operational decisions (Anthony, 1965). 
Also logistics decisions differ in terms of scope, frequency and time horizon. In his dis-
sertation, Verduijn (2004) compares different classifications of logistics decisions and 
concludes that the exact position of each logistics decision at the hierarchy is arbitrary, 
because the different models do not categorize the same type of logistics decisions at 
the same hierarchical level2. At least, it may be concluded that logistics outsourcing 
and collaboration decisions are not taken at the operational level within an organiza-
tion, because operational decisions relate to the execution of the day-to-day opera-
tion. Furthermore, at the end of each decision making process, one person has the final 
responsibility for the decision made. Nevertheless, decisions are mostly not taken in 
isolation. Depending on the type of decision and the organizational structure within a 
particular organization, different persons from different disciplines are involved (Marcus 
et al. 2007). These different persons use their own considerations and background to 
provide input for the person that has the final responsibility. The same is applicable for 
logistics outsourcing and collaboration decisions. The structure of, and persons involved 
in these decisions differ between organizations, but in most cases more than one person 
is involved (Laios and Moschuris, 1999). In this research, we focus on the different indi-
viduals that participate in logistics outsourcing and collaboration decisions. The possible 
interactions between these individuals or other aspects of a group decision process are 
out of scope for this research.
2  For a more detailed discussion about logistics decisions we refer to section 2.1.22 |
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1.4   Research objective
Given the observation that in practice some thresholds prevent the potential benefits of 
logistics collaboration from being exploited, it is the objective of this research project to 
measure these thresholds. 
The following research questions are defined to reach our objective:
•  Which factors hamper a shipper to intensify collaboration with a logistics service 
provider?
•  What is the relative importance of the identified factors in a shipper’s collaboration 
decision?
1.5   Research strategy
This research project incorporates both a theoretical and an empirical part. The theoreti-
cal part consists of a descriptive literature review. Three different streams of literature are 
reviewed in parallel: logistics outsourcing, collaboration and behavioral decision making. 
These three streams are chosen as a starting point, because they are the key words in 
our research questions. The review starts from a  specific perspective with a discussion of 
the logistics outsourcing literature. The second stream includes supply chain collabora-
tion literature. Subsequently, several organizational theories are reviewed, because these 
theories provide characteristics of designing and selecting inter-organizational relation-
ships. Finally, the behavioral decision making literature is discussed. Historically, sup-
ply chain management and decision making behavior literature are studied by separate 
communities of scholars. In practice, the two fields are intimately tied to one another. 
Therefore, we adopt the approach of Mantel et al (2006), that an integration of decision 
making behavior literature within the field of supply chain management can contribute 
to closing the gap in understanding collaboration decisions, because the behavioral 
decision making literature provides an opportunity to understand the human aspects of 
the decision making process. This is in line with Van Aken (1994)  who states that the 
use of theories from a different domain can help to put a research topic in another light. 
The results of the three different streams are combined into a conceptual model. This 
conceptual model is used to draft hypotheses for the empirical part of the research 
project. 
For the empirical testing of the hypotheses a stated preference (SP) experiment is used. 
SP techniques are a family of market research tools that enable the analysis of the deci-
sion behavior of individual respondents, by proposing (hypothetical) alternatives (Ben-| 23
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Akiva et al., 1994; Faivre d’Arcier et al. 1998). SP uses carefully constructed interviews 
or questionnaires, in which respondents are asked to make choices between alternatives 
product descriptions, so to reveal how respondents value different attributes. SP results 
can be used to determine and quantify the relative importance of attributes that are of 
interest to the researcher. The SP method is selected as an appropriate research method 
for this project for several reasons. In stated preference (SP) analysis researchers ask re-
spondents what they would do if they faced a specific situation; SP research analyzes hy-
pothetical behaviour. Alternatively, observations of respondent behavior, revealed pref-
erence (RP) research, could be used to answer the research question. However, such a 
direct approach has some disadvantages. Validity issues arise in such a direct approach, 
because the researcher cannot be sure whether the respondent incorporates additional 
variables in his evaluation (Futures Group, 1994). Moreover, in general, RP research re-
quires larger sample sizes in order to develop efficient statistical models as with SP. 
Each SP interview produces multiple observations per individual, because a respondent 
is asked to consider a number of situations3. Conversely, RP data most frequently only 
result in a single observation per individual. Additionally, SP enables a researcher to bet-
ter control the choices offered to a respondent. Thus, the effects of variables of interest 
can be isolated from those of other factors, and SP techniques can ensure that data is of 
sufficient quality to construct adequate statistical models (Pearmain et al., 1991). Finally, 
when selecting an appropriate method for this analysis of shippers’ choice behavior, it 
needs to be taken into consideration that logistics collaboration decisions and accom-
panying thresholds have a random aspect: not all individuals have the same preferences 
under comparable conditions. Therefore, for the empirical validation of our hypotheses 
we need an analytical approach that supports this random aspect of decision making. 
The stated preference method that uses a random utility framework meets this crite-
rion. The random element of the utility function implies that the utility is related to the 
probability of an individual making a certain choice than directly to the decision itself. 
Pearmain et al. (1991) state that this is a more plausible approach to modeling choice 
behavior than the simple assumption of complete consistency in the way individuals 
express their preferences, as used in models without random utility. 
The data for the SP experiment are only collected at the shippers’ side, because the ship-
per is the purchasing and thus leading actor in a collaboration decision between shipper 
and LSP. All data are collected in the chemical industry. The chemical sector is selected 
for four reasons. First, to reach our final research objective it is important to select a 
sector that is not characterized by opportunistic choice behavior, but by well-considered 
3  It is important to distinguish two types of variation in observations collected in a SP experiment: variation 
that occurs between individuals and variation within each interview. This issue is discussed in section 8.1.3.24 |
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decision behavior. The chemical sector with its stable and conservative character meets 
this criterion (Connekt, 2003). Besides, the chemical sector has a broad experience in 
logistics outsourcing and thus enough experienced respondents are available from a 
relatively homogenous sample. Third, although the chemical industry has broad experi-
ence in outsourcing logistics; the outsourced services often have an operational and 
transactional character. Stronger relationships need to be established with LSPs to find 
truly innovative and competitive supply chain solutions. Line organizations in the chemi-
cal industry have identified more intensive supply chain collaboration between shippers 
and logistics service providers as one of the critical drivers for long term competitiveness 
of the industry (McKinnon, 2004; Roller et al, 2004).  Finally, the chemical sector is a key 
contributor to the European economy (Cefic, 2007). 
Although widely used in transport and marketing, applying SP research to freight trans-
port is still fraught with difficulties (Danielis et al., 2005). Also Bergkvist (2001) and Tsai 
et al. (2007) concur that defining and evaluating choice behavior is still in its infancy, 
compared to passenger transport. To overcome this difficulty, we follow the design rules 
defined by Sheldon (2007) and Pearmain et al. (1991) who recommend designing the 
experiment based on prior qualitative research like literature and case studies. As a re-
sult, prior to our stated preference experiment a sector study and some case studies are 
conducted. This sector study involves the chemical sector and logistics service providers 
industry. The sector study is based on literature review and four explorative interviews 
with sector representatives. Details about these four interviews can be found in appen-
dix A. The sector study is followed by seven case studies. These case studies are used to 
validate some of our theoretical findings and as a result create in-depth understanding 
of logistics collaboration and outsourcing decisions based on practitioners’ knowledge. 
The case study method is selected based on three conditions identified by Yin (1994). 
First, this empirical phase has an exploratory character. Second, the researcher has no 
control of the behavioral events as objects of research are in a real life environment. 
Finally, the research focuses on a contemporary event and situation. Also Eisenhardt 
(1989) selects the case study as the most preferred method for research with an explor-
atory character; a case study strategy provides the opportunity to gather a lot of data on 
a small number of study objects which in turn makes it possible to receive detailed de-
scriptions of complex research subjects. Moreover, Dubois and Araujo (2004) argue that 
case studies are very suitable for studies in which interactions and relationships form 
the basic units of analysis. The case study approach enables the researcher to capture 
potentially crucial contextual information and facilitates a deeper understanding of re-
lationships. Relationships are characterized by interaction between at least two parties. 
Therefore not only the shipper but also the service providers’ perspective is incorporated | 25
Introduction
in the case studies. All data at the shippers’ side are collected in the chemical industry to 
support the in-depth character of this study. 
1.6   Outline of the thesis 
The remainder of this thesis consists of three parts. Part I describes the results of the 
literature review. In three different chapters the logistics outsourcing, collaboration and 
behavioral decision making literature are reviewed. Chapter 5 concludes part I. In this 
chapter, a cross-section of the theoretical findings and the hypotheses resulting from the 
theoretical findings are presented. 
Part II describes the empirical research part and consists of three chapters. Chapter 6 
shortly introduces the two sectors that are involved in our study: the chemical sector 
and logistics service providers industry. Afterwards, chapter 7 describes the results of 
the case studies. As discussed in the previous section, these cases are used to validate 
some of the theoretical findings. The results of the case studies create the base to design 
a reliable stated preference experiment that is used to test the hypotheses. Chapter 8 
explains the setup and the results of this stated preference experiment. In this chapter, 
the hypotheses as presented in chapter 5 are tested.
Finally, conclusions are formulated in part III. Chapter 9 describes the conclusions of 
this research project and concludes with recommendations for future research. Figure 
2 depicts the outline of the thesis. The numbers in the figure correspond with the nine 
chapters of this thesis.26 |
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Figure 2: Outline thesis| 27
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2.   Logistics outsourcing
This chapter describes the first of the three literature streams that are reviewed in this 
research. As a result, the phenomenon of logistics outsourcing is discussed. Traditionally, 
most firms are organized and viewed as independent and single entities that need to 
compete with others to survive. Nowadays, business processes become more special-
ized and an increasing part of the value adding activities is placed outside the physical 
boundaries of a firm. As explained in the first chapter, logistics is one of the activities 
that are increasingly outsourced to specialized providers. The first chapter starts with de-
fining logistics outsourcing. Afterwards, the link between outsourcing decisions and the 
overall business strategy is explained. The second section describes drivers and impedi-
ments of logistics outsourcing. Subsequently, the sourcing process for logistics services 
is discussed. Finally, the chapter concludes with summarizing the main findings. 
2.1   Logistics strategy
When a particular firm identifies a need for a specific product or service, the first process 
step is to decide whether to make the product or perform the service internally (make), 
or to purchase the requirement from an external source (buy). The classic make-versus-
buy decision has been a historical debate centered on the economic trade-offs associ-
ated with each option (Bowersox and Closs, 1996; Ford et al, 1998). More recently, 
attention has expanded to the analysis of the strategic trade-offs. This expanded focus 
requires that outsourcing decisions examine not only which firm has the lowest total 
cost, but also which one can deliver a superior service. Both questions must be answered 
from a long-term perspective (Skjott-Larsen, 2000; Hakansson and Ford, 2002; Momme 
and Hvolby, 2002). 
Logistics is one of the activities increasingly sourced from external providers (Canete, 
2005; Jafaar and Rafiq, 2005; Razzaque and Sheng, 1998). In recent years, outsourcing 
logistics activities has received considerable attention in academic literature. Various 
terms have been introduced to describe this phenomenon; they generally mean the 
same thing (Van Laarhoven et al., 2000). Table 1 presents an overview of the different 
terminology used. 30 |
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Terminology used Source
Third-party logistics Lieb, 1992; Virum, 1993; Lieb and Randall, 1996; Skjott-Larsen, 
1995; Langley et al, 1997; Murphy and Poist, 1998; Beglund et al, 
1999; Skjott-Larsen, 2000; Sohail and Sohal, 2003; Selviaridis and 
Spring, 2007.
Contract logistics Kearney, 1995
Logistics alliances Bowersox, 1990; Van Laarhoven and Sharman, 1994; Andersson 
1995; Bagchi and Virum, 1996 
Logistics partnerships La Londe and Cooper, 1989; Andersson, 1997
Operational alliances in 
logistics
Van Laarhoven and Sharman, 1994
Contract distribution Wilson and Fathers, 1989; Cooper and Johnstone, 1990
Outsourcing Razzaque and Sheng, 1998; Rabinovich et al, 1999; Van Laarhoven 
et al, 2000; Stefansson, 2004; Wilding and Juriado, 2004; Groot-
hedde, 2005; Canete, 2005: Isiklar et al, 2007; Hsiao, 2009
Table 1: Terminology used to describe logistics outsourcing phenomenon(adapted from Van Laar-
hoven et al., 2000)
We continue to use the term outsourcing, and follow Razzaque and Sheng (1998) to 
define logistics outsourcing as the provision of single or multiple logistics services by a 
vendor on a contractual basis. 
From a business perspective, logistics outsourcing is never a goal to be reached; it is 
only a means to an end. The business strategy is at the top of the decision-hierarchy. 
This overall business strategy can be seen as a choice of products, markets and required 
service levels (Copacino and Rosenfield, 1987). These choices result in a corresponding 
logistics strategy and decisions (Groothedde, 2005). Outsourcing can be one of the pos-
sible decisions to achieve the company’s overall objectives.
A common way to cluster the logistics decisions that need to be made to define the lo-
gistics strategy, is to position the choices within a hierarchical model, because the choice 
of a strategy leads to decisions of a more tactical and operational nature that flash out 
the strategic concepts and guide the activity of the firm on a month-to-month and day-
to-day basis (Lalonde and Masters, 1994). 
Copacino and Rosenfield (1987) present such a hierarchical model and divide the logis-
tics decisions into four hierarchical levels: 
•  Long term distribution and production patterns: plant and warehouse choices, cus-
tomer assignment and product assignment to facilities.
•  Deployment of inventories within a network: locating and controlling the inventories.
•  Aggregate planning for the intermediate term: manufacturing and distribution plans 
for a relatively short term horizon of 6 to 12 months| 31
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•  Plant operations: specific manufacturing and distribution plans including workforce 
planning, scheduling of workers and routing for each operational period are defined.
Ruijgrok (2001) presents a similar hierarchy using slightly different wording and adds a 
time horizon to each of the hierarchical levels:
•  The structure of the logistics network: decisions concern the number, size and loca-
tions of the fixed assets in a logistics network and the assignment of customers and 
production to these facilities. These decisions have a strategic character and a rela-
tively long planning horizon of 2-5 years.
•  Alignment of the logistics network: the alignment of the network prescribes material 
flow management policies including production levels at plant level, assembly policy 
and inventory sizes. These decisions have a mid-range horizon of 6 - 24 months.
•  Scheduling the logistics network. Decisions are made on frequency of delivery, lead 
times, shipment sizes and transportation mode. Time horizon is 3 - 30 days.
•  Resource management: decisions about the resources and the efficient and effective 
deployment of these resources are made. In fact, it concerns the operational decision 
to guide the daily operation like order handling and vehicle routing decisions. Time 
horizon differs from 2 to 48 hours.
An alternative hierarchical model is presented by Christopher (1998). Also this model 
consists of four levels, but the top level is linked to the customer service requirements. 
In his model these requirements set the standard for the other logistics decisions. The 
second level in the hierarchy concerns structural choices regarding channel design and 
network strategy. The third level concerns functional decisions about warehouse opera-
tions, transportation management and materials management. At the bottom there is 
the implementation level that contains choices such as policies and procedures and 
information management. 
Moreover,  several  authors  have  presented  hierarchical  models  of  logistics  decisions 
which are based on the classical three decision levels as defined by Anthony (1965): stra-
tegic, tactical and operational decisions. Muckstadt et al. (2001), Pel and Sirisoponsilp 
(1988) and Van Goor et al. (1996) have classified the different logistics decisions in the 
same way. 
While the described logistics decisions models focus on the design of the physical lo-
gistics network, the hierarchy presented by Christiaanse and Kumar (2001) stretch the 
supply chain dimension of logistics decisions. According to these two authors the logis-
tics decision hierarchy starts with the choice of actors. The process consists of selecting 
possible actors like suppliers, contract manufacturers and logistics service providers. At 
a second level the governance structure is defined. The governance structure plays a 32 |
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key role in designing the logistics network, because it deals with decisions on core com-
petences and the extent where in activities are outsourced. Afterwards, a sequence of 
manufacturing and logistics processes need to be defined to deliver a product to fulfill 
customer demand. This step includes selection of the type of processes and resources 
that are required to bring the product to the market. The lowest level in this model is 
supply chain coordination. This deals with the management of the activities of the dif-
ferent actors in a supply chain.
Verduijn (2004) compares the different classifications presented above and concludes 
that it remains disputable what level of decision making a particular decision should be 
allocated. As an example he shows that Van Goor et al. (1996) assign facility location to 
the tactical level, while Perl and Sirisoponsilp (1988) classify this as a strategic choice. 
Nevertheless, we conclude that each of the classifications is useful to show the wide 
range of decisions that need to be made by organizations concerning their logistics 
strategy and that these decisions differ in terms of scope, frequency and time horizon. 
Figure 3 shows the link between the overall business strategy and the logistics strategy 
as well as the different aspects of a logistics strategy (Groothedde, 2005). As depicted 
in this figure, the process for developing a logistics strategy starts with an understand-
ing of the corporate business strategy. As a next step this business strategy is translated 
into customer service requirements. Afterwards the logistics strategy is defined. This 
requires decisions on different aspects of logistics like network structure, inventory poli-
cies, material handling and order processing. Once a logistics strategy is defined and 
implemented, control activities over the flow of goods and information through a logis-
tics network are required.  | 33
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Figure 3: Business and Logistics Strategy (Groothedde, 2005)
Outsourced logistics services differ in complexity. Literature contains several classifica-
tions to distinguish between different types of logistics services. Table 2 provides an 
overview  of  these  classifications.  The  classifications  presented  in  this  table  differ  in 
names and number of levels used to distinguish between different logistics services out-
sourced, but they have the same objective: to explain that not all logistics services out-
sourced have the same level of complexity. In this dissertation, we will follow Andersson 
and Norrman (2002) and distinguish two types of logistics services: basic and advanced. 
This classification is chosen, because Andersson and Norrmann (2002) not only mention 
that logistics services outsourced differ in complexity, but they also explain criteria that 
drive the degree of complexity. These criteria are factors such as the number of services 
bought at the same time (single or multiple), whether focus is on execution of the activi-
ties or also on management of these activities, and whether the outsourced service is 
pre-defined or development and re-engineering are parts of the scope.34 |
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Year Author(s) Levels Description
1990 Bowersox 2 Distinguish between single transactions and 
integrated service contracts
1994 Van Laarhoven and Sharman 2 Classification in basic and integrated services
1995 Bagchi and Skjott-Larsen 2 Distinguish in early and advanced stage of 
maturity in logistics outsourcing
1998 Razzaque and Sheng 2 Distinguish between traditional logistics ser-
vices and contract logistics
1999 Berglund, Van Laarhoven and 
Sharman 
2 Categorization in logistics services and logis-
tics solutions
2002 Andersson and Normann 2 Distinguish basic and advanced logistics 
services
2002 Delfmann, Albers and Geh-
ring
2 Categorize logistics service in direct or indirect 
services  related to the physical flow of prod-
ucts
2002 Gunasekaran 5 Classification based on service level character-
istics (1PL till 5PL)
2003 Hertz and Alfredsson 3 Classification based on service level character-
istics (1PL till 3PL)
2004 Halldorsson and Skjott-Larsen 3 Categorize logistics services based on compe-
tencies
Table 2: Classifications of logistics services, adapted from Zeegers (2007).
2.2   Drivers and impediments of logistics outsourcing
2.2.1   Drivers of logistics outsourcing
Drivers of logistics outsourcing are widely discussed in academic literature. Some ex-
amples are Bask, 2001; Power et al., 2006; Sink and Langley, 1997; Van Damme and 
Ploos van Amstel, 1996. In their contribution, Wilding and Juriado (2004) compare find-
ings of five previous empirical studies. We extend their results by two additional cases 
(Lieb and Randhall, 1996; Wilding and Juriado, 2004). The results are shown in table 3. 
Since different studies use different wording to refer to generically same or similar rea-
sons, the first column is indicating the type of reason in general terms. Columns two till 
seven indicate the ranking of each reason in the particular study. For each of the studies, 
ranking 1 before a reason means that the largest share of companies surveyed claimed 
a particular reason to be their primary motivator for outsourcing logistics activities. In 
the last right-hand column an overall ranking is calculated. This overall ranking shows in 
how many studies a specific reason for outsourcing is identified. The table shows that 
cost reduction is the reason most often mentioned for logistics outsourcing. This reason 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































and Juriado only talk about cost reduction in general as a driver for logistics outsourcing. 
Andersson (1995) and Van Laarhoven et al. (2000) give a more detailed description of 
cost related motives for logistics outsourcing. They explain that these motives are not 
only related to absolute cost reductions, but also turning fixed logistics costs (partly) 
into variable and finance some logistics activities off-balance by avoiding investments in 
logistics assets. 
2.2.2   Impediments of logistics outsourcing 
Just like there are many reasons for logistics outsourcing, there are many others that 
discourage its use. Loss of control and increased dependency appear to be the most 
commonly cited concern that inhibits firms from outsourcing logistics activities (Lieb and 
Randhall, 1996; Razzaque and Sheng, 1998, Van Laarhoven et al, 2000, Canete, 2005; 
Selviaridis and Spring, 2007). Loss of control refers to losing control in production, in-
ventory management, important information or customer service. Besides losing control 
and increased dependency of third parties, concerns about the true costs and uncertain-
ty about service level offered by the service provider are often cited as concerns regard-
ing outsourcing logistics (Lieb and Randhall, 1996; Canete, 2005). Other concerns that 
have been mentioned in literature are: evaluation and monitoring problems, lack of trust 
in business partner, lack of (top) management support, clashing firm cultures, switching 
costs and sunk costs (Ellram and Cooper, 1990; Aertsen, 1995). Sunk costs refer to earlier 
investments. Investments in for example a warehouse management system have large 
setup costs. These costs are normally spread over the whole operating life-time of the 
system. Outsourcing the warehouse operation before end-of-life to an external service 
provider makes the system useless. The remaining investments are marked as sunk costs. 
These costs can be a reason to keep certain logistics services in-house.
2.3   Purchasing logistics services
2.3.1   Purchasing process
A standard purchasing process consists of six steps (Van Weele, 2005). The first step in 
the process is determining specifications. Then the partner is selected and contracted. 
During the contract period, goods or services are ordered from the supplier, and sub-
sequently these orders are monitored and controlled. The final step in the process is 
evaluation of the supplier and accompanying contract. Although the purchasing pro-
cess is described sequentially, no linear path should be assumed. In some processes a 
phase may be omitted entirely, and interruptions and recycling throughout the stages | 37
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are common. The time and effort involved in each step may vary depending on both an 
organization’s previous experience, and the kind of products purchased. 
There is no difference between outsourcing logistical functions and any other purchas-
ing process (Bradley, 1994). Bradley asserts that like a reliable supplier of materials and 
parts, contract logisticians should also provide a high level of customer satisfaction so 
that their clients can become a tougher competitor. Several authors have defined pro-
cesses to purchase logistics services (Andersson and Norman, 2002; Bagchi & Virum, 
1998; Lambert and Stock, 1993; Menon et al., 1998; Sink and Langley, 1997; Skjott-Lars-
sen, 1995). Although these authors use different names to explain the different phases 
in a purchasing process for logistics services, the processes all distinguish the same basic 
phases as identified in the standard purchasing process explained at the beginning of 
this section. 
2.3.2   Positioning logistics services
The Kraljic matrix has become the standard in the field of purchasing portfolio models to 
determine a comprehensive strategy for supply (Gelderman, 2003). Kraljic’s approach in-
cludes the construction of a portfolio matrix that classifies products on the basis of two 
dimensions: profit impact and supply risk. Each variable has two possible values: ‘’low” 
or “high”. The result is a 2x2 matrix and a classification in four categories: bottleneck, 
non-critical, leverage and strategic items. Each of the four categories requires a distinc-
tive approach towards suppliers. This is illustrated in figure 4.
Figure 4: Kraljic’s purchasing portfolio (Kraljic, 1983)38 |
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In contrast with a growing acceptance and use of Kraljic’s purchasing portfolio, there 
are some problems and unanswered questions (Gelderman and Van Weele, 2003). The 
authors explain that one of the main problems identified, is the choice of dimensions 
and accompanying values. What is exactly meant by “profit impact” and “supply risk”? 
How could or should the dimensions be measured in practice? The theory does not 
provide prescriptions or procedures for this. Furthermore, Gelderman and Van Weele 
(2003) notice that the critique of Kraljic, however, does not include the experience of 
practitioners. As a result, they study how practitioners handle the identified measure-
ment issues and conclude that there is no simple, objective or standardized blue print 
for the application of the Kraljic matrix. This conclusion is in line with De Boer (1998) 
who suggests that organizations should use a fully customized approach by determining 
their own criteria and their own specific threshold values. 
Gelderman and Van Weele (2003) show that experienced practitioners have found ef-
fective approaches to handle the measurement problems. Organizations translate the 
original two dimensions, profit impact and supply risk, into dimensions that can be put 
into practice more easily. Profit impact is for example replaced by value of purchased 
items or strategic importance of the sourced items. Supply risk is put into practice by the 
number of alternative suppliers available or the level of dependency in the relationship. 
This is in line with the interpretation of the dimensions as proposed by Vermunt  (2008). 
He translates the profit impact axis into strategic importance of the sourced items (core 
or non-core related items). The strategic importance of non-core items is relatively low 
and the importance of core items is relatively high. The supply risk axis is translated into 
dominance in the relationship between buyer and supplier. In case the dominance level 
of the supplier is relatively low, the supply risk will be low. On the other hand, if the sup-
plier has a dominant position in the relationship, the buyer is dependent and as a result 
the supply risk is relatively high. 
Using  Kraljic’s  purchasing  portfolio  to  position  logistics  services,  some  decades  ago 
these were positioned between leverage and non-critical items (Andersson and Nor-
rman, 2002). The position on the “strategic importance axis” was based on the fact 
that, although logistics is a big cost element and an important service element in many 
organizations, it was normally not the major competitive advantage or cost element. 
When analyzing the “dominance in the relationship axis” this was often quite low as the 
buyer has a strong negotiating position and there are a large number of providers in the 
market. Nevertheless, nowadays, the position of logistics services in the Kraljic’s matrix 
is more differentiated for a number of reasons. 
First, the technological innovation has increased the system integration between shippers 
and logistics service providers. As a result, web-based freight exchange has emerged (An-| 39
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dersson and Norrman, 2002). This development drives the position of basic logistics ser-
vices, especially transportation, downwards in the Kraljic’s portfolio to non-critical items. 
At the same time, the complexity of logistics outsourcing increases. Literature review 
makes clear that the bulk logistics services outsourced are still basic logistics services in 
the areas of transportation and warehousing (Lieb and Bentz, 2005; Lieb and Randall, 
1996, Selviaridis and Spring, 2007; Capgemini, 2007). Nevertheless, an altering busi-
ness environment forces companies to find new ways of working together in the supply 
chain to gain and maintain competitive advantage. This also results in new demands on 
logistics. Logistics services are increasingly outsourced in a package of multiple services 
(Van Laarhoven et al., 2000; Andersson, 1997; Sink and Langley, 1997; Berglund, 2000). 
At the same time more different activities like value adding services and IT services are in-
cluded in this package of services (Andersson and Norrman, 2002). Furthermore the level 
of responsibilities shifted to service providers is changing. The responsibilities handed 
over nowadays are not limited to an operational level, but can also have a tactical or 
even strategic character (Capgemini, 2007; Hertz and Alfredsson, 2003; Razzaque and 
Sheng, 1998). For example, a LSP gets the responsibility for supply chain orchestration 
activities. As an overall result it may be concluded that the complexity of logistics ser-
vices purchased is increasing.
Third, logistics services purchased some years ago were usually quite easy to specify, but 
the recent developments make some of the logistics services more complex and conse-
quently the specification of these services more difficult (Sink and Langley, 1997; Ander-
sson and Norrman, 2002). The development of a scope of work that meets the firm’s 
needs is crucial to the success of purchasing logistics services (Menon et al., 1998; Bag-
chi and Virum, 1998). The difficulty of service specification is also identified by various 
authors in the general purchasing literature, because of the differences between goods 
and services. In comparison to goods services are: intangible, heterogeneous (not stan-
dardized), inseparable (difficult to separate production of the service from consump-
tion), and perishable (not possible to stock) (Andersson and Norrman, 2002; Axelsson 
and Wijnstra, 2002; Ellram et al. 2004; Grönroos, 2000; Lovelock, 2001; Zeithaml et al. 
1985, Van der Valk, 2007).  Because of these characteristics, the purchase of services 
is perceived to be essentially different from the purchase of goods (Fitzsimmons et al. 
1998; Jackson et al., 1995; Smeltzer and Ogden, 2002; Stock and Zinszer, 1987). Axels-
son and Wynstra (2002) argue that some aspects are not only different, but also become 
more difficult or more important when purchasing services instead of goods. Van der 
Valk et al. (2005) found that purchasers feel that the developing specifications for ser-
vices is more difficult than for goods and that it is more difficult to evaluate the perfor-
mance of providers of services than of suppliers of goods. The last identified problem is 
a logical result of the first mentioned problem. This is in line with Smeltzer and Ogden 40 |
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(2002) who state that the complexity of the purchasing process for services depends pri-
marily on the clarity and preciseness of the specification. It will become more difficult to 
determine the desired service level and the specific content of a service level agreement 
(SLA) when clear specifications are missing. Furthermore, when a proper specification 
and SLA are lacking the buying company (nor the supplier) will know what needs to be 
measured. Therefore it may be argued that the success of purchasing services is primarily 
determined during the first stage of the purchasing process: specification definition. This 
specification is not a simple job. Jackson et al. (1995) find that buyers experience that it 
is more difficult to develop specifications for services than for goods. To overcome these 
difficulties and to improve service specifications Van der Valk and Rozemeijer (2009) 
propose to emphasize on the aspect of service specifications during the first stages of a 
purchasing process. They suggest incorporating two additional steps at the beginning 
of the process. These additional steps are added after the first step (define specification) 
and are called request for information (RFI) and detailed specification. The RFI is not only 
used to pre-select some suppliers, but also to get service providers involved in the pro-
cess. The detailed specification phase is focused on detailing the specification process by 
using the information received from the suppliers. Earlier supplier involvement will help 
to fully benefit from the specific expertise and knowledge of these providers. 
Nevertheless,  the  success  of  supply  chain  collaboration  will  depend  on  companies’ 
willingness to nurture their relationships, share information, explore opportunities for 
further collaboration and not revert to traditional “arm’s length purchasing methods” 
(Laarhoven and Sharman, 1994). 
Summarized, it may be concluded that nowadays the position of logistics services in 
Kraljic’s portfolio is more differentiated than some decades ago (Andersson and Nor-
rman, 2002). Some logistics services became more complex and moved up to the upper 
segments of Kraljic’s portfolio. At the same time, other services moved downward to 
lower segments of the portfolio. Two recent case studies by Zeegers (2007) confirm this 
statement. Figure 5 presents the position of different outsourced logistics services with-
in the Kraljic matrix as positioned by a chemical company located in the Netherlands. 
Next to this, for each quadrant the corresponding purchasing strategy is depicted.  It 
needs to be noticed that figure 5 is just an example; the exact position o the different 
logistics services within the portfolio will depend on the specific situation of a company 
and thus can vary from company by company.  | 41
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Figure 5: Position of Logistics Services within Kraljic Matrix (adapted from Zeegers, 2007).
Traditionally, purchasers of logistics services often use a transaction-oriented approach 
to guide the purchasing process (Andersson and Norrman, 2002; Van Laarhoven and 
Sharman, 1994). This approach is characterized by among others the following key-
words: several suppliers, exploit potential of competition, short term, arm’s length, 
avoid coming too close, and price orientation (Axelsson and Wynstra, 2002). The au-
thors explain that buyers who use a transaction-oriented approach are not focused on 
collaboration with suppliers, but on further strengthening of the buyer’s position versus 
the providers. Suppliers are subsequently not or nearly not actively involved in the pro-
curement process, and buyers do not make an appeal to the suppliers’ expertise in this 
process. The purchasing decision is mainly based on price. Previous research on criteria 
considered in selecting a logistics service provider stretches the transaction-oriented ap-
proach. The contributions show that costs in terms of price together with service are 
the most important criteria and that costs is often also the first mentioned selection 
criterion by shippers (Bradley, 1994; Lynch, 2004; Van Hoek, 2000; Van Laarhoven and 
Sharman, 1994, Van Laarhoven et al. 2000). Other criteria that are mentioned are capa-
bilities of the LSP4, financial position of the LSP, cultural and strategic fit. Next to this, 
previous research confirms that buyers try to exploit their power position in a purchas-
4  Possible capabilities are specialized knowledge of the LSP and range of services offered by the LSP.42 |
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ing process for logistics services, because of their dominant position in such a process 
(Van Laarhoven and Sharman, 1984; Laarhoven et al. 2000). Nevertheless, different posi-
tions in Kraljic’s portfolio require different sourcing strategies and different sourcing ap-
proaches. As a result, for more advanced logistics services a more relation-oriented pur-
chasing approach is recommended instead of the traditionally used transaction-oriented 
approach. This relation-oriented approach supports a higher degree of communication 
and interaction between buyer and supplier and is characterized by: one or few alterna-
tives, a deal is part of a relationship, exploit potential of cooperation, early involvement 
of suppliers, long term, total cost and value orientation (Axelsson and Wynstra, 2002). 
Besides, it may be argued that general problems for buying business services, as de-
scribed above, are increasingly applicable for logistics services as well. In line with ob-
servations in that section, spending more time and effort on the specification of the 
services in collaboration with the service providers, could help purchasers to overcome 
the identified problems. Earlier and a higher level of supplier involvement make it pos-
sible to benefit from the expertise and possibilities of logistics service providers. 
Nevertheless, less empirical evidence is available about whether shippers also actually 
have a different purchasing approach for advanced logistics services. Furthermore, the 
idea of extending the purchasing process as proposed by Van der Valk and Rozemeijer 
(2009) is drawn on literature review and preliminary empirical research, but it is still 
conceptual in nature. Therefore also these ideas need further empirical validation. This 
is supported by Selviaridis and Spring (2007), who propose to focus further empirical 
research on the process of service definition in purchasing logistics services.
2.4   Concluding remarks
In this chapter logistics outsourcing is defined and introduced by reviewing current lit-
erature on this topic. This review makes clear that logistics outsourcing is one of the 
possible decisions to reach the overall business strategy. This business strategy is leading 
in defining the logistics strategy. The different levels of decisions taken to design, imple-
ment and execute a logistics strategy are widely discussed in the literature. Several au-
thors have defined models to explain the hierarchical levels in logistics decisions. These 
models do not categorize the same type of logistics decision at the same hierarchical 
level. Consequently, the exact position of each decision in the hierarchy is arbitrary, but 
each model is useful to show the wide range of logistics decisions and to show that 
these decisions differ in terms of scope, frequency and time horizon.
Literature provides more than a few classifications to explain logistics services outsourced 
differ in complexity from basic logistics services, with a transactional and repetitive char-| 43
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acter, towards advanced logistics services which are focused on integration, value add-
ing and management. Traditionally, the bulk of outsourced logistics services concerns 
single, basic services. A transaction-oriented approach with service and costs in terms of 
price as the dominating decision criteria is typically used for the purchasing process of 
these services. Nevertheless, nowadays, the range of logistics services purchased is more 
diverse. Literature identified three reasons for this: current business trends, increased 
complexity of logistics outsourcing and service specification difficulties. As a result, the 
position of logistics services in the Kraljic’s matrix is more spread than some decades 
ago. Subsequently, the purchasing process and approach should be more differentiated, 
because the traditionally followed sourcing strategy is not mostly preferred for all types 
of logistics services. More advanced logistics services require a sourcing strategy with 
a relation-oriented purchasing approach. Specification difficulties could be decreased 
by focusing on the specification process at the beginning of a purchasing process, and 
by earlier involving the service provider in the process. However, there is less empirical 
evidence available about whether the shippers actually have adapted their sourcing ap-
proach to the changed situation. Therefore further empirical validation is needed. 44 || 45
3.   Collaboration 
This third chapter describes the findings of the second literature stream that is reviewed: 
collaboration. In the previous chapter, we discussed logistics outsourcing. Logistics out-
sourcing results in a collaborative relationship between shipper and logistics service 
provider. The topic collaboration has received considerable attention across different ac-
ademic disciplines including sociology, psychology, marketing and supply chain manage-
ment (Min et al, 2005).  Recently, Van de Vijver (2009) published an extensive overview 
of contributions on creating and managing collaborative relationships in marketing, op-
erations management and strategic management literature. This chapter discusses col-
laboration in the context of supply chain management. Nevertheless, also in the context 
of supply chain management, collaboration has taken several interpretations with focus 
on different aspects of collaboration: building sales, sharing goals, jointly searching for 
solutions, joint ownership and long-term character (Groothedde, 2005). Taking these 
elements into account, we follow Schrage (1990) to define collaboration as follows: an 
affective, voluntary, mutually shared process where two or more actors work together, 
have a mutual understanding, a common vision, share resources and achieve common 
goals. Key dimensions are the cross organizational scope, the commitment to working 
together, trust and a common bond or goal.
This chapter describes different aspects of collaboration from a theoretical perspective. 
The chapter is structured as follows. The first subsection discusses different types of 
supply chain collaboration. Subsequently, factors possibly influencing a collaboration 
decision are identified. The third section describes drivers and impediments of collabora-
tion. Finally, the chapter concludes with summarizing the main findings of this chapter. 
3.1   Classifications of supply chain collaboration
3.1.1   Level of integration
Supply chain collaboration results in inter-organizational relationships. The scope of ac-
tivities organizations actually perform together in such a relationship depends on the 
level of integration. Several authors have defined classifications to express to what ex-
tent organizations are integrated. A number of these classifications are presented in 
table 4. The table shows that criteria and terminology used to classify different levels of 46 |
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collaboration differ but that the distinguished levels of supply chain collaboration are 
comparable. 
Authors Levels of 
collabo- 
ration
Evaluation criteria to define 
level of collaboration




4 •  N.A. •  Physical integration
•  Information integration
•  Coordination integration
•  Supply Chain design 
coordination
Lambert et al. 
(1996)
3 •  Duration
•  Scope
•  Closeness
•  Operational partnership
•  Coordination partnership




4 •  Scope
•  Intensity
•  Limited cooperation
•  Focused cooperation
•  Extensive cooperation
•  Integrated cooperation
Spekman et al. 
(1998)
4 •  Strategic importance
•  Complexity




Muckstadt et al. 
(2001)
4 •  Business process integration
•  Information system 
integration





Vos et al. (2003) 3 •  Scope
•  Objective
•  Horizon
•  Operational synergy
•  Coordination synergy
•  Strategic synergy
Gulati and 
Kletter (2005)5
4 •  Trust
•  Responsibilities
•  Commitment
•  Arm’s length
•  Bundling
•  Integration
•  Strategic partnering
Table 4: Classifications of levels of supply chain collaboration
5
Last decades organizations increasingly outsource portions of their activities to other 
organizations. This had led to an explosion of supply chain collaboration and nowadays 
most organizations have a network of relationships (De Man, 2004). Therefore, different 
authors argue that not supply chains but networks compete since there are usually mul-
5  Supply chain collaboration is only one of the elements discussed by Gulati and Kletter (2005). In their paper, 
they also discuss different levels of alliances and intra-organizational collaboration.| 47
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tiple suppliers and suppliers to suppliers as well as multiple customers and customers’ 
customers to be included in the total system (Christopher, 2005; Hagdorn, 2007; Pfohl 
and Buse, 2000). Two of the classifications mentioned in table 4 explicitly focus on col-
laboration in networks instead of chains: Vos et al. (2003) and Gulati and Kletter (2005). 
The classifications presented in table 4 assume an evolutionary pattern in the levels of 
supply chain collaboration. Moving from a transactional relationship to a strategic part-
nership is described as a stage-wise development which requires energy from inside and 
outside the organization. The evolutionary character is well illustrated by the synergy 
typology as defined by Vos et al. (2003). Figure 6 depicts this classification and shows 
explicitly that the three types of synergy need to be viewed as an intensity trilogy. In this 
trilogy strategic synergy is defined as the most intensive type of collaboration. Strategic 
collaboration incorporates operational as well as coordination collaboration, and coor-
dination collaboration incorporates operational collaboration. At the other side, there 
are also sources in literature that have proved that the assumed stage-wise development 
process is not always followed in practice, but replaced by a more revolutionary path 
(Jap and Anderson, 2007). As a result, relationships bypass some levels of collaboration 
in their development. 
Figure 6: Synergy typology (Vos et al, 2003)48 |
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The classification identified by Gulati and Kletter (2005) is the only classification in table 
4 that not only links the different levels of collaborative relationships to the activities 
and responsibilities that are handed over to the partner, but also to the “soft” side of 
collaboration. They explicitly define trust and commitment as two criteria that determine 
the level of supply chain collaboration and explain that the development of the levels 
of trust and commitment is needed to successfully move one step on the relationship 
ladder. The most basic form of collaboration on the relationship ladder of Gulati and 
Kletter (2005) is called ‘arm’s length’. This refers to a relationship in which the company 
purchases each product or service as an isolated transaction. Moving one rung up from 
this level, companies work with their suppliers to leverage their operational expertise 
and knowledge. A short term contract is used to formalize the collaboration. This second 
level of collaboration is named bundling. On the third level of the relationship ladder, 
employees from the company and supplier both become integrated in the company’s 
work as part of a team. These activities are often project based and have a midterm 
horizon. This level on the relationship ladder is called integration. At the highest rung, a 
company turns its activities completely over to its supplier. The supplier takes ownership 
of all related decisions and actions. Gulati and Kletter (2005) call this strategic partner-
ing. Strategic partnering has a long term horizon.  The relationship ladder as defined by 
Gulati and Kletter is visible in figure 7. 
Figure 7: Relationship ladder adapted from Gulati and Kletter (2005)
Based on the classifications in table 4 and the accompanying discussion in this section, 
three points may be concluded. First, several classifications are available in literature to 
classify different levels of supply chain collaboration. These classifications show analogy 
in the names used to identify different levels of supply chain collaboration. In general, 
it might be concluded that supply chain collaboration can range from arm’s length re-
lationships to strategic partnerships. Second, collaboration processes exist between two | 49
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actors (bi-lateral) as well as in a network between more than two actors (multi-lateral). 
Finally, a development path is needed to reach a higher level of supply chain collabora-
tion. This development path includes both hard and soft sides of the relationships. This 
path can have an evolutionary or revolutionary character. In the remainder of this the-
sis, we use the relationship ladder as defined by Gulati and Klein (2005) to distinguish 
between different levels of collaboration, because this classification takes into account 
both hard (e.g. activities) and soft (e.g. trust) criteria to determine the level of supply 
chain collaboration. 
3.1.2   Forms of collaboration 
Simatupang and Sridharan (2002) distinguish three types of supply chain collaboration: 
vertical, horizontal and lateral collaboration. They define vertical collaboration as col-
laboration between parties that succeed each other in a particular generation process 
and therefore have different activities. For example collaboration between two or more 
organizations such as a manufacturer, distributor, carrier and retailer. Horizontal coop-
eration is used to refer to concerted practices to share private information, facilities or 
resources to reduce costs or improve service between companies (competing or unre-
lated) operating at the same level(s) in the market. Horizontal collaboration occurs for 
example when two or more unrelated or competing organizations collaborate in a joint 
distribution center. Finally, Simatupang and Sridharan (2002) define lateral cooperation 
as a combination of vertical and horizontal cooperation for example to synchronize 
shippers and LSPs of multiple companies in an effective logistics network. One example 
is the RRP-case (Port of Rotterdam, 2008). RRP stands for Rotterdam-Rijn-Pijplijn. In this 
project five chemical companies (horizontal collaboration) start a joint-venture to build 
and exploit a pipeline between the port of Rotterdam and the Ruhr-area in Germany. 
The pipeline is used to transport crude oil and oil products. Also some logistics service 
providers (vertical collaboration) are involved in the project, because the pipeline is con-
nected to their terminals in the Port of Rotterdam. The chemical companies use these 
terminals to store their products. In total, the pipeline has a length of 219 kilometers 
and at an annual basis 15.7 millions of tonnes crude oil and 7.9 millions of tonnes oil 
products are transported via the RRP-system. The joint-venture functions as a separated 
entity. All the activities to the RRP-pipeline are controlled by this entity in a control centre 
which is located in Venlo, the Netherlands. 50 |
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3.2   Variables influencing collaboration decisions
3.2.1   Organizational theory
Organizational theories are often used to explain collaboration in supply chains. In this 
section organizational theories from three different perspectives are used: (1) an eco-
nomic perspective, represented by the Transaction Cost Economics and the Agency The-
ory; (2) a strategic perspective, illustrated by the Resource Based View and the Resource 
Dependency Theory and (3) a socio-economic perspective represented by the Social Net-
work Perspective. These five theories are selected because they form a natural fit with 
supply chain management; they provide characteristics of designing collaborative rela-
tionships and arguments for selecting types of collaborative relationships (Ketchen and 
Hult, 2007). At the end of this section, the discussed theories are compared. 
Transaction Cost Economics
The Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) builds on Coase (1937), who rationalized the ex-
istence of firms, and specified the conditions of market failure. TCE elaborates Coase’s 
views, focusing on the most efficient governance structure for a given type of trans-
action. The most efficient governance structure means that the total production and 
transaction costs are, in the long run, less than those of any other governance structure. 
TCE can be used to argue for the efficiency motive for entering inter-organizational ar-
rangements. Williamson has presented a framework, based on economics, organization 
theory and contractual law literature, to analyze the costs mentioned above (William-
son, 1975; 1981; 1985). These total costs are determined by three critical dimensions of 
transactions and two assumptions on human behavior. 
The first dimension of transactions is asset specificity what refers to the degree an invest-
ment is specific for a certain relation. This characteristic is identified as the most influen-
tial attribute of the transaction (Williamson, 1991). It refers to the situation where one or 
both parties need to engage in specific investments and develop proprietary know-how 
to make transactions possible. Dedicated investment will often permit production costs 
reductions but these investments also involve risks: no alternative use of the assets is 
possible after termination of the contract. The second dimension is uncertainty, because 
governance structures differ in their capacity to respond effectively to disturbances. Two 
forms of uncertainty are distinguished: internal and external uncertainty. Internal uncer-
tainty refers to problems that could in determining whether the contract parties perform 
as originally agreed (Anderson and Weitz, 1992).External uncertainty is related to the 
impossibility to anticipate all possible contingencies at the moment a contract is con-
cluded. Finally, the third dimension of transactions is frequency. The occurrence frequen-| 51
Collaboration
cy of a certain transaction influences the government structure. Costs of specialized, ex-
pensive, governance structures will be easier to recover in case of recurring transactions. 
Williamson (1985) argues that a high frequency will lead to reduced control system 
costs. The two assumptions of human behavior that Williamson has distinguished are 
bounded rationality and opportunism. Bounded rationality refers to the limited capac-
ity of human beings to formulate and solve complex problems and opportunism refers 
to the lack of candor and honesty in transactions, to include  self-interest seeking with 
guile (Williamson, 1975). Different combinations of the dimensions of transactions and 
assumptions of human behavior will lead to different optimal governance structures. 
The essence of the Transaction Cost Economics is summarized in figure 8.
Figure 8: Essence of the Transaction Cost Theory (adapted from Aertsen, 1995)
Although the Transaction Cost Economics approach is widely used to explain and predict 
organizational behavior, the approach has been criticized for various reasons. 
•  TCE focuses only on the minimizing of the costs. Inter-organizational relationships are 
not only about cost minimization, but also about joint value maximization (Kogut, 
1988; Zajac and Olsen, 1993).
•  TCE is a static approach. It treats each transaction in an independent and a-historical 
context. It simply assumes that the most efficient forms have survived. This ignores 
the dynamic process of competition between different firms (Douma and Schreuder, 
2002).
•  TCE neglects the role of social relationships in economic transactions (Ring and Ven, 
1992; Gulati, 1995; Nooteboom, 1999). Many relations between human beings are 
building on trust. In practice there are many hybrid forms between market and hi-
erarchies that combine market relations with coordinating mechanisms used within 
organizations.52 |
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•  TCE is building on the implicit and unrealistic assumption that all firms have the 
same production functions. However, firms differ in the resources and capabilities 
they have (Bell, 1996).
Agency Theory
Agency relationships occur whenever a partner in a transaction (principal) delegates au-
thority to another party (agent) and the welfare of the partner is affected by the choices 
of that agent (Arrow, 1985). While the principal may remain responsible, the actual work 
is carried out by the agent. From an economic perspective, Agency Theory assumes that 
both principal and agent are primarily interested in maximizing their own utility (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1986). Important contingencies in Agency Theory are: asymmetric infor-
mation between principal and agent, conflicting objectives, task programmability, out-
come uncertainty and measurability of outcome (Eisenhardt, 1989). These contingencies 
are based on three assumptions of human behavior: risk aversion, moral hazard and ad-
verse selection. Risk aversion refers to the assumption that an agent is more risk averse 
than the principal: costs are involved when the principal shifts risk to the agent, because 
the agent is willing to accept more risk only if this is offset by a higher expected income. 
Moral hazard refers to lack of effort on the part of the agent: the agent may simply 
not put forth the agreed-upon effort. Adverse selection reflects the misrepresentation 
of ability by the agent: the principal cannot completely verify the agent’s skills or abili-
ties. Although moral hazard and adverse selection are the official terms used in Agency 
Theory literature, they are comparable with the more common used terms opportunism 
and bounded rationality. Therefore, in the remaining of this dissertation we will use the 
words opportunism and bounded rationality to identify the human behavioral factors 
that are incorporated in the Agency Theory.
Because  of  the  contingencies  and  assumptions  of  human  behavior,  monitoring  the 
agent is important to avoid unsatisfactory performance from the principal’s point of 
view (Ross, 1973). This observation gives rise to contractual stipulations that reward or 
punish an agent’s behavior depending on its utility for the principal (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
In the Agency theory there are two options for contractual design: a behavior-oriented 
contract (e.g. salaries and hierarchical governance) or an outcome-based contract (e.g. 
commissions, stock options and market governance). The heart of the Agency Theory is 
the trade-off between (a) the cost of measuring behavior and (b) the cost of measuring 
outcomes and transferring risk to the agent (Verduijn, 2004). The right mix of behavioral 
and outcome-based incentives is necessary to motivate the agent to act in the interest 
of the principal.| 53
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Resource Based View
The Resource Based View (RBV) suggests that competitive advantage of a firm is derived 
from the unique collection of that firm’s resources and capabilities (Teece et al., 1997). 
According to Amit and Schoenmaker (1993), resources are assets that are either owned 
or controlled by a firm, whereas capabilities refer to a firm’s ability to deploy resources 
to achieve a desired outcome. The RBV builds on two basic assumptions about the firm’s 
resources and capabilities: (1) resources and capabilities are heterogeneous across firms 
and (2) resources and capabilities are imperfectly mobile (Hunt and Morgan, 1995). 
There is a distinction between tangible and intangible resources and capabilities. The 
distinction acknowledges the difference between tangible resources and capabilities, 
which can be traded relatively easily between firms (e.g. land, machines and manufac-
turing facilities) and intangible resources and capabilities, which are hardly transferable 
among firms (e.g. patents, brand name capital, skills and know-how). The capability 
notion of the Resource Based View suggests that superior performance is dependent on 
the manner firms leverage their resources. This explains why one firm performs better 
than other firms in the same industry with the same resources.
The relational view of the Resource Based View suggests that a firm’s critical resources 
may span firm boundaries and may be embedded in inter-firm resources and routines 
(Dyer and Singh, 1998). Organizations that combine resources in unique ways may real-
ize an advantage over competing firms that are unwilling or unable to do so (Verduijn, 
2004). By cooperating, partners can generate a so-called relational rent. Dyer and Singh 
(1998) define relational rent as a supernormal profit jointly generated in an exchange 
relationship that cannot be generated by either firm in isolation, and can only be created 
through joint idiosyncratic contributions of a specific collaboration partner. There are 
four sources of relational rents: 
1. Specific investments: the potential for relational rents is increasing with investment 
in relation specific assets.
2. Knowledge sharing routines: inter-organizational learning is critical to competitive 
success.
3. Complementary resource endowments: resources that collectively generate greater 
rents than the sum of those obtained from the individual endowments of each part-
ner.
4. Effective  governance:  to  generate  relational  rents  by  employing  self-enforcement 
(e.g. trust) rather than third-party enforcement (e.g. legal contracts).54 |
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Resource Dependency Theory 
In the Resource Dependency Theory (RDT), organizational success is the result of organi-
zations maximizing their power (Aldrich, 1979; Pfeffer and Salanick, 1978). Power may 
be defined as the ability of one firm (the source) to influence the intensions and actions 
of another firm (the target) (Emerson, 1962). Within this perspective, organizations are 
viewed as coalitions, altering their structure and patterns of behavior to acquire and 
maintain needed external resources. Acquiring external resources needed for the organi-
zation comes by decreasing the organization’s dependence on other and/or by increas-
ing other’s dependence on it, what is modifying an organization’s power relations with 
other organizations. 
The RDT argues that inter-organizational relationships exist for two reasons. The first 
reason is strategic interdependencies, because firms perceive critical strategic interde-
pendence with other organizations in their environment, in which one organization 
has resources or capabilities beneficial to but not possessed by the other (Levine and 
White, 1961; Aiken and Hage, 1968). Firms sought out ties with partners who could help 
them manage such strategic interdependencies. The second reason is complementary 
resources. The necessity for complementary resources is a key driver of inter-organiza-
tional cooperation (Richardson, 1972). By entering coalition activities with firms in their 
environment, organizations minimize the dependency and uncertainty about acquiring 
resources from other organizations. 
Social Network Perspective
As described earlier, two points of criticism at the Transaction Cost Economics are the 
static character and the neglection of the role of social relationships in economic trans-
actions. The Social Network Perspective is a theory that incorporates these two elements 
(Gulati, 1998).  This perspective builds on the general notion that economic actions 
are influenced by the social context in which they are embedded, and that those ac-
tions can be influenced by the position of actors in a network. This social explanation 
that highlights the role of embeddedness does not contradict the economic motives for 
partnerships. Firms do not form partnerships for their social networks, but base inter-
organizational relationships on concrete strategic complementariness that they have to 
offer each other (Gulati, 1998). An important implication of the embeddedness of firms 
in networks is the enhanced trust between firms. Trust between firms refers to the confi-
dence that a partner will not exploit the vulnerabilities of the other (Barney and Hansen, 
1994). A social network can promote trust through two possible means:| 55
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1. Referral networks: a social network serves as an effective referral network. Informal 
and personal connections across organizations are important in the organization of 
transactions.
2. “Enforceable” trust: a social network serves as a system of checks and balances and 
therefore reduces uncertainty. Playing “one shot games” and opportunistic behavior 
affects your status and reputation.
Mistrust limits greater exchange of confidential information between collaborating or-
ganizations. As a result, the lack of confidentiality decreases the level of collaboration. 
Also other authors stress the importance of confidentiality in collaboration decisions 
(f.e. Hoyt and Huq, 2002; Li and Lin, 2006). 
The production of inter-organizational networks is driven by a dynamic process involving 
both exogenous resource dependencies, which prompt organizations to seek coopera-
tion, and an endogenous embeddedness, in which the emerging network progressively 
orients the choice of partners (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1997). Networks are not static social 
structures: they are also evolutionary products. As a result new relationships are influ-
enced by the social network of prior ties.
Comparing the different theories
Table 5 summarizes and compares the specific characteristics of the five discussed or-
ganization theories. The table shows that the different theories identify several factors 
that may influence inter-organizational relationships, and therefore affect collaboration 
decisions. The presented organization theories are identified as useful and increase the 
understanding of the collaboration mechanism. Nevertheless each single theory is insuf-
ficient to capture the complexities involved in relationship formation (Barringer and Har-
rison, 2000). Therefore, the presented theories should be viewed as complementary and 
not mutually exclusive or as substitutes (Kogut, 1988; Gulati, 1998; Halldorsson et al., 
2005; Mentzer et al., 2004; Holcomb and Hitt, 2007). We will follow this line and taken 
into account all discussed organizational theories when we identify variables possibly 
influencing logistics collaboration decisions. 56 |
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Decision variables
Decision variables are forces that influence collaboration decisions positively or nega-
tively. Table 6 lists the variables identified by the organization theories discussed above.   
Some of the variables are identified by more than one discussed organization theory. 
































































































Table 5: Organization theories compared (adapted from Halldorsson et al, 2005)| 57
Collaboration
Factor Definition
Bounded rationality Limited capacity of human beings to formulate and solve complex prob-
lems.
Opportunism The lack of candor and honesty in collaboration. People and organizations 
are characterized by self-interested behavior.
Trust The confidence that a partner will not exploit the vulnerabilities of the 
other.
Confidentiality The confidence that a partner will keep shared information secret.
Power The ability to influence the intensions and actions of partners.
Risk aversion The care about the amount of risk to bear. Persons are willing to accept 
more risk only if this is offset by a higher expected income.
Uncertainty The impossibility to oversee all the possible contingencies at a moment a 
decision is made.
Frequency Occurrence frequency of a certain transaction.
Asset specificity The degree to which investments are specific for a certain relation.























Table 7: Variables as identified in the reviewed organization theories
3.2.2   Additional variables
Also general management literature apart from the organization theory discusses vari-
ables that possibly influence collaboration decisions. Reviewing these contributions re-
sults in the identification of the following variables:
•  Fit: refers to which potential partners are suited for collaboration (Beer et al., 2005; 
Douma et al., 2000). Perié (2008) explains the word “fit” in management literature 
is linked to three different aspects: competence, structure and culture. Competence 
fit is defined as the degree to which potential partners are suited for collaboration 58 |
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based on individual or organizational proficiency and experience. Structure fit refers 
to the suitability of partners’ objectives, organizational structure and geographical 
dispersion. Cultural fit explains the degree to which national and corporate cultures 
of the partners are suited.
•  Commitment: an exchange partner believing that an ongoing relationship with an-
other party is so important to warrant maximum efforts at maintaining it; that is, 
the committed party believes the relationship is worth working on to ensure that it 
endures indefinitely (Hunt and Morgan, 1994). This implies that the participating ac-
tors are loyal and tolerant to each other’s deficiencies; true partners do not constantly 
worry about being replaced (Min et al, 2005).
•  Homogeneity: internal support and commitment of all stakeholders is essential. The 
internal targets of different departments may not undermine or conflict with the col-
laborative objectives (Barratt, 2004; Min et al., 2005). 
•  Transparency: refers to the openness between the cooperating parties in terms of 
communication and measurability of f.e. costs, benefits and risks (Groothedde, 2005; 
Gulati and Kletter, 2005). 
•  Transaction costs: costs incurred when making an economic exchange (Groothedde, 
2005). For example, costs for negotiation and project management. This variable is 
indirectly also mentioned by the TCE, but not explicitly identified as decision variable 
in collaboration decisions.
•  Gain-sharing: is defined as the possibility to share collectively the achieved benefits 
from the inter-organizational collaboration (Cruijssen, 2006; Gulati and Kletter, 2005).
•  Interpersonal interaction: Andersen and Kumar (2006) stress the importance of inter-
personal emotions in collaborative relationships between organizations. They con-
sider that the collaboration between two organizations builds on the interaction be-
tween individual agents of both organizations. 
3.2.3   Discussion
Previous research has widely discussed the topic of logistics collaboration. Van de Vijver 
(2009) presents an extensive overview of research on collaboration in academic jour-
nals between 2000 and 2006 in the fields of marketing, operations management and 
strategic management. Nevertheless, most previous studies have a limited scope and 
just focus on a limited number of variables or specific perspective in the organizational 
theory (Ketchen and Hult, 2007; Selviaridis, 2007). Our literature review process has a 
wider scope and results in a list containing sixteen variables that are possibly influencing 
a collaboration decision between organizations. These variables are listed in the left side 
of table 8. The identification of this relatively large number of variables illustrates that | 59
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collaboration decisions are complex decisions. There is consensus in literature that com-
mitment and trust (including confidentiality) are the key variables on this list (Sherman, 
1992; Hunt and Morgan, 1994, Bengston and Kock, 1999; Barrat, 2004).
Comparable to our study is the work of Perié (2008). In his dissertation Perié (2008) 
presents the Delft Factors for Alignment (DFA) model. This model is based on an exten-
sive literature review process around three keywords: business alignment, collaboration 
factors and collaboration partnership factors. This process resulted in the development 
of the valuable DFA model that identifies ten constructs for alignment and describes in 
a detailed manner the factors underlying these constructs. The constructs are: compe-
tence fit, structure fit, culture fit, social bonding, trust, dependency, communication, 
cooperation, commitment and conflict. It may be useful to compare our list of decision 
variables with the constructs of the DFA model to review the result of our literature 
search to identify any gaps in our results, because both literature review processes are 
organized differently. 
Making the comparison, it needs to be noticed that more variables are identified in 
our research than the number of constructs entered into the DFA model. This can be 
explained by the fact that each construct in the DFA model is divided into one or more 
smaller factors. This observation makes it possible that one construct is linked to more 
than one of the variables identified in our literature review process. An overview of the 
comparison is presented in table 8.
Decision variable Construct DFA model













Transaction costs Not applicable
Gain-sharing Conflict
Interpersonal interaction Social bonding
Not applicable Cooperation
Table 8: Comparison of decision variables with DFA model60 |
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Table 8 results in the following conclusions:
•  Only the construct cooperation is not covered by our list of decision variables. This 
can be explained by the fact that the DFA model not only identifies constructs that 
influence the collaboration decision but also constructs that influence the collabora-
tion process itself. The other nine constructs of the DFA model are covered by our list.
•  Four variables on our list are not covered by one of the constructs in the DFA model. 
These four variables are identified in one or more of the five reviewed organizational 
theories and therefore marked as a possible decision variable in collaboration deci-
sions.
•  Our variable fit is split over three different constructs in the DFA model. This clarifies 
that the variable fit can refer to different aspects. The variable fit needs to be defined 
and described clearly when the list of variables is used in the remaining part of this 
research.  
As an overall result, we may conclude that the list of decision variables identified in this 
research project and the list of variables identified in the DFA-model are comparable; 
though in both projects the literature review process was organized differently. 
3.3   Drivers and impediments of collaboration
3.3.1   Drivers 
Although collaboration is based on a mutual objective, it is a self-interested process in 
which firms will participate only if it contributes to their own survival (Simatupang and 
Sridharan, 2002). Each member seeks to achieve individual benefits such as reducing 
costs or eliminating redundant functions, because firms only collaborate when there is 
at least one concrete strategic complementary. Clear strategic intent leads to successful 
collaborative arrangements, and provides focus for these arrangements. 
General management literature provides more than sufficient support for drivers of in-
ter-organizational collaboration. In his dissertation Cruijssen (2006) gives an overview of 
these driving forces. He explains that on a high level the reasons can be divided in three 
main groups: reasons related to costs and productivity, customer service and market 
position. 
There are also authors that specifically focus on the drivers of collaboration between 
shipper and LSP. Positive cost effects have been supposed to be one of the main driving 
forces for logistics collaboration (Andersson, 1995; Lambert et al., 1996; Zineldin, 2004). 
Logistics collaboration gives the opportunity to streamline the administration of the 
logistics system, because a collaborative relationship with a LSP can reduce transaction 
costs (La Londe and Cooper, 1989). Moreover, positive cost effects can also be achieved | 61
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by the economies of scale and scope that are reached by logistics collaboration. Econo-
mies of scale occur because in the collaboration between shipper and a LSP serving more 
than one client, the material flow volumes could be increased and thereby the scale of 
the activity could be raised. As a result the fixed costs are covered by a larger volume of 
goods (Andersson, 1995; Ellram and Cooper 1990; Fernie, 1989; Mentzer et al. 2000). In 
addition to economies of scale it is also possible that economies of scope are achieved 
by logistics collaboration because of the operational synergies that may occur. Goldhar 
and Jelinek (1983) explain that such economies will be achieved if production equipment 
is able to produce several products in a combination compared to the cost of produc-
ing them separately. An example is sharing of personnel between a warehouse and a 
terminal that has a couple of peak loads whereas the work at the warehouse could be 
allocated over a whole day. By using (at least partially) the same personnel, economies 
of scope could be achieved (Andersson, 1995).
But the driving forces behind logistics collaboration are not only related to costs. In-
tegrating activities in the supply chain through partnerships can often lead to service 
improvements for the customers in the form of shorter cycle time and more timely and 
accurate information (La Londe and Cooper, 1989; Lambert et. al, 1996; Simatupang 
and Sridharan, 2002). Another benefit of logistics collaboration is that a shipper gains 
“access”. Access in this context means access to missing knowledge or access into new 
markets (Andersson, 1995; Fernie 1989, La Londe and Cooper, 1989, Lambert et al., 
1996, Zineldin, 2004). Finally, risk reduction is an argument for logistics collaboration. 
The risk could be reduced because neither of the two parties, shipper or LSP, has to bear 
the full risk of the operation (Andersson, 1995). If a shipper does not own logistics assets 
he could eliminate the technological and financial risks connected to these assets. On 
the other hand, the LSP spreads his risks over a larger number of customers (Ellram and 
Cooper, 1990) or when a LSP invests in assets for the special needs of a specific shipper 
he takes the risk. This risk can be reduced by establishing a long term relationship with 
the shipper (La Londe and Cooper, 1989).
3.3.2   Impediments
Next to the drivers and objectives, a spectrum of impediments for supply chain collabo-
ration is mentioned in the literature. These impediments are mainly related to the four 
areas of loss of control, costs, trust and partner selection. Loss of control is one of the 
main obstacles of implementing supply chain collaboration (Ohmae, 1989; Andersson, 
1995; Zineldin and Bredenlöw, 2003). Also in the specific context of logistics collabora-
tion, shippers lose control over a part of their operation, inventory or customer service; 
the dependency on third parties increases (La Londe and Cooper, 1989).62 |
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Another impediment of supply chain collaboration is related to the costs of collabora-
tion. Participants have difficulties in determining the monetary benefits (Razzaque and 
Sheng, 1998; Zineldin and Bredenlöw, 2003). Also the literature specifically handling the 
topic of collaboration between shippers and logistics service providers pays attention to 
this impediment. Some authors identify that shippers may perceive logistics collabora-
tion as being more expensive than performing activities in-house (Andersson, 1995; 
McLaren et al., 2002). This is due to the fact that some of the costs that earlier had been 
hidden in general overhead will be visible (Ellram and Cooper, 1990). At the same time 
there are elements that add costs. First switching from a current situation to a situation 
of logistics collaboration is not without any switching costs. Second, logistics collabora-
tion requires additional costs related to coordinating and controlling the collaborative 
relationship (McLaren et al., 2002; Mentzer et al., 2000). Additionally, parties expect to 
have difficulties in establishing a fair allocation of the benefits (Lambert et al., 1999; 
Zineldin and Bredenlöw, 2003). 
The third area of impediments is related to the lack of trust between business partners 
(Andersson, 1995; Mentzer et al., 2000). In case collaboration starts, regardless the lack 
of trust, the result is often a lack of commitment. As a result the collaborating parties try 
to limit the information exchange and only choose for a limited area of collaboration. 
Finally, finding a reliable partner with whom to cooperate is perceived as one of the im-
pediments for supply chain collaboration. Doubts about the experience and knowledge 
level of the potential partners are also an obstacle to collaborate with logistics service 
providers. Moreover, shippers have fears about opportunistic behavior of their partners 
because of conflicting interests (Simatupang and Sridharan, 2002). 
3.4   Concluding remarks
Reviewing literature on supply chain collaboration makes clear supply chain collabo-
ration exists in different forms and at different levels. Three different forms are dis-
tinguished: vertical, horizontal and lateral collaboration. All three forms can occur at 
different levels. Literature provides several classifications to distinguish between these 
different levels of supply chain collaboration. These classifications are comparable and 
make three things clear. First, supply chain collaboration can range from arm’s length re-
lationships to strategic partnering. Second, supply chain collaboration can be bi-lateral 
or multi-lateral. Third, to move to a higher level of collaboration the hard side as well 
as the soft side of the relationship needs to be developed. This development path to a 
higher level of collaboration can have an evolutionary or revolutionary character.| 63
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The review of the organizational theories and general management literature results 
in a large number of variables that possibly influence a collaboration decision between 
organizations. There is consensus in the literature that commitment, trust and confiden-
tiality are the key variables on this list. Unfortunately, this literature study does not make 
clear which of the other identified variables are dominating in the specific context of this 
research; a collaboration decision between shipper and LSP. This is one of the items that 
need further empirical validation. 
The identified drivers of supply chain collaboration can be divided in three main catego-
ries: reasons related to costs, service or market position. On the other hand, there is also 
a spectrum of impediments described in the literature. These impediments are related 
to loss of control, costs, (mis)trust and partner selection. Together with the decision 
variables and the drivers, the impediments are influencing a collaboration decision. This 
is depicted in figure 9. The arrows in figure 9 represent the relationships between the 
three elements. 
Figure 9: Variables, drivers and impediments of collaboration64 || 65
4.   Decision making behavior
The decision making behavior literature is the third stream of literature that is reviewed 
in this research project. This chapter describes these review results. As discussed in the 
first chapter, the logistics and supply chain management literature has not always ad-
equately addressed the human aspects of decision making. Therefore, we adopt the 
approach of Mantel et al. (2006) that an integration of supply chain management and 
decision making behavior literature can contribute to closing the research gap in under-
standing logistics collaboration decisions. This chapter discusses the decision making 
literature from both an economic and behavioral perspective. The remainder of this 
chapter is structured as follows. The first section describes the decision making process. 
Afterwards, the second section discusses different economic perspectives on decision 
making. Subsequently, the decision making behavior literature is discussed. The fourth 
section discusses the concept of utility frameworks. Finally, this chapter concludes with 
summarizing the main findings of this chapter.
4.1   Decision making process
People make decisions every day. Decisions are just part of our daily life. Normally we 
make so many decisions as a matter of course that only rarely do we realize that we are 
in fact making a choice. Choice behavior can also be the result of a habit or the imita-
tion of somebody else. Nevertheless all decisions, explicit or implicit, have some things 
in common. They each involve the existence of at least two possibilities, and they all fol-
low more or less the same process. Choices are the outcomes of these decision-making 
processes. A number of frameworks have been put forward to describe the phases in 
such a process (Dewey, 1933; Simon, 1965; Mintzberg et al., 1976; Ben-Akiva and Ler-
man, 1985). In general, five phases are distinguished in these frameworks. The first stage 
is the definition of a choice problem. This problem recognition stage is the perceived 
difference between an ideal and actual state. This is critical because it motivates the 
decision maker to action. The next step after the problem recognition phase is the gen-
eration of alternatives. Which alternatives does the decision maker have for the actual 
state of his problem? These alternatives are generated by internal and external search. 66 |
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Internal search refers to searching for information from memory and external search 
is defined as searching for information from the environment like friends, relatives or 
published sources. The next step for the decision maker is to evaluate the available al-
ternatives. During this judgment process the decision maker is making evaluations or 
estimates regarding the likelihood that products or services will possess certain features 
or perform in a certain manner. The evaluation process is followed by the actual choice 
by the decision maker. Finally the choice is implemented. Our study mainly focuses on 
step three and four of the decision making process: evaluation of the alternatives and 
the actual choice. The different phases in a decision making process are depicted in fig-
ure 10. It needs to be noticed, that the model as presented in figure 10 is regarded as an 
ideal model. In reality, the decision making process may be a little bit different, because 
decision makers can move back and forward between the stages for a number of times. 
Figure 10: Phases of decision making process (Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985)
An example of the definition of a choice problem could be that an employee needs to 
decide on the mode of travel to work. His environment and the supply of transportation 
services generate an overview of the alternatives available. In the next step of the deci-
sion process the employee needs to evaluate these available alternatives based on the 
attributes of every available alternative. This information is processed by the decision 
maker to arrive at the choice of travel mode. To do this, the person applies a decision | 67
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rule. This is a specific sequence of calculations such as selecting the fastest mode that 
costs less than one dollar, irrespective of comfort (Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985). The 
final step in this decision making process is the trip to work itself by using the chosen 
mode. 
The example makes clear that a decision making process is a collection of procedures 
that contains the following elements: decision maker, alternatives, attributes of alterna-
tives, and decision rule. The unit of decision making can be an individual or a group of 
persons such as a family. It can also be an organization such as a firm or government. 
As stated in chapter 1, in this dissertation we only focus on individuals as the unit of 
decision making. The decision making unit makes a choice from a set of alternatives. 
This set is called the choice set and includes the alternatives that are both feasible to 
decision maker and known during the decision process. The feasibility of an alternative 
is defined by a variety of constraints such as physical availability (availability of train ser-
vice between the employee’s home and workplace), monetary resources (taxi fare might 
be too expensive in relation to income of the employee), time availability (walking will 
be infeasible when distance to workplace is too long), information constraints (lack of 
knowledge about carpool options), and so on (Swait, 1994). Each alternative in a choice 
set is described in terms of attributes. An attribute is an element that impacts the deci-
sion making unit’s choice. In our example of the travel mode choice the attributes of 
each alternative could be for example costs, time and comfort. The attributes are evalu-
ated and measured on a scale of attractiveness by the decision making unit. A choice 
from a set containing two or more alternatives requires a decision rule. This describes 
the internal mechanism used by the decision maker to process the information available 
and arrive at a unique choice (Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985). 
4.2   Economic literature
For a long time the standard assumption in economics has been that individuals are 
rational thinking agents. In this orthodox neo-classical world, transactions cause no 
coordination problems and go without transaction costs. The economy runs smoothly 
and optimal equilibriums are the automatic results. A decision maker is seen as a fully 
rational agent and a “homo-economicus”, which means in this economic stream that a 
decision maker maximizes his utility, is only guided by financial incentives, and has full 
knowledge of all options and consequences (Folmer, 2007). 
Later on the new institutional economics literature (see e.g. Coase, 1937; Williamson, 
1975; 1981; 1985) questions several assumptions of the neo-classical stream (Mosch, 
2004). The new institutional economics still rely on the assumptions of rational maximi-68 |
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zation of utility by individual actors who only respond to material incentives, but they 
question the assumptions of free and complete information and full rationality of the 
actors as defined in the orthodox neo-classical world. In the institutional economics 
literature, this assumption of full rationality is replaced by the assumption of bounded 
rationality. This means that human beings have a limited capability of collecting, stor-
ing and processing information. This implies that information is never complete, and 
the total set of potential future events and their consequences is unknown. As a result 
uncertainty enters the analysis. Moreover, when information is not freely available, ac-
tors have to invest in a certain amount of information, and thus transaction costs appear 
in economic transactions. As a result, following the new institutional economics, deci-
sion makers live in a world with uncertainty, transaction costs and bounded rationality. 
Nevertheless also the institutional economic approach is criticized, because it neglects 
the role of social relationships in economic transactions (Ring and Ven, 1992; Gulati, 
1995; Nooteboom, 1999). The Transaction Cost Economics and Agency Theory that are 
discussed in the previous chapter are part of the new institutional economics and based 
on these assumptions.
The behavioral and experimental economics (see e.g. Camerer et al., 2002; Fehr and Falk, 
2002) go one step further. They rely on the assumption that (economic) behavior is not 
only guided by material incentives, but also by psychological and sociological influences. 
According to this economic stream, decision makers also derive utility from equality, 
honesty, reciprocity et cetera. This approach offers new views on collaboration that go 
beyond the idea that collaboration only results as a result of calculations of expected 
materials payoff (Mosch, 2004). Although this economic stream is still in its developing 
phase, the empirical evidence of the experiments show that all sorts of psychological ef-
fects interfere with the fully rational kind of decision making as defined by the orthodox 
and institutional economic approaches. The behaviouralists and experimentalists seem 
to have incorporated valuable insights from other social sciences, such as sociology and 
psychology. 
In line with behavioral and experimental economics, the evolutionary economics theory 
rejects the existence of a “rational agent”. Evolutionary economics is a relatively new 
economic and diverse school of thought that is inspired by evolutionary biology. This 
theory is originally developed by Nelson and Winter (1982) and focuses on the mecha-
nisms that underlie innovations, fundamental changes and transitions (Dosi and Nelson, 
1994). This is in contradiction with the orthodox and new institutional economics theo-
ries that focus on equilibrium analyzes (Foxon, 2006). The evolutionary economics theo-
rists have backed away from the rational choice theory and adopted a quite different 
alternative. Evolutionary economics explains that decision makers often face situations 
where they do not have perfect knowledge of all possible choices at a particular time. | 69
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Besides, these decision makers do not have an unlimited power to compute the util-
ity implications of these choices. Therefore, they assume that that decision makers are 
characterized by bounded rationality, conservatism and risk aversion. Individuals have 
limitations in their possibilities to collect and process information and as a result they 
stick to their routines. These routines determine their decision behavior (Foxon, 2006). 
The discussion in this section shows that each of the four discussed economic streams is 
based on its own set of assumptions to explain decision making behavior by individual 
agents. Table 9 gives a summarized overview of the discussed approaches in this section. 
The table shows two things. First, it shows whether a specific economic stream views 
a human being as a fully rational agent. To define the term fully rational agent, the or-
thodox neo-classical tradition is followed. Second, the table presents an overview of the 
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Table 9: Different economic views compared
Does the comparison in table 9 mean that the neo-classical and new institutional meth-
odologies are poor tools to analyze individual decision making? No, it does not. Although 
several assumptions of the neo-classical and institutional economics are questioned by 
the behavioral and evolutionary economics, the core tenets of the two economic ap-
proaches are untouched and may even be insightful for other (economic) disciplines 
(Mosch, 2004). The neo-classical and new institutional approaches form a general ana-
lytical framework for analyzing decision behavior, but the restrictions of both method-
ologies need to be kept in mind. There needs to be an eye for the contributions of the 
other economic streams that take sociological and psychological factors into consid-
eration, just to be able to embed more fruitfully the concept of decision making. Also 
Folmer (2007) argues that the dividing line between economics and social sciences must 
disappear. He suggests that researchers in economics should integrate theories of social 70 |
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sciences in their research programs, because such a holistic approach will enrich the 
economic science. Nevertheless, the discussion in this section makes clear that the ec-
nomic science does not exist. As a result, researchers that follow such a holistic approach 
should be aware of the fact that different streams in the economic science are based on 
different sets of assumptions. 
4.3   Behavioral decision making literature
4.3.1   From rational to intuitive based decision making
In line with the neo-classical and new-institutional economics view on decision makers, 
the classical decision-making literature is built on the assumption that individuals are 
rational agents. By this assumption is understood that individuals have well-defined 
stable preferences, know and understand all existing alternatives, and maximize their 
preferences given the existing possibilities however complicated the decision problem is 
(Koshfeld, 1999)  This is known as the rational theory of decision making. The assump-
tion of full rationality in this theory offers several points of criticism. Nobel laureate 
Simon (1957) argued that actual decision makers have limited computational capabili-
ties to make optimal search for alternatives, evaluations of prospects and selection of 
options. Simon introduces the model of bounded rationality. In this perspective, actual 
choice behavior is bought by a sequence of heuristics or rules of thumb that bounded 
rational agents employ to make judgments and decisions in the (complex) real world 
(Simon, 1957). 
Later on, more intuitive-based decision-making models are developed for situations that 
are not characterized by full certainty. We discuss successively the Satisfying model as 
proposed by Simon (1960), the Muddling-through model developed by Lindblom (1959) 
and the Garbage-can model defined by Cohen et al. 1972. 
Simon relies his satisfying model on the assumption of bounded rationality. Based on 
this assumption a choice is the outcome of the following procedure. First, the decision-
maker defines a number of obvious alternatives based on his experience. Afterwards he 
defines his objectives: his aspiration level. Subsequently, he chooses the first alternative 
that meets this aspiration level. This choice is called the satisfying solution. Therefore, 
the Satisfying-model will not always result in selecting the most optimal alternative, 
because the decision maker ‘satisfice’ rather than optimize (Foxon, 2006). The decision 
maker is not invest additional time and money to find a better solution for his problem 
when his aspiration level is reached. In case there is not any alternative that meets his 
aspiration level he reformulates his objectives and starts again to define some alterna-| 71
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tives. As a result, the aspiration level of the decision maker is not a static variable, but 
changes based on the alternatives that are available. 
Also Linblom (1959) puts forward a justification of the rational decision making mod-
el by his “Muddling-through model” or incremental model of decision making. In this 
model ends and means are intertwined and decisions are made by comparing several 
immediately available and known alternatives. Lindblom uses his model to explain that 
decision making is the result of incremental change aimed at arriving at agreed-upon 
policies which are closely related to past experience. In his view decision making is more 
an evolutionary in stead of a revolutionary process. The status quo will only change by 
small steps. 
Cohen et al. (1972) have described their vision on non-rational decision making in their 
Garbage-can model of choice. They use their model to explain that the rational decision-
making theory can not be used when consistent, shared goals within an organization 
are missing. They use the term organized anarchies to identify such organizations. These 
are situations – or decisions- characterized by three general properties: problematic pref-
erences, unclear technology and fluid participation (Cohen et al, 1972). As a result an 
organization operates on the basis of a variety of inconsistent and ill-defined prefer-
ences, simple trial-and-error procedures and the audiences and decision makers for any 
particular choice change capriciously. The Garbage-can model relies on the assumption 
that situations of decision making under goal ambiguity are common in real life. The 
authors of the Garbage-can model state that to understand processes in organizations, 
one can view a choice as a garbage can into which various kinds of problems and so-
lutions are dumped by participants (Cohen et al. 1972). A decision is the outcome or 
interpretation of several relatively independent streams within an organization. These 
independent streams are:
•  Problems: problems are the concerns of people inside and outside the organization. 
•  Solutions: a solution is somebody’s product.
•  Participants: participants in an organization come and go. There is substantial varia-
tion in participation stems depending on other demands on the participants’ time.
•  Choice opportunities: these are occasions in which an organization is expected to 
produce behavior that can be called a decision.
The garbage can process is one in which problems, solutions and participants move from 
one choice opportunity to another in such a way that the nature of the choice, the time 
it takes, and the problems it solves all depend on a relatively complicated intermeshing 
of elements. The heart of the garbage can process is the partial uncoupling of problems 
and choices. 
Reviewing the behavioral decision making literature results more or less in the same 
conclusion as formulated at the end of the previous section. Also this stream of literature 72 |
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provides different models to explain how individuals act in decision making processes. 
There is no consensus in the literature about which model of decision making should be 
preferred to the others. All these models rely on their own set of assumptions, but over-
all it may be concluded that there is adequate evidence in the literature that confirms 
individuals can not be viewed as fully rational agents.
4.3.2   Inertia
Following the classic economic approach or the rational theory of decision making it may 
be stated that no profitable opportunity should ever remain unexploited. No arbitrage 
possibility stays unrealized, independent how small the gain actually is. But in practice 
individuals and organizations are usually reluctant to change and in consequence they 
do not always respond to relative differences in a rational manner (Hannan and Freeman, 
1984). Literature refers to this phenomenon with the word inertia. In popular parlance 
inertia means a tendency not to move. In most social scientific publications the term is 
defined as an explanation for why organizations or individuals delay or completely fail to 
respond to beneficial changes (Gresov et al., 1993). This definition refers to the inverse 
of an instantaneous rate of change between alternative levels of competitive response. 
The concept of inertia is also widely discussed in evolutionary economics (Tushman and 
Romanelli, 1985). The evolutionary economics theory explains that organizations and 
individuals are characterized by routines. A routine is a regular and predictable pattern 
of behavior undertaken by organizations or individuals, such as a specific production 
activity, collaboration decision or R &D activity (Foxon, 2006). These routines exist be-
cause individuals and organizations operate in an environment that is characterized by 
uncertainty, complexity and bounded rationality. The routines employed by a firm or 
individual at any particular time are those that ‘satisfice’ according to its chosen criteria. 
When a particular routine is no longer deemed to be satisfactory, for example, because 
of changing market conditions, this triggers the search for a new routine. Embedding of 
routines prevents fundamental change, because decision makers stick to their routines. 
Evolutionary economics refers to this phenomenon as the lock-in effect. The lock-in ef-
fect results in suboptimal decisions, decreasing the overall performance of an organiza-
tion (Gresov et al. 1993). Fundamental and structural change can only be reached when 
routines are changed. 
The inertia concept offers new views on collaboration that go beyond the idea of the 
economic orthodox and neo-classical world that collaboration only results from calcula-
tions of expected materials payoff. This does not mean that profitable decisions do not 
matter at all, but it may be that differences do not matter as such the larger they are. 
Inertia functions as a threshold in the evaluation of alternatives during a decision mak-| 73
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ing process. Patosalmi (2003) shows in his dissertation that inertia is also an important 
issue in the context of logistics and supply chain management, because also managers in 
this area often stuck to the old way of doing business, being incapable of adopting new 
management philosophies required to succeed in the changing business environment. 
Nevertheless, the role of inertia at decision makers in supply chain management has 
not received much research attention (Smith et al. 2005). Some exceptions are Gresov 
et al. (1993) who paid attention to the question why some firms respond aggressively 
to competitive challenges or to disruptions in their supply chain while others do not. 
Smith et al. (2005) focus on the impact of inertia on the management of the firm’s 
supply chain operations and the effects it can have on a produce-to-stock firm’s ability 
to respond to external market pressure and develop corrective strategies. Finally, Li et 
al. (2006) highlight the role of switching inertia in a supplier selection process. None of 
these contributions focus on the role of inertia in collaboration decisions in general or 
logistics collaboration decisions more particular.
4.4   Utility framework 
During the decision making process, decision makers use decision rules to make the 
final choice. These decision rules can be classified into four categories (Ben-Akiva and 
Lerman, 1985):
•  Dominance: an alternative is dominant with respect to another if it is better for at 
least one attribute and no worse for all other attributes. In most situations this does 
not lead to a unique choice, but can be used to eliminate inferior alternatives from a 
choice set. Additional complexity for this decision rule is the possible existence of a 
threshold level for each attribute. In such a situation a decision maker will only value 
one alternative better than another if the difference in the attribute values exceeds 
the threshold. Thus a cost difference of three percent or less than one alternative may 
be considered by a decision maker as too small to make a difference in his preference 
ranking for this alternative.
•  Satisfaction: for every attribute assume a level that serves as a satisfaction level. This 
may be defined as a level of aspiration. An alternative can be eliminated if it does not 
meet the criterion of at least one attribute. Also this rule by itself will not necessarily 
lead to a choice.
•  Lexicographic rules: the decision maker chooses the alternative that is the most at-
tractive for the most important attribute. In the case the use of the most important 
attribute will not result in a choice, the decision maker goes on with the second most 
important attribute and continues until the process results in a unique choice.74 |
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•  Utility: this class of decision rules assumes comparability of attributes. This means 
that the attractiveness of an alternative expressed by a vector of attribute values is 
reducible to a scalar. This vector is a function that expresses the overall value a deci-
sion maker attaches to a certain alternative.
Models developed to answer the question why and how individuals make their choices 
traditionally use the utility decision rule. The models are formulated in a random util-
ity framework and have built upon the postulate of utility maximizing individuals. This 
means each individual decision maker compares a set of alternatives and chooses the 
alternative that maximizes his utility. The utility or (attractiveness) of each alternative 
consists of a systematic (observable) component and a random error (unobservable) 
term. The general linear utility function can be written as follows:
Uj = β0 + ΣβkXkj + εj
Uj is the overall utility for a particular alternative j; β0 is the constant term; βk represents 
the relative utility associated with attribute k (e.g. a specific LSP selection criterion such 
as costs or service); Xkj  is the independent variable representing attribute k for alternative 
j; and εj is an error component. Different types of models have been formulated depen-
dent on the specific assumptions regarding the distribution of the error term (Crouch 
and Louvière, 2000). The most widely used assumption is that the error terms are inde-
pendently and identically distributed following a Gumbel distribution6 (Ben-Akiva and 
Lerman, 1985). The random element of the utility function implies that the utility is 
related to the probability of an individual making a certain choice rather than directly 
to the choice itself. Pearmain et al., (1991) state that this is a more plausible approach 
to modeling choice behavior than the simple assumption of complete consistency in the 
way individuals express their preferences as used in models without random utility. Not 
all individuals have the same preferences under comparable circumstances.
In a binary choice problem about traveling by train or car, the utility function of each 
mode comprises various attributes like time, cost and comfort. The probability of choos-
ing the train instead of the car reflects the difference in the utility between the two 
modes: 
6  The Gumbel distribution is a continuous probability distribution. The probability density function of a Gum-
bel random vaiable x has two parameters: k (> 0: shape parameter) and λ (> 0: scale parameter).| 75
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     1
  Pt =  ——————
    1 + e (Uc –Ut)
  Pc = 1 - Pt
  Where:   Pt  =  probability of choosing train
    Pc  =  probability of choosing car
    Ut  =  utility of train 
    Uc  =  utility of car
    e  =  exponent
Based on the same assumptions about the distribution of the error term as explained 
above.
Utility frameworks are also widely used in the logistics field to model several kinds of 
decisions7. For an overview we refer to Muilerman (2001). His overview shows that utility 
frameworks can be used for various purposes. Some examples are estimating the market 
potential of new or improved modes of transportation, exploring the opportunities of 
modal shift, deducing shippers’ sensitivities to changes in different dimensions of service 
when making mode choice decisions, and obtain monetary values of time. Especially 
the last one, monetary values of time studies, are often used in cost-benefit analyzes of 
infrastructure projects in passenger and freight transport, because these projects have 
transport time savings as one of the major benefits. The studies enable the calculation of 
the marginal substitution of time for money by providing trade-off ratios between trans-
port time and transport costs (De Jong et al., 2004a). A trade-off ratio of 0.80 implies 
that an increase in transport time of for instance 10% is regarded as having the same 
disutility as 8% higher total transport costs. 
4.5   Concluding remarks
This chapter reviews decision making literature from both an economic and behavioral 
perspective. This review makes clear that there are differences in the set of assumptions 
used by different economic streams to explain decision making behavior by individual 
agents. The neo-classical economic and new-institutional economics theory are under-
pinned by the concept of ‘rational economic man’. In the neo-classical en new-institu-
7  All mentioned examples represent choice behavior of individual agents. The models are not used to analyze 
choice behavior in groups.76 |
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tional tradition this means a decision maker maximizes his utility and is only guided by 
financial incentives. This assumption is questioned by the behavioral economic and evo-
lutionary economics theory. Both theories explain that there are reasons why beneficial 
solutions remain unexploited. Behavioral economics refers to the fact that individuals 
not only derive utility from material pay-offs, but also from non-material influences. Evo-
lutionary economics explains decision makers are conservative and often prefer to stick 
to their routines and that this can be a reason to not respond to a relative difference in 
a rational manner. These contributions need to be taken into account when analyzing 
decision behavior. 
A comparable path can be observed when reviewing the behavioral decision making 
literature. Also the classical decision making literature see individuals as fully rational 
agent who maximixes his utility and is only guided by financial incentives. Later on 
researchers found abundant evidence that decision makers often violate this classic ra-
tionalistic paradigm, and that decisions often lead to suboptimal results. As a result, 
they developed more intuitive based decisions models to explain decision making behav-
ior. Subsequently the Satisfying, Muddling through and Garbage-can model of decision 
making are discussed. There is no consensus in literature about which model should 
be preferred, but all theories make clear that decision makers can not been seen as full 
rational men (or women).
Evolutionary economics and social sciences explain that people’s decision behavior fre-
quently displays great inertia. Inertia refers to the reluctance of change that most indi-
viduals and organizations display. This explains that collaboration not only results from 
calculations of the expected material payoffs. Inertia is another reason why the most 
optimal solution from an economic point of view is not always selected. 
Summarized, reviewing decision making behavior literature provides two reasons that 
function as a threshold for individual decision makers to select the most beneficial op-
tion from an economic point of view. The first reason is the fact that individuals can 
not be seen as fully rational agents as defined in the neo-classical and new-institutional 
economic tradition. In the remainder of this thesis we follow these economic streams in 
their definition of a fully rational agent. Second reason is the existence of inertia. These 
findings are visualized in figure 11. This figure shows that the outcome of a decision 
is influenced by a number of items. The arrows in figure 11 represent the relationship 
between these different items.
Nevertheless, empirical evidence for the conclusions in this chapter in the specific con-
text of a logistics collaboration decision is not available. Therefore additional empirical 
verification is needed. For this empirical verification a model based on the random utility 
framework can be used, because this is a proved method to answer questions why and 
how individuals make their choices. | 77
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Figure 11: Overview theoretical findings on behavioral decision making78 || 79
5.   Theoretical findings and hypotheses
In the previous chapter we have described the three reviewed literature streams in isola-
tion. Nevertheless, there is some overlap between the streams and all three streams are 
useful to answer our research question from a theoretical point of view. Therefore, this 
chapter describes a cross-section of the theoretical findings. These theoretical findings 
are used to draft hypotheses for the empirical research phase.
The chapter is structured as follows. The first section presents the cross-section of the 
theoretical findings. Subsequently, the hypotheses for the empirical research phase are 
introduced in section two. Finally, the third section gives a short introduction to this 
empirical research phase. 
5.1   Cross-section of the theoretical findings
Logistics outsourcing and collaboration are closely related, because logistics outsourc-
ing results in a collaborative relationship between shipper and logistics service provider. 
A logical result is that there is also some overlap in the topics reviewed in both streams 
of literature. The drivers identified by both streams are comparable. Furthermore, both 
streams focus on the variables used to make a collaboration or logistics outsourcing 
decision. Especially the collaboration stream has resulted in an extensive list of variables 
that possibly influence a collaboration decision. The literature identified trust, confi-
dentiality and commitment as key variables on this list. On the other hand, the logistics 
outsourcing stream provides an overview of criteria used to select the most suitable lo-
gistics service provider. Costs and service are marked as most important selection criteria 
in this overview. This means that based on the literature review, we may conclude that 
costs, service, trust, confidentiality and commitment are identified as most important at-
tributes in a collaboration decision between shipper and LSP. Table 10 shows the defini-
tions of these key variables and the expected impact on a logistics collaboration decision 
from a shipper’s perspective.80 |
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Variable Definition Expected impact
Costs Costs of the services provided by a LSP Negative: shippers prefer collaboration 
alternatives with lower costs.
Service Service level offered by a LSP to the 
shipper in terms of shipments deliv-
ered on time
Positive: shippers prefer collaboration 
alternatives that result in a higher level 
of customer service.
Trust The belief that a partner will not harm 
the interests of the counterpart
Positive: shippers are more willing to 
cooperate when the level of trust is 
higher.
Confidentiality The belief that a collaboration partner 
keeps shared information confidential
Positive: shippers are more willing to 
cooperate when the level of confiden-
tiality is higher.
Commitment Participating actors are loyal and toler-
ant and do not worry constantly about 
being replaced
Negative: shippers are more willing to 
cooperate when the required commit-
ment from their side decreases.
Table 10: Definition and impact of key variables
All three streams of literature discuss the fact that the potential benefits of collaboration 
are not always fully achieved. They explain that some thresholds do exist which prevents 
a certain proportion of collaboration from being initiated. The thresholds identified by 
the logistics outsourcing and collaboration literature are comparable. At the other side, 
the behavioral decision making literature identifies two thresholds that are not identi-
fied by the logistics outsourcing or collaboration literature. 
The first threshold is the fact that individual decision makers cannot be seen as fully 
rational agents8 as is often assumed in optimizing models used in supply chain manage-
ment literature. Some streams in economic science and the behavioral decision making 
literature make clear that collaboration does not only result from calculation of expected 
pay offs, because also immaterial factors impact a collaboration decision. Individuals do 
not only derive utility from material benefits. Also the supply chain management and 
logistics literature mention immaterial incentives like trust, confidentiality and commit-
ment as possible thresholds for collaboration. Nevertheless, they do not go one step 
further and link this to the nature of the decision makers. These decision makers cannot 
be seen as fully rational agents and thus derive utility from both material and immate-
rial incentives. Additionally, the supply chain and logistics literature do not quantify the 
impact of immaterial benefits or prove that they significantly impact a logistics collabo-
ration decision. 
8  To define the term fully rational agent, the neo-classical or new-institutional tradition is followed.| 81
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The second threshold that is identified by the behavioral decision making literature is 
the existence of inertia. Inertia refers to the reluctance of change of most individuals. 
As a result, decision makers do not always respond to a relative difference in a rational 
manner. Inertia does not mean that profitable decisions do not matter at all, but it may 
be that differences do not matter as such the larger they are. Therefore, the existence 
of inertia can be another reason why potential benefits of vertical logistics collaboration 
are not achieved in practice. 
 The theoretical findings are summarized in figure 12. This figure shows that the level 
of collaboration between shipper and LSP is the outcome of a decision taken by the 
shipper. The key decision variables that influence this decision are: costs, service, trust, 
confidentiality and commitment. Next to this, the aspects of “non-full rationality” and 
“inertia” function as a threshold for a shipper to collaborate with a logistics service pro-
vider. These thresholds also influence a shipper’s collaboration decision. These theoreti-
cal findings are an answer to our first research question: Which factors hamper a shipper 
to intensify collaboration with a logistics service provider?  Nevertheless, this conclusion 
lacks empirical evidence and thus further empirical verification is needed. Next to this, 
the theoretical findings does not provide an answer to our second research question: 
What is the relative importance of the identified factors in a shipper’s collaboration deci-
sion? To answer this question further empirical research is required. 
Figure 12: Theoretical findings82 |
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5.2   Hypotheses
The theoretical conclusions discussed in the previous section are the starting point to 
draft  a number of hypotheses. An overview of these hypotheses can be found in table 
11 at page 61. Hypotheses one till eleven are related to the theoretical finding that deci-
sion makers can not be seen as fully rational agents, but they derive utility from both 
rational and immaterial incentives in logistics collaboration decisions. The five variables 
identified as key variables9 in logistics collaboration decisions are used to transform 
this theoretical finding into hypotheses that can be tested. For empirical testing of the 
hypotheses a stated preference experiment is used, because a stated preference ex-
periment enables the researcher to determine and quantify the relative importance of 
variables that are of interest of the researcher10. For each of the variables two aspects 
need to be measured: is the impact of a specific variable significant11 in a logistics col-
laboration decision between shipper and LSP and is the impact on such a decision posi-
tive or negative. Impact is defined as positive in case it is expected that a decision maker 
prefers logistics collaboration alternatives with a higher level of the specific variable. On 
the other hand, impact is defined as negative in case it is expected that a decision maker 
prefers a logistics collaboration alternative with a lower level of the specific variable. 
These two aspects can not be tested by one hypothesis. As a result for each of the five 
key variables two hypotheses are drafted. The five variables incorporate both rational 
(costs and service) and immaterial (trust, confidentiality and commitment) elements. 
Therefore, the test results can be used to verify whether the aspect of  non-full rational-
ity functions as a threshold to benefit from logistics collaboration (hypothesis eleven) 
12. Next to this, hypotheses twelve till fourteen are related to the theoretical conclusion 
that decision makers display inertia and that this functions as a threshold to benefit 
from logistics collaboration. To confirm this theoretical finding, inertia needs to have a 
significant value in our test results and inertia needs to be valued negatively, because it 
is expected that a decision maker prefers to stick to his current logistics solutions. These 
results are used to test hypothesis fourteen: inertia functions as a threshold to benefit 
from logistics collaboration. 
9  These five key variables are explained in table 10 in section 5.1.
10 For a detailed discussion about the selection of the stated preference method to test our hypotheses, we 
refer to section 1.5.
11 To determine whether a specific variable is significant; the results of the SP experiment are used. A  variable 
is significant at a 95% confidence level, if the t-ratio is greater than 1.96. More details about these tests can 
be found in section 8.4.3. 
12 More details about how the other decision making variables are incorporated in the choice experiment is 
explained in chapter 8.2.1.| 83
Theoretical findings and hypotheses
5.3  Introduction to empirical research phase
As discussed in the previous section, a stated preference experiment is used to test our 
hypotheses. Nevertheless, the empirical research phase starts with a sector study and 
some case studies; because the results of the literature review alone provide an insuf-
ficient base to design a reliable choice experiment13. The sector study is used to gather 
more specific information about the two sectors involved in our study: the chemical and 
LSP industry. This sector study is described in chapter 6. 
Subsequently, case studies are used to get an in-depth understanding of logistics collab-
oration and outsourcing based on practitioners’ knowledge. The results of the literature 
review are the starting point to identify the topics that will be reviewed during the case 
studies. Previous section makes clear that costs, service, trust, confidentiality and com-
mitment are identified as the most important variables in a logistics collaboration deci-
sion between shipper and LSP. Nevertheless, this theoretical conclusion needs further 
empirical validation before the variables can be incorporated in the choice experiment. 
Case studies will be used for this validation.
Additionally, logistics outsourcing is the start of a collaborative relationship with one or 
more logistics service providers and results in purchasing logistics services. Literature re-
view makes clear that the position of logistics services in Kraljic’s purchasing portfolio is 
more differentiated than some decades ago. As a result, the sourcing approach used for 
logistics services is also expected to be more differentiated than the traditionally used 
transaction-oriented approach. Nevertheless, there is less empirical evidence available 
whether shippers also actually have adapted their sourcing approach to the changed 
situation. Finally, the case studies are used to analyze the nature of the logistics activi-
ties outsourced and the level of logistics collaboration in the chemical industry. The case 
studies are discussed in chapter 7. 
Together with the results of the literature review and the sector studies, the results of 
the case studies create a solid base to design a realistic stated preference experiment.
The design and results of the stated preference experiment are described in chapter 8.   




Individuals do not act 
as fully rational agents, 
but incorporate both 
rational and immaterial 
incentives in their deci-
sion making.
A. Sign
Costs 1] Costs of services provided by LSP are valued nega-
tively in logistics collaboration decision.
Service 2] Service is valued positively in logistics collaboration 
decisions
Trust  3] Trust is valued positively in logistics collaboration 
decisions.
Confidentiality 4] Confidentiality is valued positively in logistics col-
laboration decisions.
Commitment 5] Commitment is valued negatively in a logistics col-
laboration decision.
B. Impact
Costs 6] Costs of services provided by LSP significantly 
impact logistics collaboration decision.
Service 7] Service significantly impacts logistics collaboration 
decision.
Trust  8] Trust significantly impacts logistics collaboration 
decision.
Confidentiality 9] Confidentiality significantly impacts logistics col-
laboration decision.
Commitment 10] Commitment significantly impacts logistics col-
laboration decision.
C. Threshold
Full rationality 11] The aspect of non-full rationality functions as a 
threshold to benefit from logistics collaboration. 
Decision makers display 
inertia in logistics col-
laboration decisions
A. Sign
Inertia 12] Inertia is valued negatively in a logistics collabora-
tion decision.
B. Impact
Inertia 13] Inertia significantly impacts logistics collaboration 
decision.
C. Threshold
Inertia 14] The aspect of inertia functions as a threshold to 
benefit from logistics collaboration.
Table 11: Hypotheses for empirical testing| 85
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6.   Focus industries 
In this chapter, the industries that are involved in our empirical research are introduced. 
Our empirical data are collected at shippers and LSPs active in the chemical industry14. 
The chemical sector and the logistics service provider’s industry are discussed in this 
chapter. The first section describes the chemical sector. Successively, the current situation 
and the different subsectors are explained. Afterwards, the second section focuses on 
the logistics service provider’s industry. This section explains the current situation in the 
service provider’s industry and the different types of LSPs that are active in this market. 
6.1   Chemical industry
6.1.1   Current situation
The chemical sector is a key contributor to the European economy. Throughout the Euro-
pean Union (EU), about 1.26 million people are employed in one of the 29,000 chemical 
companies and the industry provides further employment in a range of downstream 
industries. In 2008, the industry had an annual turnover of 537 billion euro (Cefic, 2009). 
This makes the EU one of the chemical blocks in the world. This is also presented in 
figure 13. 
Figure 13: Geographic Breakdown of World Chemicals Sales 2008 (Cefic, 2009)
14 For a detailed discussion about the selection of the chemical industry we refer to section 1.5.88 |
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The chemical industry is also unique in supplying every other sector of the economy with 
essential materials. The competitiveness of all these sectors is partly dependent on the 
efficient supply of chemical products. It is for that reason that the chemical industry has 
been described as the “anchor” of a modern economy (Howitt, 2000; McKinnon, 2004; 
Schreckenbach and Becker, 2006).
In general, the chemical industry has a high intensity in terms of its generation of trans-
portation and logistics activities. On average the chemical industry spends about 8 to 
10 percent of its total turnover on logistics and supply chain activities. This is estimated 
at 60 billion euro and represents 1.5 billion tonnes of movement per year in 2005. This 
represents five percent of the total tonnes lifted in the EU (Braithwaite, 2005). 
Safety and environment are main topics within the chemicals industry. Despite the fact 
that the chemical industry is one of the most highly regulated industrial sectors, the 
public perception of the chemical industry is not purely positive. This requires build-
ing trust by engaging in dialogue with those stakeholders shaping the environment: 
customers, regulators, legislators, scientists, opinion-formers, media and the public at 
large (Cefic, 2006). By building trust, the industry can anticipate and effectively address 
the important policy and society issues affecting the industry’s long-term prospects and 
competitiveness. 
Despite the positive facts and figures, the future for the EU chemical industry might be 
less bright. The worldwide competition is getting fiercer, and the EU as a major chemi-
cal production region is at risk. Developments in the last 10 years show the EU was the 
leader in world chemicals sales, but has lost its first place in the ranking to Asia in 2005 
(Cefic, 2007).  
Regulation, energy, transport and investments have a strong impact on the industry’s 
competitiveness. On all four counts, the picture in Europe compares unfavorably to that 
in other parts in the world (Cefic, 2004). On the regulatory front, the EU is continuing 
to tighten its health, safety and environmental laws, more than in most other parts of 
the world. 
Besides, the chemical industry is an energy intensive industry, but energy costs in Europe 
are higher than in Northern America and Asia. Another important disadvantage for the 
EU chemical industry is the overloaded transport infrastructure in Europe, and the higher 
logistics costs. 
Finally, investments in the EU’s chemical sector are shrinking steadily. This includes R&D 
expenditures as well as capital investments. 
Summarized the current developments result in a conflicting cost pressure for the chem-
ical industry in Europe. This conflicting cost pressure is reflected in figure 14. Downward | 89
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there is cost pressure by the increased competition from rapid growth of Middle Eastern 
and Far Eastern chemical industries. 
At the same time there is an upward cost pressure by higher fuel and labor costs, tighter 
environmental and security controls, congested transport infrastructure, and longer dis-
tance to customers. 
Figure 14: Conflicting cost pressure (McKinnon, 2004)
To secure the industry’s long-term competitiveness, decisive action by both the indus-
try and the authorities is required to steer the critical drivers determining the chemical 
industry in the right direction over the next ten years (Budde et al., 2006; Cefic, 2004; 
ECTA, 2006). One of these critical drivers15 is supply chain collaboration (Cefic, 2004; 
McKinnon, 2004; Roller et al., 2004). This collaboration could take place along similar 
firms (horizontal collaboration) or along the vertical chain between producers, distribu-
tors, customers and logistics service providers (vertical collaboration). The chemical in-
15 Other drivers that are mentioned are innovation and focus on economies of scale90 |
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dustry has almost universally outsourced its physical logistics while retaining most of 
its supply chain control and design (Braithwaite, 2005). Stronger relationships need to 
be established with the LSPs to find truly innovative and therefore competitive supply 
chain solutions. Creating win-win relationships between suppliers and LSPs offer major 
opportunities for value creation, fulfilling customer expectations and competitive dif-
ferentiation (Engel and Roolfs-Broihan, 2006). 
6.1.2   Subsectors in the chemical industry
As many other sectors, the chemical sector exists of a diverse range of products, pro-
cesses and organizations. Chemical products can be roughly segmented into commodi-
ties and specialties. Raw materials and basic chemicals are characterized as commodi-
ties. Intermediates and end-products are identified as specialties. Albeit this distinction 
is common place in the industry, it should be kept in mind that chemical commodities 
are not equal to commoditized products we know in other sectors of industries. Chemi-
cal commodities still offer more opportunities for differentiation (Hofmann and Budde, 
2006). It needs to be noticed that the product portfolios of many major players in the 
chemical industry are quite diverse. These hybrid players have a portfolio ranging from 
primarily commodity products to specialty products. 
The two subsectors not only differ in products supplied, but also in other aspects. Com-
modities are more capital intensive, are produced in larger volumes, have lower profit 
margins and the chemical commodities have a highly cyclical character. On the contrary, 
specialties are characterized by low volumes, high profit margins and high investment 
risks. These differences also affect the logistics processes. Commodities have a continu-
ous 24/7 production process, and focus on cost reduction and bulk transportation. On 
the other hand, production processes for specialties are organized in batches, specialties 
are mainly distributed as packed materials, and this subsector is more customers driven.
In the remainder of this thesis, we will use the two identified subsectors to distinguish 
different types of chemical companies.
6.2   Logistics service providers
6.2.1   Current situation
Last decades, logistics outsourcing increased. Nevertheless, the service providers’ indus-
try is facing hard times. There are several causes for this problem: fierce competition 
in the global market, high fixed cost, fragmentation of transport flows, pressure to 
decrease CO2 emission, congestion, rising petrol and labor prices and the increasing | 91
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expectations of customers in terms of both service and price (Cruijssen et al, 2007; 
Groothedde et al, 2005; Verstrepen et al, 2009). Overall it may be concluded that the 
logistics sector as a whole is under pressure with negative or low profit margins. The 
vicious circle depicted in figure 15 displays the current situation of the LSPs. It shows 
that the service providers’ industry is characterized by low profit margins, strong frag-
mentation and price competition. As a result, service providers do not have the time and 
money to develop new skills or undertake new projects to create competitive advantage. 
Consequently, no innovation or other initiatives are undertaken to structurally improve 
the level of service. The logistics services will remain a commodity and competition will 
be focused on the lowest price. This results in even thinner profit margins and stronger 
competition: starting another iteration of the vicious circle.
As a result of the situation described above, LSPs focus on efficiency by achieving econo-
mies of scale and scope. Therefore, during the last decade the LSP industry is character-
ized by mergers and acquisitions (Carbone and Stone, 2005; Lieb and Bentz, 2005). As a 
result, the number of large logistics companies has increased.
Besides mergers and acquisitions, economies of scale and scope in a logistics network 
can also be reached by collaboration. Therefore, collaboration concepts are important 
for the long term competitiveness of the LSPs. This means the service providers have the 
challenge to become the customer’s partner instead of merely its supplier. 
Figure 15: Vicious circle LSPs (Cruijssen, 2006)
The situation described above presents a general picture. It needs to be noticed that 
there are also companies that are in a more positive situation. Especially companies that 
have the required economies of scale or focus on niche markets are able to realize higher 92 |
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margins. Examples are the bulk and tank transporters. The chemical sector is responsible 
for 70% of the volume handled by tank and bulk carriers (ING, 2004).  Figure 16 com-
pares the average profit margins of the transport sector and the profit margins of the 
bulk and tank transporters over the years 2001 till 2007 in the Netherlands. 
Figure 16: Profitability tank and bulk sector (TLN, 2008)
6.1.2   Different types of LSPs
The buyers of logistics services act on different markets with their own specific require-
ments. Therefore, the requested logistics services differ case by case. As a result logis-
tics service providers differ in terms of services supplied and assets owned. Literature 
provides a number of classifications to distinguish different types of LSPs. Examples 
are the “green / blue world classification” originally provided by Dorp et al. (1992), an 
asset-based classification from Muller (1993), and a classification based on the degree of 
integration between LSP and shipper provided by Shary and Skjott-Larsen (2000). In this 
dissertation we use a classification based on service scope to distinguish different types 
of LSPs (Vannieuwenhuyse, 2003). This classification is chosen, because it is also used by 
many players in the market.
•  1st Party-logistics (1PL): in a 1PL concept, logistics activities are not outsourced, but 
performed in-house by the shipper. The 1PL is therefore not an autonomous service 
provider, but an integrated department of the shipper’s firm. 
•  2nd Party-logistics (2PL): a shipper outsources the operational activities of logistics 
tasks (transport or warehousing) to a specialized provider, but organization and plan-
ning are still be done by the shipper.
•  3rd Party-logistics (3PL): a 3PL allows a shipper to outsource a package of logistics 
services. This LSP takes the responsibility for planning and organization, and in that | 93
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role communicates with both the shipper and the receiver(s). A 3PL provider has the 
possibility to use his own assets, but can also use assets of other providers. In the 
last case, the provider is an intermediary between his customer and other LSPs. The 
provider is then characterized as a 3PL+ (Rustenberg et al, 2006). 
•  4th Party-logistics (4PL): a provider that delivers a comprehensive supply chain solution 
to the shipper by even taking the responsibility for the management of the logistics 
activities. A 4PL focuses on this orchestration role and therefore generally does not 
own logistics assets. 
This classification makes it possible to illustrate the development process of the logistics 
service providers’ industry. Carbone and Stone (2005) make clear that there have been 
three main waves in the development of the service providers market. (Carbone and 
Stone, 2005). In the early 1960s, traditional services like warehousing and transport 
were outsourced. Later on, in the early 1980s, the traditional LSPs began providing value 
adding services through acquisition of specialist capabilities. The last wave dates from 
the late 1990s when a number of players on the market started to deliver supply chain 
solutions.
Majority of the players in the logistics services market still focus on basic transportation 
services from A to B. Just a minority of the players have developed themselves towards 
a 4PL player that orchestrates the supply chain. 
Also the chemical industry is dependent on the resources and capabilities of the service 
providers industry, because the industry has almost universally outsourced to a range of 
providers including bulk tanker operators, container lines, terminal operators, packed 
and bulk trucking companies, warehouse operators, packaging specialists and a range 
of ICT companies. Not all the players on the logistics services market are active in the 
chemical sector and none of the players provides a full range of integrated services 
across modes and geographical areas to the chemical sector (Braithwaite, 2005). Espe-
cially in subsegments where there are additional requirements because of the (danger-
ous) character of the goods, the number of players is limited. Even in conventional 3PL 
services there are no truly pan-European providers that serve the chemical industry in 
case of special requirements. Unfortunately, no exact numbers are available about the 
number of LSPs that are active in the chemical sector.94 || 95
7.   Case studies 
This chapter described the case studies. These case studies are conducted to validate 
some theoretical findings of the literature review and through that create in-depth un-
derstanding of the status of logistics collaboration and outsourcing in the chemical 
industry. This understanding is needed to create a solid base for our stated preference 
experiment, which is used to test our hypotheses.
This chapter is structured as follows. First, the case study methodology is discussed. In 
this section the case study design, protocol and drawbacks are described. Furthermore, 
in section two the seven cases are introduced. Afterwards, section three discusses the 
results of the cross-case analyzes16. Finally, section four concludes with summarizing the 
main results of this chapter.
7.1   Methodology
7.1.1   Case study design
Within a case study, a researcher has the option of selecting a single or multiple case 
study design (Yin, 1994; Verschuren and Doorewaard, 2005). The main reason for con-
ducting  multiple  case  studies  is  replication,  because  replication  would  consider  the 
robustness of the findings (Yin, 1994). This research project follows a multiple case 
approach for the same reason. Although literature does not provide an unambiguous 
rule-of-thumb for the number of cases required for a multiple case study approach; 
Eisenhardt (1989) states that usually between 4 and 10 cases are sufficient. Using mul-
tiple case studies, there are several strategies possible to analyze the cases and to adjust 
the theoretical framework. The first strategy is to reflect the case study on the theory, 
and to adjust the theoretical framework after completion of each case. This implies that 
after each case study a new case study protocol should be developed reflecting the new 
insights. The second strategy is to use a single case study protocol for each of the cases, 
and to analyze the results of the cases after completion of all cases. We follow the sec-
16 The detailed single case descriptions can be found in appendix E.96 |
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ond strategy, because this allows a joint or cross-case analysis, and prevents bias in the 
adjustments made to the framework towards the last completed case study (Yin, 1994).
7.1.2   Drawbacks of case study strategy
Although in general case studies are considered an adequate strategy for in-depth de-
scriptions, interpretations, and explanations of real-life phenomena (Eisenhardt, 1989), 
case studies also have drawbacks (Yin, 1994; Verschuren and Doorewaard, 2005). First, 
case studies seldom yield statistically representative results, which inhibits generalizing 
of findings. This however is no problem when the goal is to build or to validate theo-
retical findings like in our case study. Second, there are no standard analysis techniques 
for case study data. To enable ex-post verification by others, case study protocols and 
analysis procedures should be made as explicit as possible by the researcher. Third, case 
studies have the risk of yielding biased information, because case studies are often char-
acterized by personal interaction (interviews) between researcher and respondent. Three 
main potential pitfalls are (Foddy, 1996):
•  Failure of respondents to understand the questions as intended.
•  A lack of effort, or interest on the part of the respondents.
•  Unwillingness to admit to certain attitudes or behaviour.
These pitfalls are caused by various biases (Muilerman, 2001):
•  Affirmation bias: answers are conformed to what is expected to be the ‘right’ answer 
in the eyes of the researcher.
•  Unconstrained response bias: unreliable answers because the respondent does not 
understand the task, or because the study’s topic does not appeal to this respondent.
•  Rationalization bias: respondents want to cast behavior in a better light.
•  Policy response bias: respondents want to influence the outcome of the study by de-
liberately manipulating answers, thus trying to affect policy decisions that might be 
taken as a consequence of the study. 
The next subsection explains what is undertaken to avoid these biases in our case stud-
ies.
7.1.3   Case study protocol
A case study protocol is the preparation of a case study. It contains the level of analy-
sis, tactics to approach participating organizations, number and type of participants, 
sources of data collection, instruments (e.g. questionnaire), as well as the general rules | 97
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to be followed. The protocol is the major way of increasing the reliability of case study 
research, and is intended to guide the researcher during the process. Different aspects 
of a case study are discussed below.
a. Case study objective
The case studies in this research project have an exploratory character and are not used 
to reach the final research objective. The case studies are conducted to get in-depth 
understanding of logistics collaboration and outsourcing decisions based on practition-
ers’ knowledge. Through that we create a solid base for the second empirical phase and 
thus our findings are used as input for the second empirical phase: a Stated Preference 
experiment.
b. Target group
Where most contributions on outsourcing and collaboration in logistics take a single 
perspective (Cruijssen et al, 2007; Lieb and Bentz, 2005; Menon et al. 1998; Sink and 
Langley, 1997), our cases take an integrated perspective. We choose this integrated per-
spective, because the topic of collaboration decisions is characterized by interaction be-
tween at least two parties. The integrated perspective means that both logistics service 
providers and shippers are involved. As a result, target groups for our cases are shippers 
and LSPs in the chemical industry. The target is to have at least one of the interviews per 
case at the shipper’s side and at least one at the service provider’s side.
c. Unit of analysis
The unit of analysis in each case is a tender process for three reasons. First, a tender 
process is the starting point of a collaborative relationship between shipper and LSP. 
Next to this, during a tender process the level of collaboration between both parties is 
defined. Finally, in a tender process certain criteria are used to select the LSP.  Defining 
a tender process as the central unit of analysis in each case, gives us the possibilities to 
analyze these subjects. 
d. Selection criteria
The goal of our cases is to get a better understanding of the status of logistics col-
laboration and outsourcing in the chemical industry. The selected cases need to make it 
possible to reach this objective and therefore have to meet the following criteria. First, 
both shippers and LSPs should be active in the chemical industry. Furthermore, the pur-
chasing project should not have taken place more than two years ago to ensure partici-
pants have required information available. Finally, the sample needs to include various 
logistics services. As a result the external validity of the study will increase, because the 98 |
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findings are applicable to different types of logistics services sourced (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
McCutcheon and Meredith, 1993). 
The above mentioned criteria mean that random sampling would be inappropriate. We 
need to use purposive sampling: cases are chosen on the basis of their relevance with 
regard to the research goal and the defined selection criteria.
e. Tactics to approach organizations
Representatives of chemical branch organizations are consulted to identify possible cas-
es and accompanying primary contact persons. These persons are contacted to request 
their willingness to participate and to verify whether all selection criteria are met. In total 
seven cases at five different shippers are selected17. The seven cases are spread over six 
different LSPs18. In the remaining of the dissertation the different projects are identified 
by the letters A till G to protect the anonymity of the participating companies. Involved 
shippers are all leading, multinational chemical companies. Also the LSPs operate Euro-
pean- or worldwide and can be characterized as third-party logistics service providers 
which all offer a wide range of logistics services. The cases differ in type of logistics 
services sourced. 
f. Data collection 
Yin (1994) lists five sources for data collection: 1) documents: publications, memos, 2) 
archival records: contracts, numeric data, 3) interviews: semi-structured, open questions, 
4) observations, and 5) physical artefacts: devices and tools. It is not recommended to 
use one single source for data collection. The principle of triangulation (using multiple 
sources of data) is strongly advised. Also in our case studies we use multiple sources of 
data as much as possible. Table 12 depicts which sources of data are used per case study. 
Case A Case B Case C Case D Case E Case F Case G
Documents, me-
mos, publications




x x x x
Interviews x X x x x x X
Table 12: Sources of data per case study
17 Case A and B as well as C and D are tender projects of different business groups of the same shipper.
18 One LSP is involved in case A and B.| 99
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Interviews are the main sources of data in all seven case studies. The case study approach 
entails the use of key informant method, interviewing a limited number of participants. 
This is consistent with qualitative researchers’ recommendations that it is appropriate to 
depend on the extensive insights of a few key informants to develop a comprehensive 
understanding of a particular phenomenon (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; McCracken, 1988). 
Therefore the interviewees are not chosen on a random basis, but through the use of 
purposive sampling. For each case an exploratory interview with the primary contact 
person is set up to select the people to be interviewed. Interviewing multiple func-
tional representatives enables data triangulation, which improves validity and reduces 
biases. In total twenty-five interviews are carried out with representatives involved in 
the discussed projects. The respondents have a leading position in logistics, purchasing 
or general management. Each interview lasts approximately fifty to ninety minutes and 
is conducted at the participant’s workplace. The interviews are audio-taped. Table 13 
gives an overview of the case study respondents. The table only depicts the business 
card title of each respondent to ensure the anonymity of the participating respondents 
and companies. 100 |
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Case Interviews at shipper side Interviews at LSP side
A •	 Director supply chain management 1
•	 Manager sourcing and contracting
•	 Supply chain engineer
•	 Managing director 3
•	 Sector manager
B •	 Director supply chain management 1
•	 Senior sourcing and contracting officer
•	 Managing director 3
C •	 Senior manager physical distribution 2
•	 Logistics manager
•	 Category manager physical 
      Distribution
•	 Managing director
•	 Business development  
     manager
D •	 Senior manager physical distribution 2
•	 Supply chain manager
•	 Operations manager
•	 Account manager
E •	 Business manager
•	 Logistics manager
•	 Marketing & sales director
F •	 European supply chain manager •	 Managing director
•	 Operations director
G •	 Director transportation & logistics
•	 Supply chain manager
•	 Deputy managing director
•	 Managing director
1)  Person was involved in cases A and B.  Case A and B are conducted at different business groups 
of the same company.
2)  Person was involved in cases C and D.  Case C and D are conducted at different business groups 
of the same company.
3)  Person was involved in two cases. LSP was involved in case A and B.
Table 13: Case study respondents
The interviews are semi-structured, because semi-structured interviews allow for the 
collection of a large amount of data and wide variety of information while at the same 
time safeguarding the coverage of all topics. Pre-defined questionnaires are used to 
guide the interviews. The use of pre-defined questionnaires increases the transparency 
of the research approach and thus enhances reliability of the study (McCutcheon and 
Meredith, 1993). The results of the literature review and questionnaires used in similar 
studies are used to design the questionnaires. As explained above, two types of firms are 
interviewed: shippers and LSPs. This results in two types of questionnaires. Both cover 
the same topics, but are specific for different roles the two types of firms have in collab-
orative relationships. Two pilot interviews are conducted prior to the case studies to test 
the questionnaires: one pilot at the shipper’s side and one at the LSP’s side. Examples of 
both questionnaires can be found in appendix B.  | 101
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g. Data analysis
The audio-taped interviews are transcribed by the researcher. Coding is used to struc-
ture and analyze the collected data at the moment all interviews are completed. A code 
is a label for assigning units of meaning to the descriptive or inferential information 
compiled during a study (Miles and Huberman, 1994). These labels can be assigned to 
words, sentences, or paragraphs in the textual data. In this study, the codes are based 
on the central research topic and the used questionnaire. Both are accepted guidelines 
to develop a coding scheme (Miles and Huberman, 1994). The coding scheme can be 
found in appendix C. 
For reliability and dependability of the interpretations the interim conclusions in the 
coding process are discussed with other researchers in two group discussions. More-
over, two researchers, who were not involved in the case studies or group discussions, 
validated the interpretation of the interview results. Finally, to enhance external validity 
and to confirm that our interpretations are consistent with respondents’ interpretations 
a summarized overview of each interview is fed back to the particular participant for 
verification. Feedback received from the study participants is incorporated in the final 
conclusions.
f. Data quality  
Although in general case studies are considered an adequate strategy for in-depth de-
scriptions, interpretations, and explanations of real-life phenomena, case study research 
has its drawbacks (Saunders et al., 2007). Therefore issues of validity and reliability need 
to be addressed. In order to minimize drawbacks and to verify believability of the results, 
Yin (1994) has defined a set of criteria for ensuring the legitimacy of case study findings. 
This set is related to the general criteria used to judge scientific research: construct valid-
ity, internal validity, external validity and reliability. Table 14 summarizes the tactics used 
in our case studies to increase the trustworthiness of this research. 102 |
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Criteria Methods addressing this criteria in the cases
Construct validity:
“establishing correct op-
erational measures for the 
concepts studied”
-	 Triangulation of multiple informants
-	 Triangulation of multiple sources of data: interviews, company 
document and public available sources
-	 All respondents receive draft version of interview report
-	 All respondents receive draft version of case study report
-	 Interpretations and interim conclusions are discussed with other 
researchers in two group discussions




tionships whereby certain 
conditions are shown to 
lead to other conditions, as 
distinguished from spuri-
ous relationships”
-	 Rival explanations are addressed and discussed in the two group 
discussions
External validity:
“establishing a domain in 
which the study’s findings 
can be generalized”
-	 Theoretical sampling of the cases to be sure cases meet selection 
criteria
-	 Use replication logic by selecting multiple cases
Reliability:
“demonstrating that the 
operations of a study can 
be repeated with the same 
results”
-	 Development of interview questionnaires
-	 Development of case study protocol to make research transpar-
ent and repeatable
Table 14: Validity and reliability in case studies (based on Yin, 2003)
7.2   Case characteristics
This section is used to explain the characteristics of each case. In three different sub-
sections company, product and supply chain characteristics are discussed. These char-
acteristics are used in the analysis of the case study data and in the stated preference 
experiment, which will be discussed in chapter 8. For additional information about the 
cases we refer to appendix D. This appendix provides for each case some market charac-
teristics. The information is solely included for informative purposes. | 103
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7.2.1   Company characteristics
Previous chapter explains that chemical products can be roughly segmented into com-
modities and specialties. Next to this, it is mentioned that there are also many hybrid 
players that have a product portfolio ranging from primarily commodity products to 
specialties. Table 15 depicts the type of products supplied bij the shippers in our cases. 
The table shows the type of products supplied at company level, but also shows the 
type of products supplied by the specific business units involved in our research. This 
overview makes clear that 3 business units (43%) are active in the commodity market 
and that the remaining 4 (57%) supply products to the specialties market. This is in line 
with the segmentation in the sector: 45% of the turnover is generated in the commodity 
market and 55% in the specialties market. 
Table 15 also shows whether the size of the involved companies is identified as large or 
small. This identification is based on the company turnover generated on the European 
market. We follow Budde et al. (2006) and position companies that generate more than 
3 billion Euros as large companies. Based on this criterion 2 of the 5 involved shippers 
are categorized as small and the remaining 3 as large. Unfortunately, there are no data 
available about the segmentation in the sector.
As explained in section 7.1, data of our case studies are also collected at the service pro-
vider side. To classify the different LSPs that are involved in our cases, the classification 
as selected in chapter 6 is used19. The fifth column presents the results of this classifica-
tion. The information in table 15 makes clear that all involved LSPs can be classified as 
a 3PL service provider, but that the service providers differ in the geographic region(s) 
they serve.  
Finally, the last column of table 15 identifies the different logistics services sourced per 
case. This overview makes clear that the logistics services sourced differ per case. This 
is in line with our case study protocol which recommends including cases with various 
logistics services.





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































7.2.2   Product characteristics
Reviewing some product characteristics makes it possible to compare the seven cases. 
The characteristics that are discussed are chosen based on the theory as provided by Van 
Goor et al. (2005). The following two aspects will be discussed: value density and pack-
age density, Lovell et. al. (2005) and earlier Ploos van Amstel and D’hert (1996) use value 
density and packaging density to determine which elements are dominant in a logistics 
cost structure: warehousing and transportation, handling or interest. They suggest using 
this information as a starting point to define an optimal distribution structure. In our 
case we use the mentioned criteria of value density and packaging density to determine 
the characteristics of the products handled in our cases. Both aspects are classified as 
low or high. We follow Van Goor et al. (2005) and Groothedde (2009) and mark the 
value density low in case the value is lower than 2500 Euro/m3 . Based on Van Goor et al. 
(2005), we define a package density of more than 50 units/m3 as high. Table 16, shows 
that most cases have a relativly low value density and low package density. This results 
in the conclusion that transportation and warehousing are the dominant elements in the 
logistics cost structure in most of our cases bases on the theory as defined by Lovell et 
al., (2005) and Ploos van Amstel and D’hert (1996). This finding is confirmed by Kuipers 
(1999) and McKinnon (2004). Both authors describe the characteristics for the chemical 
industry and conclude that both product characteristics have a relatively low value. Nev-
ertheless, case E is an exception to this general finding, because in this case the package 
density is high. This can be explained by the fact that this is the only case where products 
are delivered to the end user of the products. These end users are farmers, who only use 




Case A Case B Case C Case D Case E Case F Case G
Value density Low Low Low Low Low Low Low
Packaging density Low Low Low Low High Low Low
Table 16: Product characteristics per case
7.2.3   Characteristics supply chain structure
Each case has its own supply chain structure. These supply chain structures are com-
pared at the following aspects: stock points, responsibility replenishment stock points, 
transportation modes used, point of customer order entry, responsibility sourcing sub-
contractors. These aspects are chosen because information about these aspects could 106 |
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be useful later on when the stated preference experiment is designed20. The results of 
the comparison are visible in table 17. This table shows that all cases use one or more 
stockpoints in their supply chain structure. These stockpoints are owned and operated 
by external logistics service providers in case these stockpoints are not located at the 
manufacturing sites of the shippers. The orchestration and coordination activities re-
lated to the replenishment activities of all stockpoints are done by the shippers. Fur-
thermore, intermodal transportation is only used for stockpoint deliveries. Customer 
deliveries are done by road transportation by all shippers, but the shipper in case B plans 
to increase customer deliveries by using intermodal transport. Customer orders for all 
cases are received by the shippers. In some cases these orders are directly forwarded to 
the service provider who is responsible for order handling and order fulfillment. In case 
A, C and G a logistics service provider is used to coordinate transportation activities. The 
subcontractors used by this LSP are sourced and contracted by the shipper in the cases A 










Case A Hub structure Shipper 1. Intermodal
2. Road
Shipper Shipper
Case B At plant sites n.a.** 1. n.a.
2. Road
Shipper n.a.





Case D GDC and hubs Shipper 1. Intermodal
2. Road
Shipper n.a.
Case E Country DC Shipper 1. Road
2. Road
Shipper n.a.
Case F EDC Shipper 1. Intermodal
2. Road
Shipper n.a.
Case G At plant sites n.a. 1. n.a. 
2. Road
Shipper LSP
* Two answers per case: 1. refers to transportation mode used to replenish stockpoints; 2. refers 
to transportation mode used for customer deliveries. 
** n.a. = not applicable
Table 17: Characteristics supply chain structure per case
20 Details about the design of our stated preference experiment can be found in section 8.2.| 107
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7.3   Findings:  cross-case analysis
In each case the same topics are analyzed and compared. This section presents results 
of this cross-case analysis. The central subjects in this analysis are: logistics outsourcing, 
logistics collaboration and the purchasing process for logistics services.
7.3.1   Logistics outsourcing and collaboration
All visited companies have logistics outsourcing as part of their logistics strategy. The 
drivers for the shippers to outsource (parts of) their logistics activities are in line with the 
drivers identified during the literature review21. Table 18 compares the drivers identified 
in literature with the drivers identified per case. 
Drivers logistics outsourcing identified in literature review Drivers identified per case
Cost savings Case A, B
Service improvements
Focus on core competencies Case A, B, C, D, E, F, G
Investment related Case B, G
Missing expertise
Operational flexibility Case E, G
Table 18: Drivers of logistics outsourcing
Table 18 shows focusing on core competences is mentioned by all visited companies as 
reason to outsource logistics activities. This does not mean that all logistics activities 
are defined as non-core competences by the shippers. The outsourced activities can be 
classified as operational, coordination or orchestration activities. Table 19 shows which 
kinds of activities are outsourced in each specific case. Most of these activities have an 
operational character and these activities are defined as non-core activities. This conclu-
sion is in line with previous studies on this topic, because previous studies show that 
logistics services frequently outsourced are those with an operational character (Budde 
et al, 2006; Selviaridis and Spring, 2007). At the other hand, supply chain coordination 
and orchestration activities are often identified as important and for that reason not 
outsourced to external service providers. Table 19 shows that shippers of case C, D en 
G outsource coordination activities. Nevertheless, also these shippers are reserved in 
outsourcing this type of logistics activities. Shipper in case C explicitly decides to split 
21 The drivers of logistics outsourcing are described in chapter 2.2.1108 |
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operational and coordination activities between different service providers because of 
fears about loss of control and increased dependency. Shipper in case D tries to keep the 
internal logistics knowledge up to date to avoid dependency from external providers. 
Finally, shipper in case G decides to hand over operational and coordination activities to 
the same providers, but contracted three service providers for these activities because of 
dependency reasons too. 
Type of activities
Case Operational Coordination Orchestration Remark
A •	 Transport
•	 Customs & brokerage
•	 VAL
•	 Warehousing
•	 Inventory management 
•	 Order processing & fulfillment
B •	 Transport
•	 Customs & brokerage
















•	 Inventory management 













split over three 
LSPs
Table 19: Type of activities outsourced per case| 109
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The involved shippers also explain their concerns of logistics outsourcing and collabora-
tion. These concerns function as an impediment to increase the level of logistics out-
sourcing. Table 20 compares the concerns identified in literature with the concerns indi-
cated per case. This table shows that concerns about dependency and loss of control are 
most often mentioned by our respondents. Also existing literature marks dependency 
and loss of control as some of the main impediments for logistics outsourcing (Razzaque 
and Sheng, 1988; Van Laarhoven et al., 2000) 22. 
Impediment logistics outsourcing  
identified in literature review
Impediment logistics outsourcing  
identified per case
Loss of control Case C, D, F
Dependency Case A, B, C, D, E, F, G
Cost issues
Service issues
Partner selection Case G





Table 20: Impediment logistics outsourcing
Outsourcing logistics activities results in collaborative relationships between shippers 
and LSPs. The relationship between shipper and LSP in each case is positioned at the 
relationship ladder as defined by Gulati and Kletter (2005)23. Three criteria are used 
to position a case at this ladder. The first criterion is commitment. Commitment is ex-
pressed as the contract term agreed between shipper and LSP. At the lowest level of the 
relationship ladder, arm’s length, services are bought as in isolated transaction and there 
is no contract or commitment between the parties. At the second level of the ladder, 
bundling, a short or mid term commitment is used. A contract term of less than three 
years refers to a short term commitment and a contract term between three and five 
years refers to a mid term commitment. The next step at the ladder, integration, is char-
acterized by a long term commitment. A contract term of more than five years refers to a 
long term commitment.  At the final stage, strategic partnering, no end date is defined. 
The second criterion is the type of services outsourced to the involved LSP. In line with 
22 Concerns of logistics outsourcing are discussed in section 2.2.2
23 The relationship ladder is discussed in section 3.1.1110 |
Chapter 7
table 19, these services are classified as operational, coordination or orchestration ser-
vices. Arm’s length and bundling relationships focus on operational activities. The next 
level at the ladder, integration, focuses on coordination and the strategic partnering on 
the orchestration activities. Finally, the third criterion is the objective of the collabora-
tion. Has the shipper the objective to create a win-win situation or does the relationship 
have an opportunistic character? The lowest two levels at the ladder, arm’s length and 
bundling, normally have an opportunistic character. The level of trust between the par-
ties is relatively low. At the integration and strategic partnering level, the collaborating 
partners have the objective to build a long term relationship and thus to create a win-
win situation for both parties. The level of trust between the parties is relatively high. 
Figure 17 shows the position of the seven cases at the relationship ladder. This figure 
makes clear that case B is positioned between arm’s length and bundling. Reasons are 
the short commitment of 1 year, operational character of the outsourced services and 
the opportunistic character of the relationship. The shipper hesitates to use longer com-
mitments towards their logistics service providers and prefers tendering on a yearly basis 
to reduce the logistics costs. Also the involved LSP indicates they are reserved to invest 
in the relationship, because of the opportunistic behavior of the shipper. As a result, the 
level of trust between the parties is low. 
In addition, figure 17 shows that the cases A, C, E and F are characterized as bundling. 
Bundling relationships are normally characterized by a short or mid term commitment. 
Case A, C and E have a mid term commitment of three years. Nevertheless, it needs to 
be noticed that the motives to choose for this mid-term commitment have an opportu-
nistic character; the shipper does not have the intention to build a long term and stable 
relationship with the LSP. In case A and E a commitment of three years has been a mini-
mum requirement of the LSP to make operation specific investments. After this period, 
the shipper will choose for a shorter commitment. The shipper in case C chooses for a 
mid term commitment to ensure sufficient logistics capacity in the market. At the other 
hand, case F has a relativly long commitment of five years. This commitment could be 
an indication for a different type of relationship than bundling. Nevertheless, the reason 
identified to choose for this longer commitment is not related to the intention to build 
a long term and stable relationship with the LSP. In line with case C, the shipper tries 
to avoid price-rises and ensures logistics capacity by using longer contract terms at the 
moment the situation on the market for logistics services seems to change from a buyer 
to a seller market. Next to this, cases A, E and F are positioned as bundling, because of 
the operational character of the outsourced activities. The situation in case C is slightly 
different. The outsourced activities are at the coordination level. Nevertheless, the re-
sponsibilities of the LSP are still limited, because the operational activities that belong 
to this coordination responsibility are for dependency reasons outsourced to other LSPs. | 111
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This reflects a low level of trust between shipper and LSP. As a result, case C is positioned 
as bundling, in spite of the character of the outsourced services. 
Finally, figure 17 makes clear that cases D and G are positioned at the integration level 
of the relationship ladder, for the following reasons. First, these cases are characterized 
by a long term commitment of 7 and 5 years. Next to this, the outsourced activities are 
at coordination level. Finally, parties involved in case D and G have explicitly indicated 
that the long term commitment is needed to create a stable supply chain and have the 
possibility to improve the current operation for both the shipper and LSP. As a result, 
the relationships in the cases D and G are characterized by a relatively high level of trust.
Figure 17: Position of the different cases at the relationship ladder
7.3.2   Purchasing process
Kraljic matrix
As discussed in chapter 2, the Kraljic matrix has become the standard in the field of 
purchasing models to determine a comprehensive strategy for supply. Therefore, the 
respondents in our cases are asked to position their tender project in the matrix. This 
perception of the respondents is presented in figure 18.
Figure 18: Position cases in Kraljic’s matrix:  perception respondents112 |
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The information in figure 18 is important, because this can help us to determine whether 
the   purchasing approach followed by a shipper is in line with the position of the case 
in the Kraljic’s matrix. Nevertheless, it will also be useful to position cases in the Kraljic’s 
matrix from the perspective of the researcher. This exercise will give the possibility to 
determine whether there are differences in the perception of the respondents and the 
valuation of the researcher. Next to this, the researcher will use the same criteria for all 
cases to determine the place of each case in the Kraljic matrix. This will give us a possibil-
ity to compare the cases. 
The literature review in chapter 2 makes clear that the theory does not provide pre-
scriptions or procedures of how to use the Kraljic’s matrix. To solve this problem, we 
use the methodology proposed by Groothedde (2009). Originally, Groothedde has de-
signed this methodology to define the preferred type of network for an organization. 
Nevertheless, the procedure can also be used to position items in other portfolios like 
Kraljic. Groothedde proposes to break down each axis into a number of factors. The 
factors together are a proxy for a specific axis in the matrix. The factors are valued at 
a five point scale by the researcher. The points for each of the factors are added and 
the total number of points determines the position at a particular axis. Each axis has a 
value range from 0 till 10. The factors used to breakdown the axis and the accompany-
ing values are determined by using existing publications (Gelderman and Van Weele, 
2003; Groothedde, 2009; Vermunt, 2008)24. The position at the profit impact axis is 
determined by two factors: the sourced service expressed as percentage of the turnover 
and the strategic importance of the service. The position at the supply risk axis is also 
determined by two factors: number of alternative suppliers available in the market and 
the power position of the shipper in the purchasing process. The factors and their values 
are depicted in figure 19. The example used in figure 19 shows a situation where the 
sourced services are between two and five percent of the turnover and the strategic im-
portance of the sourced services is valued as very low. As a result, the total points for the 
profit impact axis are three. Next step is to value the supply risk axis. There are between 
four and six alternative suppliers available in the market that can provide comparable 
services. Therefore, three points are added to the first factor of the supply risk axis. Next 
to this, the power position of the shipper is valued high. This results in an additional two 
points. In total the supply risk axis receives five points. If we then plot the profit impact 
and supply risk points in the Kraljic matrix, the position in this matrix can be derived. In 
our example, this results in a position between non-critical and leverage items.
24 More details about the operationalisation of the axis as proposed by  these authors can be found in section 
2.3.2.| 113
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Figure 19: Kraljic’s valuation procedure (adapted from Groothedde, 2009)
Using this procedure to position our cases, this results in the following picture.
Figure 20: Position cases in Kraljic’s matrix: researcher’s perception
A comparison of figure 18 and 20 results in the observation that cases A and B are 
positioned in different quadrants of the Kraljic’s matrix by the respondents and the 
researcher. The respondents position case A as an item between leverage items and 
strategic items. The valuation by the researcher results in a position in the leverage item 114 |
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quadrant. This is the result of the researcher’s lower valuation of the supply risk. The 
higher valuation of the supply risk at the shipper’s side is explained by the strong fears 
of being dependent of an external supplier. On the other hand, the researcher concludes 
that there are enough alternative suppliers available in the market and that the power 
position of the shipper is relatively strong. Also case B is positioned differently by the 
respondents and the researcher. The respondents positioned case B as a leverage item 
and the researcher as a non-critical item. The difference can be explained by the differ-
ent position at the profit impact axis. The respondents argue that this position is rela-
tively high, because logistics is defined as one of the areas to create competitive advan-
tage. Also the supply chain disruptions caused by the service providers add a significant 
amount of additional costs. The researcher valued the position at the profit axis lower, 
because the strategic character of the logistics service contradicts to the strong focus on 
rates and short term character of the relationship between shipper and LSP. Next to this, 
the additional costs could be decreased by another way of working.
Tender process
The tender projects of each case are compared at different aspects to analyze the pur-
chasing process and the used purchasing approach. Results of this comparison can be 
found in table 21. This table shows that all investigated projects followed a standard-
ized, phased process to source the required logistics services. Only the number of phases 
used differs per case. The projects in case D, E and F use a process consisting of four 
phases. The companies in case A, B, C and G use a six phased approach. In these projects 
two additional phases, RFI and Evaluation, are added. In case A, B, C the RFI phase is 
used to reduce the number of LSPs to continue with. This contradicts to the recommen-
dation of Van der Valk and Rozemeijer (2009)25 to use a RFI to earlier involve the supplier 
in the purchasing process. Only in case G the RFI is used to define the logistics concept in 
consultation with the LSP and thus to get the supplier already involved at the beginning 
of the purchasing process. 
Subsequently, table 21 makes clear that almost all projects investigated have a closed 
character. Closed refers to the fact that the requested services are already highly speci-
fied by the buyers before entering the market place. Most shippers used a so called 
input specification method to define their requirement. This means shippers do not only 
specify the services in terms of the required performance (output terms), but the ship-
pers also specify the processes en procedures that need to be followed by the LSPs in 
deep detail. Consequently, the expertise and knowledge of service providers is not used 
25 A detailed explanation of the extended purchasing process as proposed by Van der Valk and Rozemeijer 
(2009) can be found in section 3.2.2.| 115
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to define the service requirements and underlying logistics concept. In more detail, the 
service providers involved in the projects of case B, D and F are only asked to provide tar-
iffs. Also in the cases A, C and E, the requested services and underlying logistics concept 
are already defined by the shipper, but in these projects the LSPs have the possibility to 
suggest improvements in their response documents.
Nevertheless, the projects A till F have in common that the services are specified without 
consultation of external sources. In project G the situation is different. The shipper in 
case G uses the RFI phase of the purchasing process to define the final requirements and 
logistics concept in cooperation with the LSPs. The interviewed LSPs confirm that most 
tender procedures have a closed character. On the other hand, they also state that they 
could take the initiative more often to propose suggestions to the shippers. The LSPs 
indicate that it is hard to find sufficient time to put forward these suggestions, because 
they are overloaded by RFI’s and RFQ’s. This issue could be solved by being more selec-
tive in deciding which tender proposals are answered and which not. 
In addition, table 21 shows the commitment terms used in the seven cases. These com-
mitment terms are already discussed in section 7.3.1. This discussion makes clear that 
the arguments to choose for a mid-term or long-term commitment in the cases A, C, E 
and F have an opportunistic character. Only in the cases D and G a long term commit-
ment is given to build a long term and stable relationship with the LSP.  

















































The criteria used in the cases are compared with the collaboration decision criteria iden-
tified in the literature review. The results of this comparison are shown in table 22. This 
table shows how many times each of the decision criteria found in literature is used in 
case studies. Comparing the results of the literature review and the case studies makes 
clear that our case studies identify one decision criterion that has not been identified 
during the literature study. This criterion is flexibility. Flexibility refers to the capability 
and willingness to handle exceptions. The other criteria used in the cases are also identi-
fied during our literature review as criteria that could be used in a collaboration decision.   
Table 22 demonstrates that there is a strong focus on costs in our cases, because costs 
is the selection criterion most mentioned in our cases. Next to this, costs was also often 
the first-mentioned criterion by the respondents. Furthermore, table 22 shows that also 
service is an important decision criterion in our cases to select a LSP. These findings are 
in line with our finding in the logistics outsourcing literature that costs and service are 
the most frequently used criteria to select a logistics service provider. Besides, table 22 
makes clear that also trust, confidentiality and commitment are often used as decision 
criteria in our cases. This is also in line with the findings of our literature review, because 
this review process made clear that these three variables are identified as key variables 
in collaboration decisions.118 |
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Table 22: Selection criteria used in case studies
The case study methodology provides an opportunity to not only gather information 
about which decision criteria are used, but also to receive an explanation of what is ex-
actly meant by a specific criterion. This detailed discussion makes clear that the term costs 
does not refer to a total costs of ownership approach that includes switching costs. The 
criterion costs only refers to the tariffs calculated by the LSPs. The shipper in case B em-
phasizes the focus on tariffs in the consideration to use one year commitments towards 
the contracted LSPs. This short term commitment gives the organization the possibility to 
tender on a yearly basis which results in the required annual savings. Subsequently, focus 
on tariffs is also underlined by the considerations of some shippers to sign contracts with 
a mid-term horizon instead of the normally used short-term horizon. Shippers in cases C 
and F try to avoid price-rises by using longer contract terms at the moment the situation 
at the market for logistics services seems to change from a buyer to a seller market. Be-
sides, the shipper in case C decides to source and contract subcontractors itself in stead 
of outsourcing this to the LLP. This choice gives the shipper the possibility to exploit its 
own purchasing power. Finally, the shipper in case F chooses for a central supply chain 
department to better exploit the purchasing power of the organization. | 119
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The discussion with our respondents makes also clear that the criterion service is related 
to the performance as (will be) delivered by the LSP. Depending on the logistics services 
outsourced, different key performance indicators (KPIs) are defined to measure the ser-
vice level offered by the LSP. For transport activities the KPIs are often related to the num-
ber of shipments delivered on time and/or number of shipments delivered complete. For 
warehousing these KPIs are for example related to the handling and storage activities. 
In addition, the discussions about the term trust result in the conclusion that the crite-
rion trust can refer to different elements in a relationship. Some respondents use the 
term trust to refer to the people that are involved from the side of the LSP. For these 
respondents it is important that they are convinced that the people involved from the 
LSP side will promote the interest of the shipper in the organization of the LSP. Other 
respondents link the term trust to the general feeling that a LSP will not show oppor-
tunistic behavior at the moment decisions need to be made during the operation, for 
example in the selection of subcontractors. In general, we may conclude that the term 
trust refers to the feeling that the LSP will not harm the interests of the shipper, but we 
notice that the exact interpretation of the term trust can differ case by case. 
Next to this, table 22 shows that the capabilities of the LSP are mentioned in two cases 
as one of the used decision criteria to select the LSP. The accompanying discussion makes 
clear that the term capabilities can refer to the assets of the LSP (transportation equip-
ment, ICT systems, etc.) or to the experience of the LSP with a certain type of products 
or operation. 
Furthermore, the respondents in one of the case that use cultural fit as a decision crite-
rion in their project explain that this criterion is related to the fit between the corporate 
culture of the shipper and the corporate culture of the LSP. Also transaction costs are 
only identified in one of the cases as a decision criterion. The term transaction costs in 
this particular case refers to the costs that result from tendering and switching to a dif-
ferent LSP. 
Finally, the discussions about the criteria commitment, confidentiality and financial po-
sition clarify that the explanation of these criteria does not differ per case. In all cases, 
commitment refers to the contract term as agreed. The criterion confidentiality explicitly 
refers to the belief  that the LSP will keep shared information confidential and is thus 
closely related to the criterion trust. The selection criterion financial position is used to 
reflect how shippers value whether a LSP is healthy from a financial point of view. 
Based on the discussion above, we may conclude that the findings in our cases are in line 
with our findings in the literature review, because our cases confirm that costs, service, 
trust, confidentiality and commitment are important decision criteria in a logistics col-
laboration decision. Nevertheless, the detailed discussions make clear that the explana-
tion/interpretation of a specific criterion can differ case by case. As a consequence, it is 120 |
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important to explicitly and clearly define the decision criteria when they are used in the 
remaining of this research.
We have also analyzed whether the used decision criteria differ per subsector in the 
chemical industry. Table 23 compares the decision criteria used in the cases A, B and C 
(commodity market) and the cases D, E, F and G (specialty market). Based on the infor-
mation in table 23, we conclude that there is no indication for a difference in the selec-
tion criteria in the two subsectors of the chemical industry. Nevertheless, this conclusion 
needs further empirical validation, because the number of cases studied is limited.






Capabilities LSP 1 1
Financial position 1 1
Cultural fit 0 1
Switching costs 1 0
Flexibility 0 1
Table 23: Comparison decision criteria in commodity and specialty market
Based on the detailed discussions in this section about tender process, commitments 
and decision criteria, it may be concluded that the purchasing approach used in the cas-
es A till F can be characterized as a transaction-oriented purchasing approach26. This in 
spite of the fact that the shippers position the sourced services in different quadrants of 
the Kraljic matrix and thus a more varied picture could be expected. On the other hand, 
the purchasing approach followed in case G is different and in line with the expected 
approach using Kraljic’s theory. The approach in case G is characterized by supplier in-
volvement, a long term horizon and focus on total supply chain costs instead of focus 
on rates offered by the LSPs. The shipper focuses on more solid and closer relationships 
with the LSPs. Consequently, from the seven investigated projects, case G is the only one 
where a more relation-oriented purchasing approach is used. 
26 For more information about different purchasing approaches we refer to section 2.3.2| 121
Case studies
Increased complexity of logistics outsourcing
Literature review makes clear that the complexity of logistics outsourcing has increased 
over the last decades. The literature identifies three reasons for this: business trends, 
increased complexity of logistics services and specification difficulties. As a result, nowa-
days the range of logistics services purchased is more diverse and the position of logis-
tics services in the Kraljic’s matrix is more spread than some decades ago. Consequently, 
it is expected that shippers use different sourcing approaches to purchase different type 
of logistics services. Nevertheless, empirical evidence for this statement is limited. As a 
result, this aspect is explicitly discussed during our case studies. An overview of the re-
sults of these discussions is depicted in table 24. The table shows that only the respond-
ents of case E indicate that the complexity of logistics outsourcing has not increased. All 
other respondents confirm that the complexity of logistics outsourcing has increased. 
The reasons given by the respondents are in line with the reasons found in the literature. 
Current business trends like globalization, consolidation in the LSP market and more 
demanding customers are mentioned by the shippers in case A, C, D and F as one of the 
reasons for the increased complexity of logistics outsourcing. The increased complexity 
of logistics services is identified by the shippers in case A, B, C and G as a reason for the 
increased complexity of logistics outsourcing. Finally, specification difficulties are only 
identified by the respondents of case G as a reason for increased complexity of logistics 
outsourcing. It needs to be noticed that the shipper in case B mentions an additional 
reason for the increased level of logistics services next to the three reasons identified in 
the literature. Shipper B argues that the increasing volumes affect the complexity level 
of the outsourced processes in a negative way. 
Nevertheless, table 24 also shows that only the shipper in case G follows a different 
approach for different kind of logistics services. In line with the theoretical findings, 
this shipper uses a more relation-oriented purchasing approach for advanced logistics 
services. This means that tender projects have an open character and the LSPs are early 
involved in the project to support the supplier to define the final logistics solution. Par-
ticipants of the other cases do not have different sourcing approaches for different kinds 
of logistics services. This finding is supported by an empirical study about purchasing 
strategies for logistics services by Zeegers (2007). In this study, the author shows that in 
practice companies follow the same purchasing strategy for sourcing logistics services 
that are in different quadrants of Kraljic’s portfolio. Companies acknowledge the need 
for more differentiated sourcing strategies, but still focus on exploiting their purchas-
ing power for all logistics services bought. Some of the shippers in our cases explain 
that they respond to the increased complexity of logistics outsourcing, but not by using 
different sourcing approaches for different kinds of logistics services. Shippers in case 
C, D and F respond by changing their sourcing strategy in general. For the shipper in 122 |
Chapter 7
case C this means that it uses longer commitments towards the LSPs and that it splits 
operational and coordination responsibilities over different LSPs. Shipper in case D also 
changes its general sourcing strategy for logistics services and decreases the number of 
contracted LSPs. The shipper in case F responds by setting up a central supply chain man-
agement department to better combine the flows of the different divisions and to better 
use the company’s purchasing power. Finally, shipper of case A and B acknowledges the 
increased complexity of logistics outsourcing, but the shipper does not actively respond 
to this change. 
Based on these observations, it may be concluded that there is very limited empirical 
evidence for the theoretical finding that shippers respond to the increased complexity of 
logistics outsourcing by using a more differentiated sourcing approach. The case studies 
make clear that shippers acknowledge the increased complexity, but respond in differ-
ent ways.  | 123
Case studies
Case Complexity   
increased
Reasons Reaction Standardized process  
for all logistics services
A Yes •	 Trends: globalization 
•	 The increased complex-
ity of logistics service: a 
combination of services 
is sourced
•	 None •	 Yes; tender projects 
differ only in duration
B Yes •	 Growing volumes
•	 The increased complex-
ity of logistics service: 
more advanced logistics 
services outsourced
•	 None •	 Yes; tender projects 
differ only in IT-tools 
used to support the 
project
C Yes •	 The increased complex-
ity of logistics service: 
more advanced logistics 
services outsourced 
•	 Trends: globalization
•	 Trends: consolidation in 
LSP market; power posi-
tion shipper decreases 





activities split over 
different providers
•	 Yes
D Yes •	 Trends: globalization
•	 Trends: more demand-
ing customers




E No •	 Higher level of automa-
tion makes it easier 
to coordinate more 
complex flows
•	 Sourcing strategy 
not changed
•	 Yes
F Yes •	 Trend: consolidation in 








G No •	 The increased complex-
ity of logistics service: a 
combination of services 
is sourced 
•	 Difficulties in defining 
requirements
•	 Sourcing strategy 
changed: different 
sourcing strategies 
for different type 
of services
•	 No; set up and con-
tent tender projects 
depend on type of 
service
Table 24: Complexity of logistics outsourcing increased124 |
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7.4   Concluding remarks
The case studies described in this chapter are conducted to create an in-depth under-
standing of logistics outsourcing and collaboration in the chemical sector. This under-
standing is needed to create a solid base for our stated preference experiment. Next to 
this, the case studies are used to validate some findings of the literature review. The 
case studies result in the following conclusions. First, most of the relationships between 
shippers and LSPs in the cases are characterized as bundling because of the operational 
focus of the outsourced activities. The shippers are still scared to transfer more respon-
sibilities to their logistics service providers. Fears about loss of control and increased 
dependency of a certain LSP are reasons given to not intensify logistics collaboration.
In most of the cases, shippers use a transaction-oriented purchasing approach with a 
strong focus on costs in terms of price and low level of involvement of the supplier dur-
ing the purchasing process. In addition, in all cases a set of decision criteria is used to 
select the final LSP. Costs, service, trust, confidentiality and commitment are the most 
frequently used decision criteria in our cases. These findings are in line with earlier re-
sults about this topic. On the other hand, our cases also show that the exact interpreta-
tion of a specific criterion can differ per case and as a result criteria need to be defined 
and explained clearly to a respondent when used later on in this research.
Moreover, the cases show that shippers acknowledge the increased complexity of lo-
gistics outsourcing, because of the current business trends, increased complexity of 
logistics services, specification difficulties and growing volumes. Shippers do not only 
respond to this increased complexity by using a more differentiated sourcing approach 
for purchasing different logistics services as was expected based on the literature review 
results. Our cases make clear that shippers respond in different ways. The results of these 
cases are used to design our stated preference experiment. This experiment is described 
in the next chapter. | 125
8.   Stated preference experiment 
This chapter describes the stated preference (SP) experiment27 used to test the hypoth-
eses as defined in chapter 5. The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. The 
first section starts with an introduction to the selected method. In this section the meth-
od, its drawbacks and the SP design template are described. Subsequently, the second 
section explains our experimental design. Section three focuses on the description of the 
analysis. Furthermore, section four presents the empirical findings. Finally, section five 
concludes with a summary of the main findings of this chapter.
8.1   Method
8.1.1   Stated Preference method
SP uses interviews or questionnaires, in which respondents are asked to make choices 
between alternative product descriptions, so to reveal how respondents value different 
attributes. SP research is widely used in the fields of marketing and passenger transport 
analysis. For an overview of SP research in the logistics field we refer to Muilerman 
(2001) and De Jong (2008). These overviews show that SP techniques can be used for 
various purposes. Some examples are estimating the market potential of new or im-
proved modes of transportation, exploring the opportunities of modal shift, obtaining 
monetary values of time and deducing shippers’ sensitivities to changes in different 
dimensions of service when making mode choice decisions. 
Using SP techniques, alternatives are presented to the respondents, who are asked to 
choose every time the most preferred one in a series of options. The alternatives are 
described as bundles of variables known as “attributes”, which are expected to impact 
respondents’ preferences for the proposed options. Together the options are called the 
“choice set”. This framework enables us to observe the choice behavior of the respond-
ents, in order to examine the effect of the attributes that influence preferences (Travisi, 
2007). Subsequently, SP results can be used to determine and quantify the relative im-
27 For a detailed discussion about the selection of the stated preference method as the preferred research 
strategy, we refer to section 1.5. 126 |
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portance of attributes that are of interest of the researcher. See figure 21 for an example 
of a choice card from a choice set shown to a respondent in a simple SP experiment 
about two alternative travel situations. The alternatives differ in time and costs. 










  Prefer option A  Prefer option B
Figure 21: Example of a choice card used to present an alternative to a respondent
SP research is based on the economic concept of individuals deriving “utility” from the 
consumption of a particular product or service (Pearmain et al, 1991). Utility implies an 
overall value attached to a product or service by an individual. Under the principle of 
utility maximization, the decision maker is assumed to select the alternative that gives 
him or her the highest utility. The attractiveness (or utility) of each alternative consists 
of a systematic (observable) component and a random error (unobservable) term. The 
general linear utility function can be written as follows: 
Uj = β0 + ΣβkXkj + εj
Uj is the overall utility for a particular alternative j; β0 is the constant term; βk represents 
the relative utility associated with attribute k (e.g. a specific LSP selection criterion such 
as costs or service); Xkj  is the independent variable representing attribute k for alternative 
j; and εj is an error component. It is usually assumed that the error terms are independ-
ently and identically distributed with a Gumbel distribution, which leads to the MNL 
model, but other distribution functions are sometimes used as well.   | 127
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8.1.2   Drawbacks stated preference research
The data deduced by the SP experiment can be expected to provide a more realistic 
picture of decision-making behaviour. Nevertheless, like all research methods also stated 
preference research has its own drawbacks. An objection often heard against the use 
of SP techniques is the fact that it measures intended behaviour and people do not 
necessarily have to do what they say (Pearmain et al., 1991). Several authors have done 
studies to compare stated preference and revealed preference data. These experiences 
show that stated preferences perform well in predicting real-life choices (Green and 
Srinivasan, 1978; Bates and Roberts, 1986; Louvière, 1988; Wardman, 1988; Ortúzar 
and Willumsen, 2001). A second drawback is the occurrence of the non-commitment 
bias (i.e. if the respondent provided unconstrained and unreliable answers because the 
subject of study does not appeal to her or him (Muilerman, 2001)). A thorough prepara-
tion and setup of a realistic experiment can prevent this possible bias. Finally, one of the 
great advantages of the SP technique is its flexibility: a researcher can design SP experi-
ments based on his ideas. This huge flexibility implies that the design (context and for-
mat) could influence the results of the analysis. This drawback can be avoided by using 
a general SP design template, and again using a realistically designed choice experiment 
(Ben-Akiva et al., 1994). 
8.1.3   Design template
Stated preference requires an elaborate preparation by the researcher. Before the data 
can be collected, several choices and assumptions are made. The different aspects of 
such a SP design template are discussed below. 
a. SP experiment objective
A SP experiment is used to reach our final research objective: measure the thresholds 
in a logistics collaboration decision. The choice behavior of the shippers is analyzed by 
measuring how they value different choice variables. The collected data are used to 
determine and quantify the relative importance of attributes that influence logistics col-
laboration decisions. 
The data of the SP experiment are only collected at the shipper’s side, because the ship-




SP experiments can differ with the type of responses collected. These different types of 
responses are ranking, rating or choice of options (Pearmain et al, 1991; Louvière et al., 
2000).
•  In a ranking approach all the options are presented at once to the respondents. The 
respondents are then required to rank the hypothetical options in order of prefer-
ence, so implying a hierarchy of utility values. 
•  A rating experiment requires respondents to express the strength of their preferences 
on numerical or semantic scales. 
•  In a choice experiment, the individual simply selects the most preferred options from 
a pair or group of options. 
There is no consensus in the literature for one method over another. In deciding about 
the method appropriate for the research topic, the researcher should be guided by the 
suitability of the response method in relation to the choices respondents have to make. 
In our experiment we will use a choice based experiment, because we wish to ensure as 
much realism and simplicity as possible in the exercises presented to the respondents. In 
such a case, a choice based experiment is recommended (Pearmain et al., 1991).
c. Attribute selection
One of the most important activities for a SP researcher is defining which attributes to 
include in the experiment. It is desirable to include a minimum of three attributes to 
place the choice experiment in a realistic context, and to reduce the likelihood of re-
spondents recognizing a pattern in the presented options. At the other side, the number 
of attributes that can be added is not unlimited, because decision makers are by nature 
characterized by bounded rationality. Therefore, only a limited number of attributes can 
be taken into account. Subsequently, experimental designs which include a lot of attri-
butes can confuse respondents and are very complex to design. The experiences of sev-
eral researchers suggest an upper limit of six or seven attributes (Pearmain et al., 1991; 
Wardman, 2007). Therefore, a researcher should be selective in adding attributes. We 
follow Sheldon (2007) and Pearmain et al. (1991) who recommend selecting attributes 
and accompanying levels based on prior qualitative research like literature review, case 
studies and focus groups. Our attributes are selected based on the previous described 
literature review and case studies. Besides, it is recommended to define more than two 
levels for each attribute to have the possibility to measure non-linear effects of the dif-
ferent attributes. | 129
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For this experiment an orthogonal design is used28. This ensures that the attributes pre-
sented to respondents are varied independently from one another, thus avoiding corre-
lation between attributes (Pearmain et al., 1991; Wardman, 2007). The orthogonal plan 
that belongs to a particular experiment can be easily generated by using the conjoint 
module of the statistical program SPSS. Based on the number of attributes and the num-
ber of levels of each attribute included in a design, SPSS configures a matrix showing 
the number of options of a full choice set and the level of each attribute for each single 
choice. The SPSS module is used during our design process.
The number of possible combinations in a SP experiment is the result of the number of 
levels raised to the power of the number of attributes (Pearmain et al, 1991). Thus, in 
a design with 2 attributes with 3 levels and 1 attribute of 4 levels this result in 32 x 41 
= 36 options. When the number of options becomes high, there is a strong likelihood 
that respondents will experience fatigue in carrying out the choice exercises and there-
fore increasing the response error. Kroes and Sheldon (1988) suggest a range of 9 to 16 
options as acceptable to present towards a respondent. The practical limit will to some 
extent depend on the context of the survey in which the stated preference exercise is 
introduced. For example face-to-face interviews allow a larger number of options than 
self-completion surveys and also surveys that consist of different parts allow a larger 
number of choices (Pearmain et al, 1991; Sheldon, 2007). Because of this limitation, 
in most experiments researchers need to find a way to reduce the number of options 
presented to each individual respondent. The literature provides different strategies to 
resolve this problem (Pearmain et al, 1991; Wardman, 2007). In our design we follow 
two strategies to reduce the number of options. First, we remove those options that are 
dominant in the choice set. A dominant option is a question where all the attributes of 
one of the two presented options are better than the other. Second, we randomly sepa-
rate the remaining options into blocks, in such a way that the full choice set is complete 
by groups of respondents, each responding to a different subset of options. 
d. Interview type
SP surveys may be administered by face to face interviews, by telephone interviews or by 
self- completion questionnaires on paper or via the internet. In our research project we 
28 Currently, orthogonal SP designs are recognized as inefficient, because orthogonality in the design not auto-
matically ensures orthogonality in the data required from the experiment. Nevertheless, “efficient” designs 
require a-priori assumptions about the expected coefficient values (Ortuzar, 2000)]. To our best knowledge, 
no previous experiments about logistics collaboration are available. Therefore, an orthogonal design is used 
and the data of this experiment can be used to make an “efficient” design later on. The orthogonal design 
of our experiment is improved by removing the dominant choices and using a folding procedure. A  folding 
procedure means that the researcher tries different combinations of attribute levels and selects only those 
that gave a minimum level of dominant questions.130 |
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use face to face interviews, because face to face interviews are recommended for any 
study which involves a complex or customized SP exercise. Pearmain et al. (1991) state 
that this is the case in the majority of experiments.  Not exclusive to SP work, face to 
face interviews give the researcher the possibility to monitor the process, and the abil-
ity to probe respondents to ascertain their understanding of the alternatives presented. 
No such controls are possible with self-completed designs. In general self-completed 
surveys are restricted to cases where the SP tasks are quite straightforward. Besides, 
as with all self-completion questionnaires, there will be the problem of unknown bias 
introduced by questionnaires not being returned.
During our face to face interviews a laptop is used to assist the researcher and respon-
dent, because such a system offers significant advantages over manual methods. These 
advantages include an interesting and flexible presentation format, automatic data cod-
ing and storage, reduction of interview times, and the ease to tailor a SP experiment to 
an individual (Bradley, 1988). 
Each interview for this research project lasted approximately 60 to 90 minutes and was 
conducted at the participant’s workplace. 
e. Testing 
To test a SP survey, Wardman (2007) recommends having at least one pilot interview. 
The pilot interview is used to validate the design, context and questionnaire of the ex-
periment. Summarized, it is used to ensure a realistic experiment. In our project two 
cycles of eight pilot interviews have been conducted before the actual SP experiment 
took place. The results of our pilots are used to fine-tune the levels of the attributes and 
context of the experiment. 
f. Sampling
The interviewees are not chosen on a random basis, because to get reliable results it is 
a precondition that the individual respondents are experienced in logistics collaboration 
decisions. Therefore the respondents are selected by the use of purposive sampling. 
Representatives of chemical and logistics branch organizations are consulted to identify 
possible organizations and accompanying primary contact persons. These persons are 
contacted to request willingness to participate in the research project and to identify 
people to be interviewed. Most companies select representatives from both the supply 
chain management and purchasing departments as the people to be interviewed. This 
is in line with the findings of our case studies in the previous chapter, because these 
case studies show that purchasing and supply chain management departments are of-
ten both involved in purchasing projects for logistics services. Two times an interview 
is cancelled by the researcher, because the company primary contact person identified | 131
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a respondent who did not meet the precondition of being experienced in logistics col-
laboration decisions.  
As explained in one of the previous sections, we use face-to-face interviews to collect the 
SP data, because of the complex and customized character of our experiment. Face-to-
face interviews have the disadvantage that relatively a small number of respondents are 
consulted in comparison to large scale self completion surveys sent via (e)mail. Literature 
does not provide an unambiguous rule-of-thumb for the sample sizes required for a par-
ticular SP experiment. Part of the discussion lies in the nature of the information collected 
in SP studies. For example, each respondent might give responses to 9 choice situations. 
With 30 interviews this amounts to 270 data records, which is almost certainly enough 
to calibrate a significant model (Pearmain et al., 1991). However, this argument fails 
to make the distinction between two kinds of variations in responses that arise; varia-
tion between individuals and variation within each interview (Pearmain et al., 1991). For 
our study in total 4729 interviews are conducted. This conforms to the rule-of-thumb as 
proposed by Sheldon (2007), that around 50 interviews are sufficient. This is also in line 
with recent, comparable studies (Danielis et al. 2005; Muilerman, 2001; Tsai et al., 2007). 
8.2   Experimental design
8.2.1   Attribute selection
Our literature review has resulted in a list of variables that are possibly influencing a col-
laboration decision between organizations. Subsequently, case studies are used to verify 
which decision variables are dominating in the specific context of this research: logistics 
collaboration decisions between shippers and logistics service providers in the chemical 
industry. Following the design rule that recommends selecting attributes and accom-
panying levels based on prior qualitative research, we use the results of our literature 
review and case studies to select the attributes for the experiment. This prior research 
makes clear that costs, service trust, confidentiality and commitment are the main crite-
ria in a vertical collaboration decision between a shipper and logistics service provider30. 
These five variables are included in our experiment. The other decision variables that are 
not explicitly included in our design as a separate attribute are represented by the error 
term of the utility function. Our case studies show that  it is important that the explana-
tion of a variable is clearly expressed to a respondent. The definitions of the variables 
included in our design are depicted in table 25.
29 Five of these 47 respondents are also interviewed during the case studies.
30 For a more detailed description of the main criteria identified in our case studies we refer to section 7.3.2. 132 |
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Variable Definition
Costs Costs of the services provided by a LSP
Service Service level offered by a LSP to the shipper in terms of shipments delivered on 
time
Trust The belief that a partner will not harm the interests of the counterpart
Confidentiality The belief that a collaboration partner keeps shared information confidential
Commitment Participating actors are loyal and tolerant and do not worry constantly about 
being replaced
Table 25: Variables included in the experiment
8.2.2   Context of the experiment
The heart of our SP experiment is to give respondents the choice to reduce logistics 
costs by implementing a different logistics concept, which requires more intensive col-
laboration with logistics service providers. To make this choice clear and explicit to the 
respondents, a standard case description is used. This standard case contains two dif-
ferent logistics concepts: “basic collaboration” and “intensified collaboration”. For the 
design of the standard case we rely on the results of our case studies and existing case 
studies about logistics collaboration in the chemical industry as described by Eutralog 
(2004) and Cruijssen and Verweij (2006). This will be discussed in more detail in the sec-
tion below.
Concept A: basic collaboration
The starting point of the standard case is a collaborative situation between shipper and 
LSPs with an operational and repetitive character. This because SP researchers recom-
mend that the experiment needs to be realistic and should be geared to the respond-
ents’ perception of their environment (Ben-Akiva et al., 1994). Existing literature and 
our case studies have shown that most collaborative relationships between shippers and 
logistics service providers are focused on operational execution of activities. The major-
ity of the relationships between shipper and LSP in our cases described in the previous 
chapter are characterized as bundling at the relationship ladder defined by Gulati and 
Kletter (2005). Therefore, the relationship between shipper and LSP in the concept of 
basic collaboration is also characterized as bundling. 
The basic collaboration concept has the following logistics structure. Products are pro-
duced in a manufacturing plant owned by the shipper (company X). In line with the 
cases described in chapter 7, the shipper uses different stock points (hubs) to distribute 
the products to their customers in Europe. In our case we only focus on one of these 
hubs. This hub is used to store products and deliver these products to customers in 
Southern Europe. The hub is owned by a logistics service provider. | 133
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Company X has outsourced its warehousing and transportation activities to different 
LSPs. The concept focuses on these services for two reasons. First, our case studies con-
firm that basic logistics services in the areas of transport and warehousing are the servic-
es most frequently outsourced. Second, our cases and previous research show that value 
and package density are relatively low in the chemical industry. As a result, transport and 
warehousing are the dominant elements in the logistics costs structure. 
In line with the majority of our case studies the service providers contracted in this con-
cept of basic collaboration are only responsible for the operational execution of the ac-
tivities. Coordination and orchestration activities are still done by the shipper. This means 
the service provider at the hub is responsible for receiving the inbound shipments, the 
temporary storage of the products at the hub and final delivery to the customer. Com-
pany X is responsible for replenishing the hub. For the replenishment shipments towards 
the hub road transport is used, because a high proportion of European chemical traffic 
currently moves by road (NEA, 2004). Our cases, as described in chapter 7, confirm this 
statement.  The many different LSPs used for the hub deliveries are contracted and man-
aged by company X. The hub is delivered after receiving a sales order from one of the 
customers. This concept is depicted in figure 22.
Figure 22: Concept: basic collaboration
Concept B: intensified collaboration
The alternative concept proposed to the respondent is the intensified collaboration con-
cept. In this concept a collaboration structure is offered that can be characterized as 
integration, which is the next level of collaboration at the relationship ladder of Gulati 
and Kletter (2005) after bundling. Proposing an alternative outbound structure at the 134 |
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level of strategic partnering is expected not to be geared to the respondents’ perception, 
because our cases have shown that most collaborative relationships between shippers 
and LSPs have an operational level. 
The intensified collaboration concept uses different transport modalities in stead of only 
using road transportation to deliver the logistics hub.  This choice is made for the fol-
lowing reasons. First, modal shifts are identified as one of the areas of supply chain 
improvements within the chemical industry (Cefic, 2004; McKinnon, 2004). Next to this, 
an intermodal context is chosen because the limited available examples of beneficial 
collaboration between shippers and LSPs in the chemical industry are examples where a 
(partial) modal shift is part of the solution (Eutralog, 2004; Cruijssen and Verweij, 2006). 
The experiences of these best practices are used in our experiment. Besides, one of the 
shippers in our cases explicitly mentions the ambition to increase the use of intermodal 
transport solutions.
In principle the hub is delivered by non-road modes, and road transport is used as a 
fallback scenario. The concept reduces logistics cost significantly31 and can improve the 
delivery performance, but also results in a higher degree of mutual dependency between 
both organizations. This choice is made because existing literature and our cases mark de-
pendency as one of the main impediments for outsourcing and more solid collaboration. 
The concept requires a certain level of economies of scale to be profitable, therefore the 
LSP functions as a central point to manage the split between the modes. As a result, 
Company X has to transfer more responsibilities to the LSP. The service provider will 
become responsible for the stock availability at the hub, and managing and contract-
ing the subcontractors used to replenish the hub. As a result the hub LSP functions as a 
Lead Logistics Provider (LLP). Our cases demonstrate that the use of a central LLP is not 
unknown for the chemical industry and that such a solution requires a higher level of 
collaboration compared to the situation that the transport management activities are 
not outsourced, but coordinated by the shipper. 
Besides, in the concept of intensified collaboration more information needs to be shared 
between Company X and the LSP to plan and control the activities. The transit times of 
the goods increase, and as a result replenishment of the hub will be based on sales fore-
cast in stead of actual received sales orders. The service provider needs a sales forecast 
at an aggregated level in order to ensure delivery of the customer orders. The concept of 
more intensive collaboration is depicted in figure 23. 
31 In the proposed cost reduction, switching costs are included.| 135
Stated preference experiment
Figure 23: Concept: more intensive collaboration
8.2.3   Three different parts
The heart of our experiment is the choice between the two explained concepts as ex-
plained in the previous section. This makes the context of the experiment relatively com-
plex. Therefore, the total experiment is divided into three parts, in order to help re-
spondents by gradually increasing the complexity of the choices. Additionally, designing 
a SP questionnaire that consists of different parts allows us to propose a larger number 
of choices to the respondent (Pearmain et al, 1991; Sheldon, 2007). Finally, including 
different choice experiments in one experiment gives the researcher the possibility to 
collect a richer set of data. 
In the first part respondents are asked to compare logistics collaboration proposals, 
both revolving around the concept of basic collaboration. Experiments comparing same 
concepts are a so called within mode experiment (Sheldon, 2007). The proposals shown 
to the respondent in the first part differ in costs, service and commitment. 
The second part of the experiment is a so called between mode experiment, because it 
focuses on the choice between the two concepts of collaboration: basic versus inten-
sified collaboration. This part includes all selected attributes: costs, service, commit-
ment, trust and confidentiality. Choice cards presenting the basic collaboration concept 
contain three attributes: costs, service and commitment. Choice cards reflecting the 
intensified collaboration concept include all five attributes. For this concept, more infor-
mation needs to be shared between the collaborating parties and more responsibilities 
are transferred from the shipper to the LSP. Therefore, with this concept, trust and con-
fidentiality are more important.136 |
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Finally, in the third part of the experiment, respondents are asked to compare collabora-
tion proposals, both based on the concept of intensified collaboration. These choices 
include all selected attributes and these attributes are shown on all choice cards.
8.2.4   Attribute levels
Although widely used in transport studies, applying SP research to freight transport is 
still in its infancy (Danielis et al., 2005). Also Bergkvist (2001) and Tsai et al. (2007) con-
cur that defining and evaluating of freight transport attributes is still infancy compared 
to passenger transport. To the author’s best knowledge, no previous experiments in 
the context of logistics collaboration decisions are available. To overcome this difficulty 
attribute levels and values for our SP experiment are defined by consulting existing SP 
studies where applicable32, as well as by using findings from our literature review and 
case studies. 
The SP literature recommends to define more than two levels for each attribute, thus en-
abling the measurement of non-linear effects of the different attributes. Moreover, the 
inclusion of more levels allows closer estimates of the value attached to each attribute 
by the respondent. At the other side, the numbers of levels added to each attribute 
directly impacts the number of possible combinations in a design33. Taking these three 
considerations into account, following attribute levels are defined for our experiment.
Attribute Levels Card A + Card B
Costs 7 % below current costs
2% below current costs
Equal to current costs
1% above current costs
5% above current costs
Service 4% below current service level
1.5% below current service level
Equal to current service level





Table 26: Attribute levels part I: basic versus basic collaboration
32 The following SP studies are used as reference document: Danielis et al. 2005; De Jong et al. 2004a; De Jong 
et al. 2004b; Kouwenhoven et al. 2007.
33 For further explanation see section 8.1.3. | 137
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Costs 4% below current costs
1% below current costs
Equal to current costs
3% above current costs
12% below costs Card A
6% below costs Card A
2% below costs Card A
Equal to costs Card A
Service 4% below current service
1.5% below current service
Equal to current service
2% above current service 
4% below current service
1.5% below current service
Equal to current service
2% above current service 
Trust (1) You are not absolutely certain LSP will not 
harm  your interests. This is not contractually 
agreed.
(2) You are not absolutely certain LSP will not 
harm your interests, but this is contractually 
agreed.
(3) You are convinced LSP will not harm your 
interests. This is not contractually agreed.
(4) You are convinced LSP will not harm your 
interests. This is contractually agreed.
Confidentiality (1)  You are not absolutely certain information 
is kept confidential. This is not contractually 
agreed.
(2) You are not absolutely certain information is 
kept confidential, but this is contractually agreed.
(3) You are convinced information is kept confi-
dential. This is not contractually agreed.
(4) You are convinced information is kept confi-









Table 27: Attribute levels part II: basic versus intensified collaboration138 |
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Attribute Levels Card A + Card B
Costs 7 % below current costs
2% below current costs
Equal to current costs
1% above current costs
5% above current costs
Service 4% below current service
1.5% below current service
Equal to current service
2% above current service level
Trust (1) You are not absolutely certain LSP will not harm   your interests. This is not 
contractually agreed.
(2) You are not absolutely certain LSP will not harm your interests, but this is 
contractually agreed.
(3) You are convinced LSP will not harm your interests. This is not contractually 
agreed.




(1)  You are not absolutely certain information is kept confidential. This is not 
contractually agreed.
(2) You are not absolutely certain information is kept confidential, but this is 
contractually agreed.
(3) You are convinced information is kept confidential. This is not contractually 
agreed.






Table 28: Attribute levels part III: intensified versus intensified collaboration 
In order to further increase realism in the experiment, the values for the attributes costs 
and service are customized for each respondent. Levels shown for these attributes de-
pend on the respondent’s current costs for physical distribution and current service level. 
At the beginning of each interview a respondent is asked to select the pre-defined cost 
range mirroring his current logistics costs level34, as well as the current percentage of 
34 This cost level selected by each respondent not always mirrors the company’s total logistics costs. It can also 
reflect the cost level of a specific business unit or geographical region. This depends on the respondent’s 
responsibilities and knowledge.| 139
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orders delivered on time to the customers. These data are entered into the Excel file 
which is used to program our SP experiment. Subsequently, the program automatically 
generates the customized levels for each respondent at the choice cards. The defined 
attribute levels and customization possibilities are validated during the pilot interviews.
8.2.5   Outline of the questionnaire
Each interview starts with general questions about logistics outsourcing and collabora-
tion with logistics service providers. This general information is used to obtain a general 
idea about the current status of logistics outsourcing and collaboration with the visiting 
company. This provides valuable information for the interpretation of the results of the 
SP experiment later on. The interview continues with the choice experiment. As dis-
cussed in section 8.2.3, in the first part of the choice experiment respondents compare 
collaboration alternatives both based on the concept of basic collaboration. In total, 
the first part of the experiment consists of six choices. An example of such a choice is 
depicted in figure 24.
Option A: Basic collaboration
Cost: € 52.500.000
(+5%)




Option B: Basic collaboration
Cost: € 49.000.000 
(-2%)




  Prefer option A  Prefer option B
Figure 24: Example first part of the experiment140 |
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The experiment continues with the second part of the experiment. This between mode 
experiment asks respondents to compare collaboration alternatives with different logis-
tics concepts: basic collaboration and intensified collaboration. In total this part pro-
poses eight choices to the interviewer. Figure 25 shows a possible choice of this second 
part of the experiment.
Option A: 
Basic collaboration
Cost: € 148.500.000 
(-1%)
Percentage orders delivered on time: 97,0%
Contract term:
1 year
Company X controls replenishment
Option B: 
Intensified collaboration
Cost: € 138.105.000 
(-7%)
Percentage orders delivered on time: 98,0%
You’re not absolutely certain LSP will not 
harm your interests.
You’re convinced and have contractu-





  Prefer Concept A  Prefer Concept B
Figure 25: Example second part of the experiment
Finally, in part three of the experiment,alternatives are proposed which are both based 
on the concept of intensified collaboration. This part contains seven choices. One of 
them is a “dominant” question, for which all the attributes of one option are better than 
the other. This question is used to identify respondents who do not appear to answer the 
questions in a sensible manner. The responses to the dominant question are not used in 




Cost: € 52.500.000 
(+5%)
Percentage orders delivered on time: 97,0%
You’re convinced and have contractually 
agreed LSP will not harm your interests.
You’re convinced LSP keeps shared informa-





Cost: € 49.000.000 
(-2%)
Percentage orders delivered on time: 93,0%
You’re not absolutely certain LSP will not 
harm your interests.
You’re convinced LSP keeps shared informa-
tion like sales forecast  confidential.
Contract term:
5 years
  Prefer option A  Prefer option B
Figure 26: Example third part of the experiment
In total this results in an experiment with 21 choices. Each of the three parts contains 
some additional questions to verify whether the respondents understand the experiment 
and whether the choices are realistic for the respondents. An example of a complete in-
terview manuscript, containing general questions and choice experiment, can be found 
in appendix G.
8.3   Analysis
Various modelling approaches can be used to analyze the data collected in an SP experi-
ment. Based on the assumed Gumbel distribution of the error term in the overall utility 
function, the binary logit approach is used. The binary logit approach is one of a family 
of discrete choice models, which are widely used to examine the choices made by indi-
viduals, households or firms, in choosing one of a set of mutually exclusive alternatives 
(Ben Akiva and Lerman, 1985). Using a binary logit approach to analyze the collected 
data we also take into account the requirement as formulated in chapter 1.5: select 
an analytical tool that supports the random aspect of decision making. Alogit version 142 |
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4.235 is used to estimate the binary logit model-coefficients for the collected data. All 47 
questionnaires are included in the analysis there were no reasons to remove respondents 
from the sample due to incomplete or inconsistent responses. Additionally, the respond-
ents value the presented choices as realistic and representative for their businesses. All 
respondents answered the dominant question in the correct way and indicated that 
they were able to compare the proposed choices. In total, during all the 47 interviews, 
987 choices are proposed to the different respondents. The answers to the dominant 
question are not included in the analysis. Besides, 14 times a respondent indicated that 
he was not able to make a choice, because he valued both options at the choice cards 
as unacceptable. This is still a valid choice, so these respondents are not excluded from 
the sample size, but only specific choices are removed from the number of observations 
used for the analysis. In total 926 observations are included in the analysis. Table 29 
shows the number of observations included in our analysis: 
Choices per 
experiment
Number of  
interviews
Total
Total number of observations 21 x 47 = 987
Dominant question 1 x 47 =     47  -
No choice    14  -
Total observations for 
analysis
926
Table 29: Observations included in the analysis
We have reviewed the results of the second part of our experiment, the between mode 
experiment, to examine whether respondents made a trade off between the choice al-
ternatives. Trading is required in order to be able to investigate how the attributes influ-
ence collaboration decisions, and to eventually get reliable results. The Venn-diagram 
in figure 27 shows how the 47 respondents traded between basic collaboration and 
intensified collaboration The numbers in the Venn-diagram represent the number of re-
spondents who chose a specific collaboration alternative. 39 respondents trade between 
basic and intensified collaboration. Two of these 39 respondents also did not make a 
choice between basic and intensified collaboration in some choices. We see that most 
respondents make a trade off between the two collaboration concepts, and thus we 
conclude that the level of trading is good.
35 Alogit is software that can be used for the estimation and analysis of logit choice models. The software was 
originally designed by the Hague Consulting Group.| 143
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Figure 27: Trading between collaboration alternatives
The initial specification of our choice model includes one alternative constant, three 
discrete variables (trust, confidentiality and commitment) and two continuous variables 
(costs and service). At the beginning of the model estimation procedure, several tests 
are undertaken to validate the quality of our data (Swait and Louvière, 1993). The first 
test explicitly analyzes whether the same variables in the three different parts of the ex-
periment are valued differently by the respondents. This test makes clear that there are 
no separate scaling factors applied to the different parts of the experiment, because the 
test confirms that the scaling factors do not differ significantly from 1, at a significance 
level of 95%. The analysis procedure continues on the assumption that the scaling factor 
for all three parts of the experiment is 1.  
Two separate tests are undertaken to determine whether there is any evidence from the 
SP data of non-linearity in the value of the two continuous variables, namely costs and 
service. Therefore, we compare different model specifications. For each model specifica-
tion the following statistics are depicted:144 |
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Statistic Definition
Model This defines the number of the model run.
Observations The number of observations included in the model estimation.
Final log (L) This indicates the value of the log-likelihood (LL). The log-likelihood is defined as 
the sum of the log of the probabilities of the chosen alternatives, and is the func-
tion that is maximized in the model estimation. The value of log-likelihood for a 
single model has no value. Comparing the log-likelihood of two models with dif-
ferent specifications allows the statistical significance of new model specifications 
to be assessed properly.
D.O.F. Degrees Of Freedom, the number of coefficients estimated in the model. Note 
that if a coefficient is constrained to a fixed value, f.e. 0, then it is not counted as 
a degree of freedom.
Table 30: Model statistics explained (Kouwenhoven et al., 2007)
The LL is used to compare different model estimations. This is done in a formal statistical 
test: the Likelihood ratio test. This test compares the negative of twice the difference 
of the LL values (Δ LL) to a chi-square value (Χ2) from published tables36 (Kouwenhoven 
et al., 2007). The value in the table depends on the confidence interval chosen (in this 
research 95%) and the degrees of freedom of the model. For example with a 95% confi-
dence interval and minus one degree of freedom, the critical value in the Χ2 table is 3.84. 
Therefore, if twice the difference in LL values between two models where one has one 
extra degree of freedom is equal or more than 3.84, the specification of the model with 
the extra degree of freedom (coefficient) is considered to give a significant improvement 
in the fit of the model. 
To test the valuation of costs, a number of dummy variables are added for the cost at-
tribute. New estimations are made for the model which includes the dummy variables. 
The estimation results of this model are compared to our original model. This compari-
son makes clear that the delta of the log-likelihood is not significant. As a result, costs 
can be considered as linear. The same procedure is repeated for the service attribute. 
Also in this case, the comparison of the model including the dummy variables and the 
original model makes clear that the delta of the log-likelihood is not significant. The test 
does not provide evidence of non-linearity in the value of service. The results are sum-
marized in table 31.
36 We use the standard table of the Χ2 distribution published by Thompson (1941)| 145
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Test: LL original 
model
LL model with 
dummies
Δ LL Δ D.O.F Conclusion
Costs linearity -283.0 -282.6 0.4 3 Not a significant improve-
ment of the model: linear 
model better fits  the data
Service linearity -492.0 -497.0 5 8 Not a significant improve-
ment of the model: linear 
model better fits the data
Table 31: Linearity test costs and service
The next step is to find the model with the best overall fit. Therefore we compare again a 
number of different model specifications via a step by step procedure. The Logliklihood 
ratio test is also used for this comparison. As part of this model estimation procedure, 
different model specifications are defined to analyze whether observed heterogeneity 
in the total sample size results in a better overall model. Another part of the estimation 
procedure was focused on the discrete variables, because in the estimation results of the 
initially defined utility function not all levels of the discrete variables were valued sig-
nificantly. Moreover, a significant difference was not always measured in the valuation 
of the different levels of the discrete variables.  Aggregating some levels of a discrete 
variable or putting some levels to zero, can improve the overall fit of a model, because 
the error term of the total model is reduced (Kouwenhoven et al., 2007). In total four-
teen different model specifications are estimated. Overview of the model estimation 
procedure is provided in table 32. This table contains a description, model statistics and 
interim conclusion for each of the fourteen models. At the end of the model estima-
tion procedure, we have concluded that model number fourteen best fits our data. This 
model will be discussed in more detail in section 8.4.3.146 |
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Table 32: Model estimation procedure
Model Description Observations Final log (LL) D.O.F* Δ (LL) Interim conclusion Remark
1 Initial utility function 926 -497,0 12 not applicable
2 Identify the optimal specification of 
costs: absolute or relative values for the 
costs attribute. Model 2 contains 
absolute values for the costs attribute.
926 -519,6 12 -23 Δ loglikelihood value = -23. Model 
1 and 2 have the same D.O.F. 
The LL of model 1 is closer to 0 
and coefficients are significant at 
95% confidence level. Model 1 
better fits the data than model 2
3 Subsamples logistics costs:                         
(1) <=10 million Euro                               
(2) > 10 million Euro
926 -491,8 13 5,2 Δ loglikelihood value =  5,2. This is 
a significant improvement at a 
95% confidence level of a 
Likelihood ratio test**. Model 3 
better fits the data than model 1. 
Costs, trust and confidentiality 
attributes valued differently by 
respondents with costs level of < = 
10 million and respondents with a 
cost level of > 10 million. These 
attributes need further verification.
4 Subsamples logistics costs:                         
(1) <=10 million Euro                               
(2) < 100 million Euro                               
(3) > 100 million Euro
926 -493,6 14 -1,8 Δ loglikelihood value = -1,8. This 
is not a significant improvement at 
a 95% confidence level of a 
Likelihood ratio test. Model 3 
better fits the data than model 4
5 Subsampel logistics costs and variable 
trust.                                                         
*Costs <= 10 million: trust level 2, 3 and 
4 aggregated                                             
*Costs > 10 million: trust level 2, 3 and 4 
put to 0
926 -489,9 12 1,9 Δ loglikelihood value = 1,9. This is 
a significant improvement at a 
95% confidence level of a 
Likelihood ratio test. Model 5 
better fits the data than model 3
6 Subsampel logistics costs and variable 
confidentiality.                                           
*Costs <= 10 million: confidentiality level 
2 and 3 aggregated                                   
*Costs > 10 million: confidentiality level 
2 and 4 aggregated; level 3 put to 0
926 -489,8 12 0,1 Δ loglikelihood value = 0,1. Model 
5 and 6 have same D.O.F. The LL 
value of model 6 is closer to 0, but 
not all coefficients are significant 
at a 95% confidence level. Model 
5 better fits the data than model 6
7 Subsampel logistics costs and variable 
confidentiality.                                           
* All costs levels: confidentiality level 2 
and 4 aggregated; level 3 put to 0
926 -491,9 10 -2,0 Δ loglikelihood value = -2,0. This 
is a significant improvement at a 
95% confidence level of a 
Likelihood ratio test. Model 7 
better fits the data than model 5.
8 Subsampel logistics costs and variable 
confidentiality.                                           
* All costs levels: confidentiality level 2 
and 4 aggregated
926 -489,9 11 2,0 Δ loglikelihood value = 2,0. This is 
a significant improvement at a 
95% confidence level of a 
Likelihood ratio test. Model 8 
better fits the data than model 7.
9 Subsample chemical industry:                    
1) Base chemicals                                       
2) Specialty chemicals
926 -496,8 13 0,2 Δ loglikelihood value = 0,2. This is 
not a significant improvement at a 
95% confidence level of a 
Likelihood ratio test. Model 1 
better fits the data than model 9
No significant difference in the 
valuation of the attributes between 
the two identified subgroups: fine 
and base chemicals
10 Subsampel responsibility respondents:       
1) supply chain management                     
2) purchasing
926 -487,3 14 9,7 Δ loglikelihood value = 9,2. This is 
a significant improvement at a 
95% confidence level of a 
Likelihood ratio test. Model 10 
better fits the data than model 1
Costs and service attribute are 
valued differently by respondents 
with a supply chain / logistics 
function and respondents with a 
purchasing function.
11 Subsample responsibility and logistics 
cost.                                                          
1) supply chain management                     
2) purchasing                                            
3) Costs < = 10 million                             
4) Costs > 10 million
926 -480,7 16 6,6 Δ loglikelihood value = 6,6. This is 
a significant improvement at a 
95% confidence level of a 
Likelihood ratio test. Model 11 
better fits the data than model 11
12 * Subsampel responsibility and Logistics 
costs                                                          
* Variable confidentiality as in model 8
926 -480,7 15 0,0 Δ loglikelihood value = 0,0. This is 
a significant improvement at a 
95% confidence level of a 
Likelihood ratio test. Model 12 
better fits the data than model 11
13 * Subsampel responsibility and logistics 
costs                                                          
* Variable confidentiality as in model 9      
* Variable trust as in model 5
926 -479,2 14 1,5 Δ loglikelihood value = 1,5. This is 
a significant improvement at a 
95% confidence level of a 
Likelihood ratio test. Model 13 
better fits the data than model 12
14 * Subsampel responsibility and logistics 
costs                                                          
* Variable confidentiality as in model 9      
* Variable trust as in model 5                     
* Variable commitment level 2 and 3 put 
to 0
926 -479,4 12 -0,2 Δ loglikelihood value = -0,2. This 
is a significant improvement at a 
95% confidence level of a 
Likelihood ratio test. Model 14 
better fits the data than model 13
* D.O.F: degrees of freedom in the model
** To determine whether the delta of the Loglikelihood value is a significant improvement, a standard table of the Χ
2 Distribution Function is used (Thompson, 1941)| 147
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8.4   Findings
8.4.1   Sample size
Company characteristics
In the period March until July 2008 the 47 SP interviews are carried out with representa-
tives from 17 chemical companies. Table 33 shows some characteristics of the compa-
nies involved. The second column shows the type of products supplied by the company. 
In line with our findings in chapter 6 and the classification used in chapter 7, three dif-
ferent types of companies are distinguished: commodities, specialties and hybrid. The 
third column in table 33 shows the type of products supplied by the business unit that 
is involved in the research. This makes clear that from one of the companies (number 
7) two business units are involved: one that supplies commodity products and one that 
supplies specialty chemicals. In total, 8 of the 1837 involved business units (44%) are 
active in the commodity market and the remaining 10 (56%) are supplying products to 
the specialty market. The last column in table 33 shows the size of the company. In line 
with the criterion used in chapter 7, a company is categorized as large in case the annual 
company turnover in Europe is larger than 3 billion Euros. As a result, 8 of the 17 com-
panies (47%) are categorized as small companies. The remaining 9 companies (53%) are 
positioned as large. These 9 large companies are all present in the top 30 major chemical 
companies in the world (Cefic, 2009). 







1 Commodities Commodities Small
2 Specialties Specialties Large
3 Specialties Specialties Small
4 Specialties Specialties Small
5 Hybrid Commodities Large
6 Hybrid Commodities Large
7 Hybrid Commodities Large
Specialties
8 Hybrid Commodities Large
9 Specialties Specialties Small
10 Hybrid Specialties Small
11 Hybrid Specialties Large
12 Hybrid Specialties Large
13 Commodities Commodities Small
14 Specialties Specialties Small
15 Commodities Commodities Large
16 Specialties Specialties Small
17 Commodities Commodities Large
Table 33: Company characteristics SP experiment
To obtain reliable results, it is important that the selected sample is representative for the 
sector. Next to this, we used our case study results to design our SP experiment. There-
fore, we would like to know whether the samples of both empirical research parts are 
comparable. Table 34 compares the sample used in the case studies, the SP experiment 
and the chemical sector as a whole. This comparison makes clear that the distribution 
over the two subsectors in both samples is comparable. This distribution is also almost 
as good as the distribution in the sector. Next to this, the table shows that the split be-
tween small and large companies is comparable in both samples. Unfortunately, sector 
data about this aspect are not available.  | 149
Stated preference experiment



















Table 34: Comparison sample sizes
The data in table 34 do not give any indication that the sample used in our SP experi-
ment is not representative for the sector or that the samples used in the case studies 
and the SP experiment are not comparable. Additionally, we compare the services out-
sourced most frequently by our SP respondents, case study participants and the sector. 
This comparison makes clear that logistics services most frequently outsourced by our 
SP respondents are those that have an operational and repetitive character. Figure 28 
shows that transport and warehousing are outsourced by (almost) all visited companies. 
These findings are in line with previous studies about this subject in the chemical sector 
(Budde et al, 2006), our case study findings as presented in chapter 7 and the context 
used in our SP experiment. As a result, also the findings on this subject do not provide 
any indication that the sample used in our SP experiment is not representative for the 
sector. 
Figure 28: Logistics services outsourced150 |
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Respondent level
As defined in section 8.1.3, it is important that our respondents are experienced in logis-
tics collaboration decisions to get reliable results. All our respondents have this experi-
ence. Next to this, they have a leading position in logistics, supply chain management or 
purchasing. Table 35 shows an overview of the respondents per chemical subsector and 
depicts how many have a position in supply chain management/logistics or purchasing. 
On request of some interviewees names of respondents and companies are kept confi-
dential. For a detailed overview of the position of each respondent and an overview of 
the number of respondents per company, we refer to appendix F.  
Supply chain managers / logistics Purchasers Total
Commodity chemicals 12 11 23
Specialty chemicals 16 8 24
Total 28 19 47
Table 35: Segmentation sample size
The respondents are located in different European countries: The Netherlands, Belgium, 
Germany and Switzerland. Figure 29 shows the spread of the respondents over these 
different countries.
Figure 29: Respondents per country| 151
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8.4.2   Findings general questions
Each interview started with general questions about logistics outsourcing and collabo-
ration with logistics service providers. This general information is used to get an idea 
about the current status of logistics outsourcing and collaboration of the visited com-
pany. These results are discussed below.
Logistics outsourcing
During the interviews the respondents’ expectations about the developments of logis-
tics outsourcing in the near future are discussed. Figure 30 makes clear that more than 
half of the respondents expect that the number of services outsourced will increase. 
Main criteria mentioned for outsourcing additional services is cost reduction followed 
by avoiding investments in assets. On the other hand, 40% of the respondents do not 
expect to outsource additional logistics service. The higher level of dependency of service 
providers is the most mentioned criterion for not outsourcing additional logistics activi-
ties. This finding is in line with our findings in the literature study and our case study 
results. Also the case used in our SP experiment stresses this point.
Figure 30: Expectations about level of logistics outsourcing
Interviewees are explicitly asked whether they expect to insource back some of the out-
sourced activities. Nine respondents (almost 20%) answered positively on this question. 
Reasons for insourcing back activities are shown in figure 31. This figure shows that 
lower than expected cost or service levels are the most mentioned reasons for insourc-
ing back some outsourced activities. It needs to be mentioned that according to some 
respondents outsourcing or insourcing decisions are not based on a fixed (logistics) 
strategy, but can differ case by case.152 |
Chapter 8
Figure 31: Reasons for insourcing back logistics activities
Collaboration
The previous subsection made clear that outsourced services often have an operational 
and repetitive character. As a result, the focus in the collaborative relationship is also 
on operational management and execution of the activities. Shippers are still scared to 
transfer more responsibilities to a service provider and to start collaboration on a higher 
level. Fears about loss of transparency, fears about dependency of a certain provider 
and problems to find a reliable and capable partner are reasons given to not intensify 
collaboration. Other shippers have identified supply chain design and control as one of 
their core businesses. Physical logistics is defined as non-core activity by almost all com-
panies. Also our case studies confirm this statement.
The majority of the companies have a certain portfolio of contracted LSPs and do not 
outsource their service to a single provider. Companies are scared to become too depen-
dent of one or a limited number of providers. Next to this, the providers market is too 
fragmented. In comparison to an average chemical company, service providers are too 
small to service a chemical company as a whole or to be competitive in all geographic 
regions. At plant or business unit level there are still possibilities for closer collaboration. 
Figure 32 shows that almost 40% of our respondents considers closer collaboration with 
some of their LSPs. | 153
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Figure 32: Companies considering closer collaboration
8.4.3   Choice experiment: variables 
As discussed in section 8.3, a model estimation procedure is used to find the model 
with the best overall fit. Table 36 depicts the final results. This table presents the coef-
ficient values of our final model together with the respective t-ratios. Coefficients are 
significant at a 95% confidence level, if the t-ratio is greater than 1.96. Each coefficient 
represents the relative importance of an explanatory variable in our binary logit model. 
The alternative constant that is mentioned in table 36 results from the between mode 
part of the experiment: the part that respondents choose between basic and intensified 
collaboration. When interpreting the values in table 36, it should be borne in mind that 
the coefficients of the quantitative and qualitative variables are presented differently. 
The coefficients of the continuous variables (cost and service) are multiplied by continu-
ous variables in the final utility function and therefore reflect the disutility per unit of 
the variable. As a result, these variables have only one coefficient. The coefficients of 
the discrete variables (trust, confidentiality and commitment) are applied to categorical 
variables which reflect the total utility increase or decrease for that variable. Therefore, 
these variables have a coefficient for each level in the choice experiment38. 
38 Except level 1, because for n categories of a discrete variable the model contains at most n-1 dummy vari-
ables. Level 1 is the minimum level used in the experiment and therefore set to 0 for the model estimation 
procedure. Other cofficients should be interpreted as relative to this level.154 |
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Table 36: Final estimation results
Table 36 shows the estimated coefficients of the attributes including their signs. Before 
we collect the data for our SP experiment, we have made assumptions about how each 
attribute impacts a logistics collaboration decision. A positive sign of a coefficient indi-
cates that the larger the value of this attribute in a particular collaboration alternative, 
the greater the likelihood that the collaboration will be chosen. On the other hand, a 
negative sign means that the greater the value of this attribute in a collaboration alter-
native, the lower the likelihood that the specific collaboration alternative is chosen. Our 
assumptions are reflected in a series of hypotheses which are described in chapter 539. 
Table 37 compares our assumptions with the final estimation results. Based on this table, 
we conclude that the impact of each attribute on a logistics collaboration decision is as 
assumed, because all estimated coefficients have the signs as expected upfront. There-
fore, the related hypotheses are accepted.






Alternative constant -2.26 (-9.0)
Costs SCM function <= 10 million -17.00 (-6.1)
Costs SCM function > 10 million -26.40 (-7.6)
Costs Purchasing function <= 10 million -5.27 (-2.1)
Costs Purchasing function > 10 million -17.70 (-6.3)
Service SCM function 44.60 9.8
Service Purchasing function 25.40 5.5
Trust level 4 costs > 10 million 1.03 3.9
Trust level 3 costs > 10 million 0.00 (*)
Trust level 2 costs > 10 million 0.00 (*)
Trust level 2 + 3 + 4 costs <= 10 million 0.77 3.7
Confidentiality level 2 + 4 0.80 3.9
Confidentiality level 3 0.46 2.3
Commitment level 4 -0.32 (-2.6)
Commitment level 3 0.00 (*)
Commitment level 2 0.00 (*)
ScalePart 1 1.00 (*)
ScalePart 2 1.00 (*)






Variable Hypotheses Estimation result
Costs Costs of services provided by LSP are valued nega-
tively in logistics collaboration decision.
Negative (-)
Service Service is valued positively in logistics collaboration 
decisions.
Positive (+)
Trust  Trust is valued positively in logistics collaboration de-
cisions.
Positive (+)
Confidentiality Confidentiality  is  valued  positively  in  logistics  col-
laboration decisions.
Positive (+)
Commitment Commitment is valued negatively in a logistics col-
laboration decision.
Negative (-)
Table 37: Expected and estimated signs coefficients
During the estimation procedure we explicitly tested whether heterogeneity in the total 
sample size would result in a better overall model. This makes clear that some subseg-
ments in the total sample can be distinguished. The first subgroup is related to the cost 
level of the respondent. At the beginning of each interview a respondent was asked 
for his current logistics cost level to place the experiment in a realistic context for the 
respondent. The estimation procedure shows that respondents with logistics costs of 
more than 10 million Euros value the attributes costs and trust differently than respond-
ents with logistics costs less or equal to 10 million. The cost and trust element are more 
important in the logistics collaboration decision for the first group. 
All our respondents have a leadership position in supply chain management / logistics or 
purchasing. These two different responsibilities are also distinguished in the model esti-
mation procedure. Table 38 shows that the coefficients for the attributes costs and serv-
ice representing respondents working in logistics and supply chain management have a 
significant higher value than the coefficients for these variables representing respond-
ents with a purchasing responsibility. As a result, it can be concluded that respondents 
with a function in logistics or supply chain management attach more value to these two 
variables in their logistics collaboration decision. The other attributes (trust, confidenti-
ality and commitment) are not valued differently by the two subgroups of respondents.
Finally, the tests on heterogeneity also focus on the product type subgroups distin-
guished within the chemical industry. Our sample size contains respondents from the 
two subgroups: commodity and specialty chemicals. The model estimation procedure 
makes clear that there is no significant difference in the valuation of attributes by re-
spondents representing these two subsegments. This confirms our finding in the case 
studies as presented in chapter 7.
Table 38 provides an overview of the values attached to each attribute by the subgroups 
distinguished in our sample.156 |
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Table 38: Coefficients per subsegment
The second part of the model estimation procedure focuses on the impact of the differ-
ent attributes on a logistics collaboration decision. The estimation results depicted in ta-
ble 36 demonstrate that the attributes costs and service are valued as highly significant 
by all respondents. These are the most important variables in their collaboration deci-
sion. These findings are consistent with the findings on decision criteria in our previous 
research (chapter 2) and our case studies (chapter 7). Moreover, the estimation results 
show that service and costs are not the only significant variables in a logistics collabora-
tion decision. The experiment proves that some levels of the three immaterial attributes 
significantly influence the respondents’ logistics collaboration decision. These findings 
are used to test our series of hypotheses that are related to the impact of the five vari-
ables on a logistics collaboration decision. Table 39 compares our hypotheses and esti-
mation results. Based on the results of this table, we conclude that all hypotheses related 
to the impact of the variables on a logistics collaboration decision are accepted. These 
findings are in line with previous qualitative studies that emphasize human factors like 
trust and commitment as being important impediments for collaboration between ship-
per and LSP (e.g. Mentzer et al., 2000; Simatupang and Sridharan, 2002; Verduijn 2004). 
Unfortunately, no other stated preference studies are available to compare our results. 
Coefficient
SCM function and costs 
<= 10 million
SCM function and costs 
> 10 million
Purchasing function and costs 
<= 10 million
Purchasing function and costs 
> 10 million
Alternative Specific Constant -2.26 -2.26 -2.26 -2.26
Costs -17.00 -26.40 -5.27 -17.70
Service 44.60 44.60 25.40 25.40
Trust level 4 n.a. 1.03 n.a. 1.03
Trust level 3 n.a. 0.00 n.a. 0.00
Trust level 2 n.a. 0.00 n.a. 0.00
Trust level 2 + 3 + 4 0.77 n.a. 0.77 n.a.
Confidentiality level 2 + 4 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80
Confidentiality level 3 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46
Commitment level 4 -0.32 -0.32 -0.32 -0.32
Commitment level 3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Commitment level 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Subgroup
n.a. = not applicable for this specific subgroup  | 157
Stated preference experiment
Variable Estimated impact Hypotheses
Costs Significant Costs of services provided by LSP significantly impact 
logistics collaboration decision.
Service Significant Service significantly impacts logistics collaboration 
decision
Trust  Significant Trust significantly impacts logistics collaboration deci-
sion.
Confidentiality Significant Confidentiality significantly impacts logistics collabora-
tion decision.
Commitment Significant Commitment significantly impacts logistics collabora-
tion decision.
Table 39: Estimated and expected impact variables
Previous discussion makes clear that decision makers in a logistics collaboration decision 
not only derive utility from service and cost benefits, but also from immaterial aspects. 
As a result, decision makers not always choose for the most profitable collaboration 
decision from an economic point of view. This confirms our hypothesis that the aspect 
of non-full rationality functions as a threshold to benefit from logistics collaboration. As 
a result, it may be concluded that decision makers do not act as fully rational agents as 
defined in neo-classical and new-institutional economics40. Models used in the supply 
chain management literature to prove the potential of vertical collaboration between a 
shipper and LSP are usually based on these economic streams. 
8.4.4   Choice experiment: inertia 
The estimation results provide the possibility to explicitly analyze the inertia level of our 
respondents. Table 36 shows that the value of the Alternative Specific Constant (ASC) 
is highly significant at a 95% confidence level and has a negative sign. This means that 
the respondents have a preference for the alternative that was called basic collaboration 
in our experiment. The ASC represents the resistance to switch to a situation of more 
intensive collaboration and thus refers to the respondents’ inertia level. As a result, this 
coefficient can be used to test our hypotheses related to inertia. Table 40 compares our 
inertia hypotheses and estimation results. The table shows that both hypotheses are 
accepted, because the coefficient of the ASC is valued negatively and has a significant 
impact. The experiment shows that our respondents display inertia. As a consequence, 
they do not always respond to relative differences in a rational manner and leave profit-
40 As discussed and conluded in chapter 4, this dissertation follows the neo-classical and new-institutional 
economics in their definition of fully rational agents.158 |
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able collaboration alternatives unexploited. This conclusion confirms our hypothesis that 
inertia functions as a threshold to benefit from logistics collaboration. This is also in line 
with our findings in the behavioral decision making literature. Unfortunately, there are 
no quantitative data available to compare our results.
Estimation  Hypotheses
Negative (-) Inertia is valued negatively in a logistics collaboration decision.
Significant Inertia significantly impacts a logistics collaboration decision.
Table 40: Estimated and expected results inertia
Table 41 shows a more detailed analysis of the ASC term. In this table the ASC term is 
expressed as a percentage of the current logistics cost level for each subgroup distin-
guished in our sample. Next to this, for each of these percentages the respective t-ratio 
is depicted. This table shows that those purchasers with logistics costs less than or equal 
to 10 million Euros have the highest resistance to change. They need more than a 35% 
cost saving to switch to a more intensive type of logistics collaboration. At the other 
side, respondents with a logistics or supply chain management responsibility and a cost 
level of more than 10 million Euros have the lowest inertia level of the four subgroups in 
our sample. They are willing to switch to a different type of logistics collaboration when 
the cost saving is almost 9%.
Table 41: ASC expressed in terms of costs
The ASC analysis can also be used to determine the monetary value of service. This mon-
etary value is defined as the ratio of the percent change of service to the percentage 
change in costs. These results distinguished per subgroup are depicted in table 42. This 
shows that respondents with a supply chain or logistics responsibility with logistics costs 
less or equal to 10 million Euros a 1% service improvement is equivalent to a cost reduc-
tion of 2.76%. The second group, supply chain responsibility and a cost level of more 
SCM function and 
costs <= 10 million
SCM function and 





and costs > 10 million
Observations 297 255 155 219
Final logL -148.2 -114.6 -89.0 -116.2
Degrees Of Freedom 7 7 7 7
Alternative constant 0.133   (-4.3) 0.0861    (-4.8) 0.354     (-4.3) 0.125     (-4.5)
Costscale 1.00    (-5.0) 1.00       (-6.3) 1.00      (-2.6) 1.00      (-5.6)| 159
Stated preference experiment
than 10 million Euros, is willing to pay 1.75% more for a service improvement of 1%. For 
the last two subgroups these percentages are 1.19% and 2.00%. 
Table 42: Monetary value of service
8.5   Concluding remarks
This chapter describes the design and results of the conducted stated preference experi-
ment. This experiment is used to test the literature review results presented in chapter 5. 
In chapter 5, we conclude that behavioral decision making literature identifies two ele-
ments that can function as a threshold to benefit from logistics collaboration next to the 
impediments that are already described in the logistics outsourcing and collaboration 
literature. These two aspects are: non-full rationality of individual decision makers and 
the existence of inertia. Both aspects can be a reason to not select the most beneficial 
collaboration option from an economic point of view. Our SP experiment is used to verify 
these theoretical findings and to quantify the impact of these aspects. 
The results of this experiment show that decision makers in logistics collaboration deci-
sions value trust, confidentiality and commitment as significant variables in their col-
laboration decision. This finding confirms that individuals making vertical collaboration 
decisions cannot be seen as fully rational agents, because they take immaterial aspects 
into account in such a decision. We conclude that the aspect of non-full rationality 
functions as a threshold to select the most profitable collaboration alternative from an 
economic point of view. Next to this, the experiment proves that the respondents have 
a significant level of inertia which constrains the intensification of logistics collabora-
tion. Also inertia functions as a threshold to fully exploit the potential service and costs 
benefits of vertical logistics collaboration. Therefore, it may be concluded that the SP 
experiment confirms our theoretical findings. Finally, the stated preference results make 
it possible to quantify the impact of each single variable relative to cost in a shipper’s 
collaboration decision. 
SCM function and 
costs <= 10 million
SCM function and 
costs > 10 million
Purchasing function 
and costs <= 10 million
Purchasing function 
and costs > 10 million
Observations 297 255 155 219
Final logL -148.2 -114.6 -89 -116.2
Degrees Of Freedom 7 7 7 7
Service -2.76   (7.2) -1.75   (6.6) -1.19   (1.5) -2.00     (5.3)
Costscale 1.00    (-5.0) 1.00     (-6.3) 1.00     (-2.6) 1.00      (-5.6)160 || 161
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9.   Conclusions and recommendations
This is the final chapter of this dissertation. In this chapter, the main conclusions of this 
research are summarized. Furthermore, scientific and managerial contributions are high-
lighted. Finally, limitations and directions for further research are discussed. 
9.1   Conclusions
Given the observation that in practice a number of thresholds prevent the potential 
benefits of logistics collaboration from being exploited, it is the objective of this re-
search project to measure these thresholds. To reach this final objective, the research 
has started with reviewing three streams of literature: logistics outsourcing, collabora-
tion and behavioral decision making. The literature review ends with the presentation 
of a cross-section of the theoretical findings. This cross-section shows the connection 
between the three streams and also illustrates the two main conclusions that result 
from the theoretical part of the thesis. First, literature review results in an extensive 
list of variables that possibly influence a logistics collaboration decision. Costs, service, 
trust, confidentiality and commitment are identified as the five key variables on this list. 
Second, the behavioral decision making literature identifies two additional thresholds of 
logistics collaboration compared to the impediments that are described in the logistics 
outsourcing and supply chain collaboration literature. One of these additional thresh-
olds is the fact that individual decision makers cannot be seen as fully rational agents 
as defined in the neo-classical and new-institutional economics. This means individuals 
do not only derive utility from material incentives, but also immaterial aspects impact a 
collaboration decision. By contrast, full rationality of decision makers is often assumed 
in optimizing models used in supply chain literature to prove the potential of logistics 
collaboration. In addition, the behavioral decision literature mentions also the existence 
of inertia as a threshold for collaboration. As a result, decision makers are reluctant to 
change and do not always respond to potential savings in a rational matter. 
The empirical setting of this research consists of seven explorative case studies and a 
stated preference experiment. The case studies are used to validate theoretical findings 
and through that create a solid base for the stated preference experiment. The case 164 |
studies result in three main findings. First, our cases confirm the theoretical conclusion 
that costs, service, trust, confidentiality and commitment are the key variables in a logis-
tics collaboration decision between shipper and logistics service provider. Furthermore, 
the cases show that logistics services most frequently outsourced have an operational 
and repetitive character. Next to this, the majority of the collaborative relationships be-
tween shippers and LSPs in our cases are characterized as bundling because of the op-
erational character and short term focus. The shippers are still scared to transfer more 
responsibilities to the logistics service providers. Finally, the shippers in our cases use 
a traditional purchasing approach with a strong focus on costs, in terms of price, and 
low level of involvement of the supplier during the purchasing process despite the fact 
that the complexity of logistics services increases and the logistics services sourced are 
positioned in different quadrants of Kraljic’s purchasing portfolio. 
A stated preference experiment is used to reach the final research objective: measuring 
the thresholds in a logistics collaboration decisions between shipper and LSP. Based 
on the results of the literature review and case studies, the design of the experiment 
includes five variables: costs, service, trust, confidentiality and commitment. The stated 
preference experiment results in the following main conclusions. The experiment con-
firms our theoretical finding that the fact that decision makers are not fully rational 
agents, functions as a threshold to benefit from logistics collaboration. The experiment 
shows that rational elements like costs and service are the most important variables in 
logistics collaboration decisions, but also proves and quantifies the significant impact 
of immaterial incentives like trust, commitment and confidentiality. Further analysis of 
the stated preference data shows there are differences in how respondents value the 
five variables in a logistics collaboration decision, because of their responsibility in the 
organization or their current costs level. Decision makers with a supply chain manage-
ment or logistics responsibility attach more value to the variables costs and service in 
a logistics collaboration decision than their colleagues with a purchasing responsibility. 
The immaterial variables, trust, commitment and confidentiality, are valued equally by 
both subgroups. Besides, respondents with relatively high logistics costs value the at-
tributes costs and trust differently from respondents with relatively low logistics costs. 
The costs and trust variables are more important in the logistics collaboration decision 
for the first group. 
The stated preference experiment also confirms the existence of inertia which constrains 
the intensification of logistics collaboration. This inertia level is significant and quanti-
fied in terms of service and costs. As a result, our empirical data prove the theoretical 
finding that inertia functions as a threshold to benefit from logistics collaboration. A 
more detailed analysis of the inertia levels explains there are differences in the inertia | 165
levels depending on the subgroups identified in our sample: supply chain management / 
logistics versus purchasing responsibility and high versus low logistics costs. 
The findings discussed above can be used to answer our two research questions. In 
our answer to the first question, we conclude that both the existence of inertia and 
the non-full rationality of decision makers hamper a shipper to intensify collaboration 
with a logistics service provider. With regard to the second question, we conclude that 
the research results quantify the impact of trust, commitment and confidentiality in a 
shipper’s collaboration decision to intensify collaboration with a LSP. Next to this, the 
research results quantify the minimum cost savings needed before a shipper is willing to 
intensify collaboration with a logistics service provider. These cost savings differ for the 
subgroups distinguished in our sample.  
9.2   Contributions
9.2.1   Scientific contributions
Supply chain management and decision making behavior are usually separated fields 
that are studied by different groups in academia. This research integrates both fields and 
shows the decision making behavior literature is useful to understand the complexity of 
logistics collaboration decisions. Models used in supply chain management literature, 
that aim to prove the potential of vertical collaboration between a shipper and LSP, often 
involve simplified representation of human behavior. At the other hand, the behavioral 
decision making literature emphasizes that immaterial aspects significantly impact col-
laboration decisions. Our empirical data quantify the impact of these aspects and also 
prove their significant role. As a result, this research contributes to the academic debate 
of logistics collaboration decisions between shippers and LSPs. This research shows that 
this debate should not only improve cost-benefit considerations and analysis, but also 
shift the attention to the immaterial side of these decisions. In addition, better incorpo-
rating human behavior into the existing models will yield more realistic insights and thus 
improve the precision and rigor of these models. 
Next to this, the behavioral decision making literature also clarifies that decision makers 
not always respond to a relative difference in a rational manner, due to the existence of 
inertia. Our research explicitly focuses on and verifies the existence of inertia in logistics 
collaboration decisions. To our best knowledge, no empirical research has been conduct-
ed earlier to quantify and test the level of inertia in such decisions. Focus on the concept 
of inertia helps to understand why the potential benefits are not always achieved in 
practice and shows that this concept is an interesting research area that deserves more 
attention in the future. 166 |
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This research uses a stated preference experiment to reach the final research objective. 
This method is widely used in marketing and passenger transport studies, but has not 
been used very often in research about logistics outsourcing and collaboration. Our 
experiment is specifically designed for this specific context and can be used by other re-
searchers to model decisions in the logistics field. Besides, hopefully the results of this re-
search encourage the logistics scientific community to more often select research meth-
ods that are relatively new for the logistics field, but proved and used by other fields. 
This is not a goal to be reached, but gives the possibility to integrate findings, increase 
our understanding of a specific phenomenon and enhance the validity of research. 
9.2.2  Managerial contributions41
The insights obtained from the case descriptions may be used by practitioners for re-
flecting on their own business processes and making improvements. Especially in the 
organization and design of a tender process for advanced logistics services, they can be 
useful, because the content and organization of such processes are important to come 
to a situation where shipper and LSP benefit more from logistics collaboration. The cases 
show that especially tender processes with an open character and higher involvement 
of the LSP give better possibilities to define a logistics concept that fits into the current 
operations of a logistics service provider. As a result, this makes it possible to decrease 
the total costs for shipper and LSP. It is as if the way of tendering determines the result.
Furthermore, this research proves that immaterial incentives are significant factors in a 
collaboration decision between shipper and LSP. These insights stretch the importance of 
relationship management in a collaborative relationship between shipper and LSP. Espe-
cially LSPs should be aware of this and pay attention to such aspects in a tender process. 
Emphasizing only the possible cost savings of a certain logistics solution is insufficient 
to convince the other party to change its routines. In addition, relationship manage-
ment is not only important during a tender process, but also after implementation. The 
entire contract term gives a LSP the possibility to present improvement proposals to the 
customer. Such a way of working will require an active attitude of the LSP. Nevertheless, 
it also increases the level of trust and commitment at the shippers’ side, and thus helps 
to relieve the thresholds of logistics collaboration. In addition, LSPs could make better 
use of best practices from other customers to convince a shipper of a different from of 
collaboration. 
41 The managerial contributions present in this section are based on a discussion session with 20 representa-
tives of the chemical and LSP industry in April 2009.| 167
Conclusions and recommendations
Also, our study shows a significant level of inertia at the shippers’ side to intensify the 
level of collaboration with logistics service providers. As a result, profitable collaboration 
alternatives between shipper and LSP remain unexploited. This makes clear that in the 
logistics field more attention needs to be paid to different aspects of change manage-
ment to relieve the existing thresholds.
Next to this, it is important that shippers develop long term logistics objectives and 
that these objectives are supported through the entire organization including the top 
management level. At the moment, shippers often act without such logistics objectives 
and that does not create a solid base to benefit form logistics collaboration. Long term 
objectives and corresponding commitments also support LSPs to invest in the relation-
ship with a particular customer.    
Finally, the findings of our study should also encourage the different branch organiza-
tions in the chemical industry to keep the subject of supply chain collaboration at their 
agendas. In the past, the branch organizations have defined supply chain collaboration 
as one of the important aspects to ensure the long term competitiveness of the chemical 
industry (ECTA, 2006; McKinnon, 2004). Stronger relationships need to be established 
between shippers and LSPs to find truly innovative and competitive supply chain solu-
tions. This study proves that there are thresholds to come to these stronger relationships 
and it quantifies the aspects that are taken into account in a logistics collaboration deci-
sion. Therefore, the next step for the branch organizations is to support the industry to 
relieve the existing thresholds. This can be done by stimulating their members to share 
best practices of stronger collaboration between shipper and LSP. These best practices 
should quantify the benefits of a stronger form of logistics collaboration, explain what 
the underlying logistics concepts are and explain how the change towards a stronger 
form of logistics collaboration can be reached. 
9.3   Limitations and further research
Despite the contributions this research made, there are some limitations and areas for 
further research. Concerning the data collection, two limitations arise. First, data col-
lected in this research project are limited to the chemical sector. As a result our findings 
cannot be directly generalized to other industries. This should be accomplished through 
additional verification: more companies and industries should be examined. Second, 
data for the stated preference experiment are only collected at the shippers’ side, be-
cause a shipper is the purchasing and thus leading actor in collaboration decisions be-
tween shippers and LSPs. Including the service providers’ side in further research may 
result in additional insights regarding logistics collaboration decisions between shippers 168 |
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and LSPs. This means that the design of the stated preference experiment needs to be 
adapted to the different roles both types of firms have in collaborative relationships. 
Other limitations can be found in the design of our experiment. The number of variables 
included in the design is limited, because decision makers are restricted in the number 
of variables that they can take into account in their decision and including too many 
variables in a design makes a choice experiment too complex. The included variables are 
identified as key variables in logistics collaboration decisions between shippers and LSP’s 
in our literature review and case studies. The remaining variables are represented by the 
error term in the utility function. It is possible that the key variables in logistics collabo-
ration decisions change over time. Therefore, we recommend to periodically research 
the key variables in logistics collaboration decision making between shippers and LSPs 
to notice a possible change in the importance of each variable. The stated preference 
design needs to be adapted in case a change in the key variables is identified. 
Next to this, our experiment gives a respondent the choice to reduce logistics costs by 
implementing a different logistics concept which requires more intensive collaboration 
with a logistics service provider. To make this choice clear and explicit to the respondent 
a standard case description is used. Therefore, the results of our experiment are related 
to this specific situation and cannot directly generalized to collaborative relationships 
between shipper and LSP in general. This could be achieved through additional empirical 
research; the current design needs to be developed further to analyze whether different 
situations will also result in different conclusions. 
In addition, the results of the stated preference experiment identify areas for further 
research. The data show that respondents from different subgroups value some of the 
choice variables differently and have different levels of inertia. Nevertheless, our research 
does not explain why these differences exist. Further work could focus on understand-
ing these differences. Next to this, our results do not show whether there is any relation 
between the differences in inertia level and the differences in the valuation of the choice 
variables by the subgroups. This relation can be an area for further research.
Furthermore, the designed experiment is used to measure the thresholds in logistics col-
laboration decisions and to quantify the relative importance of the underlying factors 
of these decisions. This information can be used in further research projects to derive 
recommendations for removing or relieving these thresholds. A longitudinal study is 
useful to measure whether the thresholds of logistics collaboration decrease over time 
after implementation of these recommendations. The stated preference experiment of 
this study can be used to collect the data for this longitudinal study. Also Selviaridis and 
Spring (2007), suggest using longitudinal studies in logistics to examine the develop-
ment of research topics over a certain period of time. | 169
Conclusions and recommendations
Finally, based on the results of our case studies further research could be aimed at sourc-
ing strategies for logistics services. Our cases show that most practitioners acknowledge 
the increased complexity of logistics outsourcing, but do not all respond by differing 
their sourcing strategies as expected based on the literature. Shippers also respond by 
changing their outsourcing strategy and internal organization to respond to the in-
creased complexity of logistics outsourcing. Further research is needed to better under-
stand this phenomenon and to define what the effect of the different responses is. 170 || 171
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Appendix A: 
Overview explorative interviews
Name Title at Business card Organization Date
Frank Otten General Manager Physical 
Distribution
DSM October 2006
Cathy Demeestere Secretary General European Petrochemical 
Association (EPCA)
December 2006









1.1  Introduction to the research project:
o	 Topic
o	 Objectives
1.2  Personal introductions: 
o	 Tasks and responsibilities of the respondent 
o	 Background of the researcher 
1.3  Discuss the possibility to participate anonymous (organization and persons)
1.4  Duration of the interview: approximately one and half hour
1.5  Explain structure of the interview. 
o	 1)  Introduction 
o	 2) General questions about the company and supply chain characteristics
o	 3) Questions about logistics outsourcing 
o	 4) Questions about a specific tenderproject 
o	 5) Closing of the interview
2. General questions about company and supply chain characteristics
2.1  Can you explain the organizational structure of the company?
o	 Where is logistics / supply chain management represented?
o	 Is logistics used to create competitive advantage?
o	 Where are you positioned in this structure?
2.2  What are the main characteristics of the overall business strategy?
o	 Which external and / or internal developments influence this strategy?
o	 How is the logistics strategy related to the overall business strategy?
2.3  Can you give a high level overview of the supply chain characteristics of your 
company?
o	 What are the main product flows?| 193
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o	 Number and location of production plants?
o	 Number and location of stock points?
o	 Kind of transport modes used?
o	 What is the order entry procedure?
2.4  What are the characteristics of the market where your products are sold?
o	 Number of competitors?
o	 Where are your main customers located?
o	 Is there any supply uncertainty?
o	 Is demand predictable?




3.1    To what extent are logistical activities outsourced to LSPs?
3.2     What were the internal or external drivers to outsource (some) logistics activities? 
3.3     Are there any concerns to increase the level of logistics outsourcing?
3.4     How many different LSPs are contracted?
3.5     Do you think the complexity of logistics outsourcing has changed over the last 5         
years?
o	 In case the answer is yes; more or less complex?
o	 In case the answer is yes; reasons 
o	 In case the answer is yes; response to this change?
4. Questions about specific tender project. 
The respondent is asked to choose a tenderproject that has taken place not longer than 
three years ago. 
4.1  Which kind of logistics activities were sourced during the tender?
4.2  How important are the services sourced in this project for the overall perform-
ance of the company?
o	 Is the profit impact of the services sourced high or low?
o	 Is their a (non-delivery) risk for the sourced services? High or low?
o	 Is substitution of the service supplier difficult?
o	 Are many other service suppliers available?
o	 Is it a standard service or is special knowhow required?
4.3  How many phases contained the followed tender process?
4.4  What was the content of each phase?
o	 What was the role of the LSP in each phase?194 |
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4.5  Which departments were involved in the tender process?
o	 Where all the people involved in all phases?
o	 Who was responsible for the final decision?
4.6  Which decision criteria were used to make the final decision?
4.7  Is the structure and contents of the tender process different for other logistics 
services?
4,8  How should you characterize the relationship with the selected LSP?
o	 What is the balance of power in the relationship (dominant party)?
o	 Do you characterize this service provider as a critical supplier?
o	 What is the duration of the contract?
o	 Is it the first time you collaborate with this LSP?
5. Closing
5.1  This interview will be transcribed. I would like to ask you to review the transcript 
and case study report to be sure everything is understood well.
5.2  To summarize agreements made during the interview:
o	 Anonymity of the company in research publications 
o	 Sending additional information 
o	 Reviewing interview transcript and case report
5.3  Do you have any remarks or observations in consequence of this interview?




1.1  Introduction to the research project:
o	 Topic
o	 Objectives
1.2  Personal introductions: 
o	 Tasks and responsibilities of the respondent 
o	 Background of the researcher 
1.3  Discuss the possibility to participate anonymous (organization and persons)
1.4  Duration of the interview: approximately one and half hour
1.5  Explain structure of the interview. 
o	 1) Introduction 
o	 2) General questions about logistics network and business strategy 
o	 3) Questions about tenderproject of a specific shipper  
o	 4) Closing of the interview
2. General questions about logistics network and business strategy
Logistics network of the company     
2.1  Can you explain the organizational structure of the company?
o	 Where are you positioned in this structure?
2.2  What are the main characteristics of the overall business strategy?
o	 Which external and / or internal developments influence this strategy?
2.3  Characterize you your company as a 2PL, 3PL or 4PL service provider?
2.4  Can you give a high level overview of the logistics network of your company?
o	 Logistics services supplied?
o	 Different transport modes used?
o	 Number and location of distribution centres / hubs?
2.5  What is your competitive position in the market?
o	 Who are your main competitors?
o	 Who are your main customers?
2.6  In which sectors are your main customers operating?
o	 Chemical, high tech, fashion, automotive, retail etc.?
3. Questions about tender project of specific shipper. 
The respondent is asked to answer the following questions for the same tender project 
as discussed with the shipper. 
3.1  Which kind of logistics services were sourced during the tender project?196 |
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3.2  How important is this customer for the overall performance of your company? 
o	 Is this shipper one of your main customers? 
o	 Percentage of the turnover?
3.3  Would it be difficult for your customer to substitute you as its supplier?
o	 Are there many competitors available in the market?  
3.4  How many phases contained the tender process?
3.5  What was the content of each phase?
o	 What was the role of the LSPs in each phase?
3.6  Which departments were involved during the tender process?
o	 Where all the people involved in all phases?
3.7  Do you know which decision criteria were used by the shipper to select you as its 
LSP?
3.8  How should you characterize the relationship with your shipper?
o	 What is the balance of power in the relationship?
o	 Can the relationship be characterized as a partnership?
o	 What is the duration of the contract? 
o	 Is this the first time you collaborate with this shipper?
4. Closing
4.1  This interview will be transcribed. I would like to ask you to review the transcript 
and case study report to be sure everything is understood well.
4.2  To summarize agreements made during the interview:
o	 Anonymity of the company in research publications 
o	 Sending additional information 
o	 Reviewing interview transcript and case report
4.3  Do you have any remarks or observations in consequence of this interview?
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Appendix D: 
Market characteristics case studies




A Market development Open competition Low High
B Market penetration Open competition Low High
C Market penetration and 
market development
Open competition Low Low
D Market penetration and 
market development
Open competition Low Low
E Market penetration Open competition Low High
F Market development Open competition Low Low
G Market development Open competition Low High
The market characteristics are described to compare the business strategies of the case 
study companies. The strategy is classified by using a classification provided by Ansoff 
(1957). In this classification four different strategies are distinguished: market penetra-
tion, product development, market development and diversification. The table above 
shows that the shippers in the cases follow different strategies to achieve the companies 
overall objectives. The market situation in each case is compared by using the follow-
ing typology: monopoly, oligopoly, limited competition, open competition. All shippers 
operate at a market that is characterized by open competition. During the interviews 
shippers stress the strong and increasing competition in the chemical industry. 
Next to this, we use the uncertainty framework provided by Lee (2002) to compare the 
supply and demand uncertainty of each case. Lee has defined his framework by expand-
ing on  the ideas of Fisher, who found that products can be categorized as either primar-
ily functional or primarily innovative based on their demand characteristics. Lee adds 
also the supply side of the chain and defines a two by two uncertainty matrix. In this 
matrix the horizontal axis represents the demand uncertainty. This uncertainty is low or 
high. The vertical axis reflects the supply uncertainty and also this is classified as low or 
high. These two dimensions are also used to classify demand and supply uncertainty in | 199
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our cases. We follow Hopp and Spearman (2008) and use the variability in the demand 
and supply to define whether the supply or demand uncertainty is low or high. 
They explain that the variability of a flow can be calculated by dividing the standard 
deviation of the number of demands (or supplies) per period of time by the mean of 
demands (or supplies) per period of time42. The uncertainty is low in case this value is less 
than or equal to 1.04 and high in case this value is larger than 1.04 (Hopp and Spear-
man, 2008). The supply uncertainty is defined as low in all cases. The shippers explain 
that the inbound flow is relativly constant. Next to this, they mention that there are suf-
ficient suppliers available and that pipelines are often used to transport the products to 
the plants. The demand side shows a more heterogeneous picture. Case A, B, E and G 
are characterized by a high level of demand uncertainty. Also here the shippers confirm 
this conclusion. Shippers in case A, B and G explain that they operate in a volatile market 
and that they do not have long term agreements with their customers that fix prices 
and volumes for a certain period of time. As a result, the demand fluctuates strongly be-
cause of the speculative character of the market. The shipper of case E explains that the 
demand uncertainty is high, because the business unit operates in the crop protection 
market which is highly influenced by seasonal influences and weather circumstances. On 
the other hand, the demand uncertainty of the shippers in case C, D and F is marked as 
low. Shippers explain that they have mid and long term agreements with their customers 
about prices and volumes that will be delivered in a certain period. These agreements 
lower the demand uncertainty.
42 The accompanying formula is: c = σt/μt (Hopp and Spearman, 2008). 200 |
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Appendix E: 
Single case study reports
Case A: Hub operation
Introduction
Case A is conducted at the Polymer division of a global operating chemical company. The 
Polymer division has activities in three regions: Europe, Asia and America. The European 
region is headquartered in the Netherlands. This division is responsible for the sales and 
distribution activities of the Polyolefin products at the European market. These products 
are manufactured in the Far East. Afterwards, the products are exported to Europe. The 
management of the Asian region is responsible for these manufacturing and distribution 
activities. The central European supply chain department takes over the responsibility at 
the moment the products arrive in a European port. For the distribution of the Polyolefin 
products within Europe a hub structure is used. All five hubs are owned and operated by 
logistics service providers. Four different service providers are contracted to run the hub 
operations for dependency reasons. Moreover, the shipper prefers to contract medium 
sized service providers, because in comparison to the large players these medium sized 
providers show a higher level of commitment to the shipper, the organizations are more 
transparent and the shipper’s negotiation position in better. For the replenishment of 
the hub intermodal transport is used; for the final delivery to the European customers 
mainly road transport is used. The European supply chain structure is depicted in figure 
33.| 201
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Figure 33: Supply chain structure case A
The Polyolefin market can be characterized as a commodity market, because Polyolefin 
are standard products and there are a large number of competitors. Competitive advan-
tage in the market can be gained by product performance or service offered to the cus-
tomer. Two types of service are distinguished. First, logistics service defined as delivering 
the right product at the right moment in the right quantity. Second type of service is 
technical marketing. This last type of service refers to the support given to customers to 
install their production machinery in such a way that the product performance is most 
optimal. Although logistics service is marked as a way to gain competitive advantage, 
the customers are not wiling to pay a higher price for a higher level of logistics service. 
As a result logistics within this company is strongly cost driven. Nevertheless, the shipper 
has the aim to use a more integral approach for logistics decisions in the near future to 
secure supply of logistics services. This integral approach means that not only pricing, 
but also elements like transaction costs and service aspects are taken into account. 
The current five hubs are not longer sufficient to serve all European customers, because 
the Polyolefin market is growing, especially in Eastern Europe. For this reason an extra 
hub is needed to serve the Eastern European customers. A purchasing project is started 202 |
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to select the service provider for this hub in Eastern Europe. The selected service pro-
vider will be responsible for the following activities: customer clearance and brokerage 
activities after the products arrive in the port of Antwerp, (intermodal) transport of the 
products to the Hub in Eastern Europe, repack and storage of the products at the hub 
and coordination of the deliveries of the products to the customers in Eastern Europe. 
The activities will be handed over to one single provider to keep the coordination of 
these activities in one hand and to limit the number of contracted suppliers. At the other 
hand, the subcontractors used to deliver the customers are sourced and contracted by 
the shipper for dependency and control reasons.
The shipper positions the package of service sourced for the hub operation in Eastern 
Europe between leverage and strategic items in Kraljic’s purchasing portfolio. The posi-
tion on the profit impact axis is valued relatively high, because logistics service is identi-
fied as one of the major competitive advantages. The position at the supply risk is in 
between low and high, because there are not many suppliers in the market that can 
provide the package service required, but the negotiation position of the shipper is still 
strong, because of the difference in size between both companies. 
Figure 34: Position case A in Kraljic’s matrix: respondents’ perception
The case is also positioned in the Kraljic’s matrix by the researcher. We use the methodol-
ogy as explained in chapter 7. This results in figure 35 and 36. Figure 35 is used to de-
termine the positions at the axis and figure 36 depicts the position in the Kraljic matrix. | 203
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Figure 35: Case A Kraljic valuation procedure
Figure 36: Position case A in Kraljic matrix: researcher’s perception
The LSP that is involved in this case is headquartered in the Netherlands. It is a medium 
sized logistics service provider specialised in intermodal transport and storage of bulk 
products and liquids. The LSP has the possibility to use its own assets for their opera-
tions, but also subcontract other providers. Therefore, the LSP can be characterized as a 
3PL provider. The LSP focuses especially on Northern and Eastern Europe. 
Logistics outsourcing
Logistics outsourcing is part of the logistics strategy of the Polymer division, because 
the shipper does not want to invest in logistics assets, specialised providers are able to 
execute the logistics operations at lower costs and the operational execution of logistics 
activities is not defined as core business. On the other hand, supply chain structuring 
and orchestration activities, amongst other things, replenishment shipments for the Eu-204 |
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ropean market, inventory management and order fulfilment are defined as core compe-
tences and for that reason not outsourced to external service providers.  
The shipper indicates that the complexity of the logistics outsourcing has increased over 
the last decades, because of the global character of the current Polyolefin market. Espe-
cially the increasing number of customers and competitors in Eastern Europe increase 
the complexity of the logistics outsourcing process. Besides, the shipper purchases the 
different outsourced logistics services more and more as a package of logistics services 
like in the case of the hub operation to reduce the number of suppliers contracted. 
Nevertheless, for all kind of services the same sourcing approach and a standard tender 
process are used. The organization and content of this process is not different for differ-
ent kind of services or changed over the last decade. The only difference between tender 
projects for basic versus more advanced services is the length of the process. Tender 
processes for advanced services, like the hub operation in this case, take longer. 
Purchasing process for hub operation
A tender project is started to select the service provider for the hub in Eastern Europe. 
The project is the responsibility of the sourcing department which is part of the Europe-
an supply chain organization. The supply chain organization is a central department that 
works for all the business units that are active in the European region and thus also for 
the Polymers division. Next to the sourcing department, the supply chain organization 
consists of the following departments: planning, customer service and engineering. The 
director of the supply chain organization reports directly to the board of directors of the 
European region. Project team consists of people from the sourcing department. They 
are supported by people from the engineering department who are also active members 
of the project group. Final decision is taken by the manager of the sourcing department 
and approved by the director of the European supply chain organization. 
The total tender project consists of six phases: internal preparation, request for informa-
tion (RFI), evaluation, request for quotation (RFQ), negotiation and final choice. During 
the internal preparation the team members define the requirements for the package 
of services sourced. The project team uses input from the European planning depart-
ment, plants in the Far East and sales representatives to define the final requirements 
for the package of services sourced. Also external representatives like port authorities 
and potential subcontractors are consulted to come to the final RFI document. The RFI 
document contains the possible scenarios for the hub operation including the preferred 
location, quantities and service requirements. At the end of the internal preparation a 
long list of twenty service providers is defined. These twenty service providers are invited 
to price the proposed scenario. They also have the possibility to make some improve-
ments to the proposed scenario. The responses of the service providers are evaluated | 205
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and a short list of five service providers is defined by the project team. Subsequently, 
a RFQ document is defined. The RFQ document is comparable to the RFI document. It 
repeats the preferred concept for the hub operation and describes the requirements 
and updated quantities. The five service providers at the short list receive the RFQ. These 
providers are asked to respond again and accentuate their quotation. The responses on 
the RFQ are used to start the negotiation process. At the end of the negotiation process 
one LSP is selected. This final selection is based on the following criteria: costs, service, 
financial position of the LSP, commitment of the service provider and trust (people who 
are involved at the side of the LSP will look well after the interests of the shipper). The 
length of the tender project was six months. Afterwards implementation of the opera-
tion is started by the engineering department.
Type of collaboration 
The relationship between shipper and LSP in this case can be characterized as bundling 
using the relationship ladder43 as defined by Gulati and Kletter (2005). Bundling is cho-
sen because the shipper has the intention to build a long term relationship with the se-
lected LSP, because the shipper marks a stable hub operation as important to deliver the 
customers in Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, the signed contract has a term of three years, 
and thus the actual commitment is three years. After that period the shipper would like 
to have the possibility to switch to a different provider when there is any motive. Pos-
sible motives are: price level, performance level or a significant change in the customer 
database which requires a new location for the hub. Besides, the activities handed over 
to the LSP have an operational character. The coordination and orchestration activities 
related to hub like replenishment, sourcing subcontractors, inventory management or 
order fulfilment are done by the shipper. Moreover, both parties indicate that the focus 
in the relationship is on the operational performance of the hub operation. Discussions 
about developments in both organizations and consequences of these developments for 
the partnership between both organizations are not taken place. Finally, joint actions or 
joint investments are not under discussion. 
43 The relationship ladder is described in section 2.1.1206 |
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Figure 37: Position case A at relationship ladder
Case B: European transport
Introduction
Case B is conducted at the Intermediates division of the same global operating company 
as case A. The European headquarter of this division is based in the Netherlands. The 
European division is responsible for manufacturing, distribution and sales activities of all 
chemical Intermediates in Europe. There are three plants in Europe. These are located in 
the Netherlands, Germany and the United Kingdom. Products are stored after produc-
tion at the plant sites and delivered to the customers after an order is received by the 
supply chain department. For this delivery process mainly road transport is used. The 
supply chain structure of this case is visible in figure 38.| 207
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Figure 38: Supply chain structure case B
The intermediates market can be characterized as a commodity market, because the 
intermediates are standard products and there are a large number of competitors. As 
a result logistics is strongly cost driven. At the other hand, senior management of the 
Intermediates division has identified logistics as one of the three areas that need be used 
to create competitive advantage. 
The supply chain of Intermediates division is characterized by interruptions. These in-
terruptions are caused by the fact that service providers do not always show up at the 
plant to pick up the products as agreed in the contract, because the logistic providers 
can earn more money at the spot market. As a result, the logistics service delivered to 
the customer is at risk. At the same time the European division has defined an ambitious 
grow path to double their volumes at the European market by selling more products to 
existing and new customers. 
After production, the Intermediates are distributed to the customer. For this distribution 
activities mainly road and sometimes intermodal transport is used. The shipper plans to 
increase the intermodal part in their European distribution activities to ensure that the 
transportation capacity will be sufficient in the near future and is cost effective at the 
same time. Around fifty service providers are contracted to take care of the transport 
from the plants to the customer. These service providers are also responsible for the ac-
companying customs activities. All providers are contracted for a period of one year. As 208 |
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a result the European transportation services are tendered on a yearly basis. In line with 
their colleagues of the Polymer division, the Intermediates division prefers to contact 
medium sized service providers, because these service providers have a stronger commit-
ment to the shipper than the large LSPs. Next to this, the shipper’s negotiation position 
is stronger comparing medium sized providers to large providers. 
The transportation services sourced for the Intermediates division are positioned as le-
verage items in Kraljic’s portfolio by the shipper. The position on the profit impact axis is 
relatively high because logistics is identified as one of area’s used to create competitive 
advantages. Besides, the impact of the disruptions caused by the service providers is 
appreciable; the effort needed to repair the disruptions results in additional costs. The 
position at the supply risk matrix is low, because there are many suppliers in the market 
available and the negotiation position of the supplier is strong. The position of case B in 
the Kraljic’s matrix is depicted in figure 39.
Figure 39: Position case B in Kraljic’s matrix: respondents’ perception
The case is also positioned in the Kraljic’s matrix by the researcher. This results in figure 
40 and 41. Figure 40 is used to determine the positions at the axis and figure 41 depicts 
the position in the Kraljic matrix. | 209
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Figure 40: Case B Kraljic valuation procedure
Figure 41: Position case B in Kraljic matrix: researcher’s perception
In total fifty different LSPs are contracted for the European transportation activities of 
Intermediates division. One of them is involved in this case study. This is the same LSP 
as contacted in case A. 
Logistics outsourcing
The transportation activities of the Intermediates division are outsourced for three rea-
sons. First, costing motives; specialized providers can run transport activities at lower 
cost because of their network and return shipments. Second, the shipper does not want 
to invest in transportation assets. Finally, the physical transport activities are not marked 
as core activities by the shipper. Orchestration and coordination activities like transpor-
tation management are not outsourced to external providers. 
The shipper indicates that the complexity of the outsourced transport operation in-
creases for two reasons. First, the number of disruptions in the supply chain increases, 210 |
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because of the growing volumes of the Intermediates division. Second, the planned 
grow of the intermodal transport activities change the requirements for the services 
sourced. Nevertheless, the sourcing approach including the organization and content 
of the tender process is not changed to respond to this increased complexity. Only, the 
number of criteria used to select the providers is changed. Some years ago, price was 
the only selection criteria. Nowadays, also price, switching costs and commitment of the 
provider is taken into consideration. Beside, internal there is a discussion about chang-
ing the standard contract term from one to three years as a possibility to extend the 
shipper’s commitment to the service providers. Nevertheless, senior management of the 
central supply chain organization is not convinced that this will improve the delivery per-
formance to the customer for three reasons. First, the opportunistic character of many 
service providers; providers do not always show up as agreed in the contract. Moreover, 
the cost impact of the change is not clear. What will happen with the tariffs when the 
prices at the transport or oil market decrease or increase? Finally, savings can still be 
reached with the current way of working with short commitments and yearly tendering.
Purchasing process for European transport
To select the service providers for the European transport operation a tender project is 
done on a yearly basis. The sourcing department of the central supply chain organization 
is responsible for this project. No other departments are consulted during the tender 
process and the final decision is proved by senior management of the sourcing depart-
ment. This approval process is different when a complete new service provider is added 
to the portfolio. In such a case, the manager of the central supply chain organization 
needs to give his approval. 
The total tender process consists of six phases. The project starts with the internal prepa-
ration phase. During this phase the RFI document and a long list of around seventy 
service providers is defined. The RFI document contains all the European lanes, quanti-
ties per lane, type of transport per lane and a standard answer format for the service 
providers. Subsequently, the RFI is sending out to all service providers at the long list. The 
responses of the service providers are evaluated by the shipper by uploading the answers 
in a software tool. The tool compares the responses on price and proposes a short list 
per lane. As a next step, the RFQ document is send out to the service providers at the 
short list. This RFQ document has the same content as the RFI document and request the 
providers to sharpen their prices. The received quotations are used to start the negotia-
tion phase which result in the selection of the preferred shipper per lane and the selec-
tion of a back up shipper per lane. For this final selection the following selection criteria 
are used: costs, service, switching costs and commitment. All providers are contracted 
for the term of one year. The total project takes three months.| 211
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Type of collaboration
The collaboration between the shipper and the service providers contracted for the Eu-
ropean transport operation can be positioned between arm’s length and bundling using 
the relationship ladder of Gulati and Kletter. This position is chosen for the following rea-
sons. First, transportation is not sourced at the spot market, but the commitments given 
to the service providers are short. Moreover, the shipper does not have the intention to 
build a long term relationship with the providers. Besides, the relationship is focused 
on the execution of the transport operation. These activities have an operational and 
repetitive character. Finally, there is a strong focus on price which results in opportunistic 
behavior from both sides and as a result a low level of trust between both parties. 
Figure 42: Position case B at relationship ladder
Case C: Lead logistics provider
Introduction
Case C is conducted at a global operating chemical company that focuses on shifting 
its portfolio to the specialties market, because the specialties market grows faster and 
delivers more stable and higher earnings. The company has built a decentralized organi-
zation structure around business groups. These business groups are empowered to carry 
out all business functions. They are supported by a number of corporate departments. 
The corporate departments supply inter-group services like purchasing, research facili-
ties and human resource management. The corporate departments are contracted by 
the business groups if needed. The company’s headquarter is based in the Netherlands.
This case is conducted at the European division of one of the business groups. This busi-
ness group is the leading supplier of pharmaceutical ingredients. The globalization has 
increased the competition in this market, because new players have entered the market. 
As a result, the business group has defined a strategy that is aimed to maintain the lead-
ership position by focusing on customer intimacy, product innovation and cost effective-212 |
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ness by off shoring production to low cost countries. The logistics strategy is aligned to 
this overall strategy and thus there is a strong focus on costs. Supply chain problems are 
identified and solved for the short run, but are not used as a trigger to critically analyze 
the supply chain concept and solve the problems for the long term. A long term vision 
about which supply chain concepts are needed to be and remain competitive in this 
market is not defined. 
Figure 43 depicts a high level overview of the supply chain structure of the European 
division. This figure makes clear that the European division has five plants. These plants 
are located in four different countries. Each plant has its own distribution centre. This 
distribution centre is used to store the finished products after production and to deliver 
the products to the customers in Europe. For these European deliveries intermodal trans-
port is used. One of the distribution centres functions also as a European distribution 
centre (EDC). Products that come from plants outside Europe are received and stored in 
this EDC. Customers that order products that are manufactured outside Europe are de-
livered from the EDC. Also products manufactured in Europe that need to be supplied to 
other regions are collected in the EDC. For deliveries outside Europe sea freight is used.| 213
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Figure 43: European supply chain structure
The logistics department in Europe is responsible for the coordination of the activities 
depicted in figure 43. The department uses external logistics service providers for the 
operational execution of the activities. This case focuses on the selection of one of these 
providers. The selected provider functions as a Lead Logistics Provider (LLP) that coordi-
nates all transports between the distribution centres and the customers. 
The shipper position the service sourced in this case between leverage and non-critical 
items in Kraljic’s purchasing portfolio. The position on the profit impact axis based on 
the fact that logistics is an important service element, but it is not the major competitive 
advantage in this market. The position at the supply risk is quite low, because there are 
a large number of providers in the market that can provide this service and the shipper 
has a strong negotiation position. 214 |
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Figure 44: Position case C in Kraljic’s matrix: respondents’ perception
The case is also positioned in the Kraljic’s matrix by the researcher. This results in figure 
45 and 46. Figure 45 is used to determine the positions at the axis and figure 46 depicts 
the position in the Kraljic matrix. 
Figure 45: Case C Kraljic valuation procedure| 215
Appendix
Figure 46: Position case C in Kraljic matrix: researcher’s perception
The LSP involved in this case is a worldwide operating 3PL service provider. The home 
market of the service provider is Europe. The company has been founded more than 
forty years ago and grew to a service provider of integrated logistics services. Services 
supplied are: European distribution, air and ocean freight, warehousing and value add-
ed activities like fiscal representation, packing and re-packing. Some of the warehouse 
locations are suitable for the store of environmentally dangerous goods.
Logistics outsourcing
Outsourcing logistics activities is part of the business group’s strategy, because the busi-
ness group would like to concentrate on their core activities and logistics is not identi-
fied as a core competence. Physical transport, transport management, warehousing and 
some value added activities are outsourced to external providers. At the other hand, 
sourcing of subcontractors and supply chain orchestration are defined as core compe-
tence and for that reason done by the shipper. It needs to be noticed that the warehouse 
that functions as EDC is an exception to this strategy. The EDC is insourced back some 
years ago, because of cost saving reasons. 
The shipper indicates that the complexity of logistics services has increased for three 
reasons. First, more advanced logistics services are outsourced to external providers. 
Second, the globalization of the market of pharmaceutical ingredients results in a more 
complex logistics structure. Third, the consolidation in de service provider’s market neg-
atively influences the power position of the shipper. This increased complexity results 
in less transparency of the outsourced operations and increases the dependency of the 216 |
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shipper from certain LSPs. The shipper changes the logistics outsourcing strategy to re-
spond to these developments. As a result, the collaboration with service providers gets a 
more long term character by giving longer commitments to the LSPs. Concrete, commit-
ments given to service providers that are responsible for the physical transportation of 
the goods change from one to three years. This to ensure capacity at acceptable costs. 
Moreover, packages of outsourced logistics service are split up into such a way that co-
ordination tasks and the operational execution of the activities are not done by the same 
provider. The selection of the LLP in this case is the result of this changed strategy. The 
project is described in the next section. 
Purchasing process for Lead Logistics Provider
A tender project is used to select the required LLP for the business group in Europe. 
The project team consists of people from the logistics, customer service and purchasing 
departments of the business group and a representative of the corporate purchasing 
group. The project team prepares the selection of the service provider. This selection 
needs to be approved by the logistics manager of the business group. The tender project 
consists of six phases: internal preparation, request for information, evaluation, request 
for quotation, negotiation and final selection. The internal preparation phase starts with 
the definition of the objectives for the project: 1) increase cost transparency, 2) decrease 
dependency of LSP, 3) increase customer focus, 4) save costs. To reach the first two ob-
jectives, a different logistics concept is defined. In the old situation the LLP functions as 
a 3PL provider which not only coordinates the European transports, but is also respon-
sible for selection of the subcontractors. This situation is changed and the LLP selected 
by this tender process will only function as a central point of contact that is responsible 
for the coordination of the transport activities. The subcontractors will be sourced and 
contracted by the shipper. This change results for the shipper in the required higher level 
of transparency and decreased level of dependency. At the same time, this new situa-
tion gives the shipper a possibility to save costs by exploit the shipper’s own purchasing 
power towards the subcontractors.  As a next step, in the internal preparation phase a 
request for information (RFI) document is defined. This document explains the chosen 
concept and required capabilities of the LSP (experience in the market). At the end of 
the internal preparation phase, a long list of ten providers is defined. These providers are 
invited to respond to the RFI document by explaining how they will fill out the role of 
LLP and by costing the proposed operation. The responses of the LSPs are evaluated and 
a short list of four providers is defined. These LSPs are asked for a revised quotation and 
visited during the RFQ phase. The results of the RFQ phase are the starting point for the 
negotiation process. The tender process ends with the selection of the provider. The fol-
lowing criteria are used to make the final selection: costs, service (number of shipments | 217
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delivered on time), trust (people involved from the side of the LSP), confidentiality and 
capabilities of the LSP (experience in the sector). Both parties agree on a contract term 
of three years. The total tender project takes almost nine months.
Type of collaboration
The relation between shipper and LSP is characterized as bundling using the relationship 
ladder of Gulati and Kletter (2005). This position is chosen for three reasons. First, the 
limited responsibility of the LLP. The LLP is only responsible for the coordination of the 
transport movements. The sourcing and contracting activities are done by the shipper. 
As a result, the activities done by the service provider have an operational character. 
Second, the level of trust in this relationship is relatively low. Choices made by the ship-
per are based on fears of dependency and loss of transparency. Third, there is not any 
intention at the shipper’s side to intensify this collaborative relationship by extending 
the scope of operation of the LSP. No joint actions or joint investments are planned. It 
needs to be noticed that this is not confirmed by the LSP. The involved LSP believes there 
is a possibility to extend the scope by also takes responsibility for the sourcing and con-
tracting activities. 
Figure 47: Position case C at relationship ladder218 |
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Case D: Global distribution centre
Introduction
Case D is conducted at the same company as case C, but at a different business group. 
The business group in this case is world’s leading supplier of fine chemicals to the food 
and pharmaceutical industry. The globalization has increased the competition in this 
market. As a result, margins and market share decrease. The business group has de-
fined a strategy to respond to this changed situation. The adapted strategy is aimed 
to keep the current market share and margins by focusing on cost savings and grow. 
The required growth should be achieved by acquisitions and own product innovations. 
The logistics strategy has a strong focus on costs. The current situation in the market 
strengthens this.  
The business group is divided in three divisions which are responsible for sales activities 
at a specific market. Each division reports to the executive board of the business group. 
The supply chain management department functions as a central staff department that 
supply services to all three divisions. Nevertheless, the department is not represented 
in the executive board of the business group. The supply chain manager reports to the 
central operations director which is responsible for all manufacturing sites, purchasing 
and supply chain management activities.
The business group has a central supply chain structure. There is one global distribution 
centre (GDC) located in the Netherlands that has three functions: replenish the regional 
distribution centres, deliver European customers, and coordinate direct deliveries from 
one of the plants to the customer. In total, the business group has fifty-five different 
manufacturing plants across the globe. The deliveries from the plants to the GDC and 
from the GDC to the RDC are done by intermodal transport; for all other movements 
road transport is used. The central supply chain management department is responsible 
for all activities in the supply chain, but outsource some of the activities to external pro-
viders. The supply chain structure of this case is depicted in picture 48.| 219
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Figure 48: Supply chain structure case D
An external service provider is used to run the operation in the GDC. This case describes 
the tender project to select this LSP. The selected service provider will be responsible for 
the coordination of the direct deliveries and all activities in the global distribution centre: 
receiving, storage, picking, packing and some value adding activities like labelling. 
The shipper positions the services sourced in this case as bottleneck item in Kraljic’s 
purchasing portfolio. The position on the profit impact axis is relatively low based on 
the fact that logistics is not identified as an important service element. Moreover, the 
logistics cost are only a small percentage of the group’s turnover. The position at the 
supply risk is quite high, because the global distribution centre has a central position in 
the supply chain concept of the business group. At the same there are not many service 
providers that can meet the required quality and safety standards defined for the stor-
age of these kinds of products. 220 |
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Figure 49: Position case D in Kraljic’s matrix: respondents’ perception
The case is also positioned in the Kraljic’s matrix by the researcher. This results in figure 
50 and 51. Figure 50 is used to determine the positions at the axis and figure 51 depicts 
the position in the Kraljic matrix. 
Figure 50: Case D Kraljic valuation procedure| 221
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Figure 51: Position case D in Kraljic matrix: researcher’s perception
The LSP that is involved in this case is global 3PL logistics provider that is active in more 
than hundred countries. The headquarter of the service provider is located in Europe. 
The service provider starts as a transportation company, but developed to a provider 
of full logistics services. The following services are supplies: distribution (groupage and 
express), air & ocean freight, warehousing, supply chain management and value added 
services. The provider services customers is several industries: healthcare, electronics, 
consumer goods, automotive and chemical.
Logistics outsourcing
The business group has all transport, transport management, customer & brokerage, 
warehousing and some value adding service outsourced, because the business group 
would like to concentrate on its core competences: developing, manufacturing and sell-
ing specialty products to food and pharmaceutical industry. Supply chain structuring 
and orchestration is done by the central supply chain division, because the own organi-
zation has a higher level of logistics knowledge than the service providers. The shipper 
indicates that the margins in the service providers are low and as a result the service 
providers do not have the possibility to invest in the required knowledge. 
The shipper indicates that the complexity of logistics outsourcing has increased over 
the last years for two reasons. First, the increased globalization results in more complex 
supply chains. Second, customers are more demanding in terms of quality and safety. 
As a result, also the requirements defined by the shipper for their outsourced operations 
change. The shipper has the experience that most LSPs have difficulties to meet these 222 |
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increased requirements. The shipper responds to this changed situation by decreasing 
the number of contracted service providers. A reduced number of contracted LSPs give 
better possibilities to control and coordinate the outsourced operations. Moreover, the 
shipper has extended the commitment to some providers to give these providers the 
possibility to make operation specific investments. The shipper indicates that the organi-
zation or content of tender projects is not changed. 
Purchasing process for global distribution centre
A tender project is used to select the service provider for the global warehouse opera-
tion. The supply chain management department is responsible for this project. The sup-
ply chain manager is part of the project group and responsible for the final decision. Ap-
proval from the central operations manager is only needed in case the project result in 
a change of the supply chain structure. Two representatives of the corporate purchasing 
departments support the project team, because they have experience with these kinds 
of projects in other business groups. The tender process used for this project consists of 
four phases: internal preparation, request for quotation (RFQ), evaluation & negotiation 
and final selection. During internal preparation phase the current supply chain structure 
is discussed. The project team concludes that current concept is still the best choice for 
this business group in spite of increasing congestion and transportation costs, because 
the market is characterized by relatively long lead times and for all products a make-to-
stock principle is used. The internal preparation continuous with de definition of the RFQ 
document. This document explains the functions of the GDC, activities that take place in 
the GDC and the quantities that need to be handled. At the end of the internal prepa-
ration phase, a list of possible suppliers is defined. The current provider that already 
runs the GDC operation for more than ten years is one of the suppliers at this list. The 
RFQ document is send to the providers at the list and these LSPs are asked to price the 
proposed operation. These responses are the input for the evaluation and negotiation 
phase. The tender project ends with the selection of the service provider for the GDC. 
The project team decides to renew the contract with the current provider. This selection 
was based on the following criteria: costs, service and trust. Trust refers to the belief and 
the experience that the service provider will look well after the interests of the shipper 
after implementation. The new contract between shipper and service provider has a 
term of seven years. The first five years are fixed and the last two years are flexible. This 
means that both parties have the possibility to terminate the contract after the five years 
fixed period. The contract is based on an open book cost plus method. Both parties have 
explicitly chosen for this costing structure for two reasons. First, such a method better 
supports long term collaboration than a standard tariff structure. Second, this method 
enforces the shipper to keep the internal knowledge about the outsourced operation | 223
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up to date. The shipper marks this as important to avoid becoming too dependent on a 
certain provider.  
Type of collaboration
The relationship between the shipper and LSP in this case can be characterized as inte-
gration level at the relationship ladder as defined by Gulati and Kletter (2005). Integra-
tion is chosen for three reasons. First, the long term character of the relationship. Both 
parties express their intention to build a long term relationship in the relatively long 
contract term. Second, the LSP has both operational and coordination responsibilities, 
because the provider runs the GDC operation and coordinates the direct deliveries to the 
customers of the business group. Finally, the chosen pricing methodology expresses a 
relatively high level of trust between collaborative parties. 
The relationship is not characterized as strategic partnerships because no joint invest-
ments are done or planned. The shipper use a relatively long contract term to show its 
commitment to the LSP and to give the LSP the possibility to make operation specific 
investments. Besides, shipper has still some fears to be too dependent on the service 
provider. 
Figure 52: Position case D at relationship ladder224 |
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Case E: Warehousing and distribution activities for the Dutch market
Introduction
Case E presents a project at the Crop Protection division of a large chemical company 
with a broad portfolio of base and speciality chemicals. The Crop Protection division is 
responsible for twenty percent of the total turnover. The division is headquartered in 
France and most European countries have their own country organization to serve the 
local customers. The Dutch country organization is responsible for the inbound flows 
from external suppliers and the inbound flows from the own production facilities in 
Germany and France, the storage of these products in a country specific warehouse and 
the final delivery of the products to the customers in the Netherlands. It needs to be 
noticed that products sourced from the own plants are always stored in the country spe-
cific warehouse before delivered to the customers, but that the products coming from 
external suppliers can also be delivered directly to the customer. For all movements road 
transport is used. An overview of the flows coordinated by the Dutch country organiza-
tion is depicted in figure 53.
Figure 53: Flows coordinated by Dutch country organization
The product life cycle of crop protection products is shortening and therefore the time 
to earn back all invested money is decreasing. As a result, the business unit focuses on 
managing the product life cycle of each product which has to result in stronger position 
at the current markets. | 225
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Since some years, there is a general believe within the Dutch country organization that 
supply chain management is one of the disciplines needed to manage the product life 
cycle well. Logistics does not only add costs, but a good organized logistics process 
results in a higher level of customer satisfaction and thus add to the overall result of 
the business unit. An example of this changed attitude towards logistics is the fact that 
members of the supply chain management department are part of a project group at 
the moment an external organization and accompanying product flows need to be inte-
grated in the Crop Protection organization after a merger or acquisition. 
The demand for crop protection products is variable and highly characterized by season-
al influences. Moreover, weather circumstances within a particular season influence the 
demand. Customers expect a high level of flexibility from their supplier. The Dutch coun-
try organization outsources some of their logistics activities to meet the flexibility re-
quirements of their customers. The country organization still coordinates the described 
processes because of dependency reasons. The shipper uses logistics service providers 
to execute some operational activities. This case study describes the tender project used 
to select a provider that can support the shipper to run the logistics operation in the 
Netherlands. The selected provider will be responsible for: warehousing activities in the 
Netherlands, outbound distribution to customer in the Netherlands and value added 
activities in the warehouse like labelling.
The shipper characterized the package of services sourced in this project as a bottleneck 
item using Kraljic’s purchasing portfolio. The position on the profit impact axis is low 
because logistics cost are only 1,1% of the business unit’s turnover. The position at the 
supply axis is relatively high, because there are just a few service providers at the Dutch 
market that have the required permissions to handle and store environmental critical 
products like the crop protection products in this case. Besides, the shipper indicates 
that the LSP is an important partner for the business unit, because the LSP is responsible 
for the final delivery to the customer and thus the directly represents the shipper. Figure 
54 depicts the position of case E is Kraljic’s portfolio.226 |
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Figure 54: Position case E in Kraljic’s matrix: respondents’ perception
The case is also positioned in the Kraljic’s matrix by the researcher. This results in figure 
55 and 56. Figure 55 is used to determine the positions at the axis and figure y depicts 
the position in the Kraljic matrix. 
Figure 55: Case E Kraljic valuation procedure| 227
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Figure 56: Position case E in Kraljic matrix: researcher’s perception
The LSP that is involved in this case is a 3PL service provider that operates in niche market 
by focussing on environmental critical products. The competition in this specific market 
is less than in others parts at the logistics providers market, because there are not many 
suppliers that have the required permissions needed to handle dangerous goods. The 
customers of the LSP are mainly active in the chemical and automotive sector. The LSP 
supplies the following services: 1) warehousing: locations in Netherlands and Belgium, 
2) distribution: Benelux with own equipment and remaining part of Europe with pre-
selected partners 3) value added services like re-packing and labelling. The LSP can be 
characterized as a European player, but is mainly focused on the Benelux.
Logistics outsourcing
Logistics outsourcing is part of the logistics strategy of the Crop Protection division, 
because logistics is not identified as core activity. Besides, as explained in the previous 
section the customer demand has an unstable character. The required level of flexibility 
can be better reached by using external providers than using own assets which results in 
high level of fixed cost. The outsourced activities have an operational character. Coordi-
nation and orchestration activities are done by the shipper.
The shipper indicates that the complexity of logistics outsourcing is not changed over 
the last years. The higher level of automation and some renewed information systems 
makes it easier to coordinate the outsourced flows and to share data with external pro-
viders. This makes it easier to meet the increasing flexibility requirements of the custom-
ers. Tender processes are standardized and the set up is not changed over the last years. 228 |
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Purchasing process for the Dutch operation
A standard tender project is used to select a service provider to run the Dutch ware-
house and outbound distribution activities. The logistics manager of the business unit 
is responsible for this project. He proposes the selected service provider to the business 
manager who needs to give his final approval. This business manager is responsible for 
both sales and logistics activities in the business unit. 
The tender project consists of four phases: 1) internal preparation, 2) RFQ, 3) negotia-
tion and 4) final choice. The internal preparation starts with defining the priorities for 
the logistics organization. These priorities are defined as follows: on time delivery, com-
plete delivery, response time, meet packaging and quality requirements, product avail-
ability, information availability and costs. These priorities are used to compose the RFQ 
document. This document describes the expected volumes for the warehouse operation, 
distribution and value added activities. Moreover, the expected delivery points for the 
distribution activities are explained. Finally, the RFQ document specifies the required ICT 
facilities to control the entire process. A list of four service providers is defined at the end 
of the internal preparation phase. These providers are invited to respond to the tender. 
The service providers are asked to price the activities described in the RFQ document 
and submit some improvement proposals for the existing processes when available and 
appropriate. The responses to the RFQ document are input for the negotiation process 
which ends with the selection of the LSP. For this final selection the following criteria 
are used: costs, service (products delivered on time, inventory accurately and handling 
times), flexibility (willingness and capability to handle exceptions), confidentiality and 
capabilities (ICT systems). Confidentiality is important for the shipper, because also some 
of their direct competitors are using the same service provider. The shipper and LSP 
agree on a contract of three years, because the LSP only starts a new warehouse opera-
tion for at least three years. This period is needed to earn back the money invested to 
set up a new customer. After this period of three years the shipper has the possibility to 
shorten its commitment and renew the contract by one year.   
Type of collaboration
The collaboration between shipper and LSP in this case is characterized as bundling 
using the relation ladder of Gulati and Kletter (2005). First, the relationship is focused 
on the operational execution of the outsourced activities. All coordination, control and 
design activities are done by the shipper. Second, the shipper has given a mid-term 
commitment of three years to the service provider, because the LSP needs this to do 
operation specific investments. Afterwards the commitment is shorten and the contract 
is renewed year by year. This gives the shipper the possibility to start a tender project in 
case there is a reason because of costs or performance issues. Finally, information that | 229
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is shared between both organizations is limited. The Crop Protection unit has a detailed 
planning cycle that contains detailed information about the expected volumes for the 
Dutch market. This is also valuable information for the LSP in order to plan and optimize 
their warehouse operation, but this information is not shared. Nevertheless, joint actions 
between shipper and LSP or joint investments are not under discussion.
Figure 57: Position case E at relationship ladder
Case F:  European distribution center
Introduction
Nowadays, the company in case F is one of world’s leading companies in supplying 
specialties chemicals. The last decades, the company focuses on transforming the prod-
uct portfolio from base chemical to specialty products, because a portfolio with special 
products provides more stable cash flows with less cycle movements. The strategy of 
the company focuses on maintaining their leadership position through faster growth 
and operational excellence. Growth need to be established through a combination of 
organic growth and acquisition. Especially the emerging markets are defined as area to 
grow. The company is divided in three divisions. This case is conducted at the division 
that focus on coating products. These products are supplied to the marine, building, 
aerospace and automotive industry. The organizational structure of the coating division 
distinguishes four regions: Europe & Africa, Americas, Asia and the Pacific. All these four 
regions reports to the central board of the division. This case focuses on a project in the 
European division. Recently, the European division has set up a separate supply chain 
department that coordinates all replenishment activities for the different sites, makes 
the production planning and coordinates the warehousing and distribution activities. 
The European supply chain manager is responsible for the central supply chain depart-
ment. He reports to the global supply chain manager who is a member of the central 
board of the coating division. Before, these activities are organized decentrally and done 230 |
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by each of the five European manufacturing plants. This change in the organizational 
structure makes clear that the importance of logistics is recognized and the position of 
supply chain management in the division is increased. Nevertheless, logistics is still cost 
and short term driven. Logistics is not identified as an element that can be used to gain 
competitive advantage. Competitive advantage can be gained by price and the techno-
logical characteristics of the product. 
The supply chain management department coordinates the European activities, but the 
physical operation is partly outsourced to external providers. A European distribution 
centre is used to centrally store the finished products of the five manufacturing plants 
and to deliver the customers. For the customer deliveries from the plants to the EDC 
intermodal transport is used; for the deliveries to the customers road transport is used. 
The supply chain structure of this case is depicted in figure 58. 
Figure 58: Supply chain structure case F
A LSP is needed to run the European distribution centre. The tender project for the selec-
tion of this provider is discussed in this case. The selected LSP will be responsible for the 
entire European warehouse operation and some value added service like labelling and 
mixing of coatings.
The shipper positions the services sourced in this case between non-critical and bottle-
neck-item in Kraljc’s purchasing matrix. The position on the profit impact axis is low be-| 231
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cause logistics cost are only 3% of the division’s turnover. Besides, logistics not identified 
as an important service element. The position at the supply axis is marked between low 
and high, because there are less service providers available compared standard trans-
portation services, but there still is variety of choices for the shipper and competition 
between the LSPs. Figure 59 depicts the position of case F is Kraljic’s portfolio.
Figure 59: Position case F in Kraljic’s matrix: respondents’ perception
The case is also positioned in the Kraljic’s matrix by the researcher. This results in figure 
60 and 61 Figure 60 is used to determine the positions at the axis and figure 61 depicts 
the position in the Kraljic matrix. 
Figure 60: Case F Kraljic valuation procedure232 |
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Figure 61: Position case F in Kraljic matrix: researcher’s perception
The 3PL provider involved in this case is a 3Pl service provider that is specialized in the 
storage of hazardous materials. Services supplied to the market are: road transporta-
tion, warehousing and value adding services. For the transport activities in the Benelux 
and Germany own equipment is used. Other parts of Europe are done with pre-selected 
partners. The service provider owns six warehouse locations in Europe. Most customers 
of the service provider are active in the chemical and automotive industry.
Logistics outsourcing
Logistics outsourcing is part of the logistics strategy, because the division prefers to 
focus on their core competencies and external providers can provide some logistics serv-
ices at lower costs. All transport, customer & brokerage, forwarding and warehousing 
activities are outsourced. Also some value added activities are done by external service 
providers. Supply chain coordination and orchestration are done by the central supply 
chain department to keep the control in the hands of the own organization and to avoid 
that dependency of external logistics service providers increases. 
The shipper indicates that the complexity of the outsourced operation increases for two 
reasons. First, power position of the shipper decreases because of the mergers and ac-
quisitions in the service providers market and the current scarcity of transportation ca-
pacity. Second, the globalization changes the productions flows. The increasing flows 
to emerging markets makes the supply chain more complex and increases the logistics 
costs. The shipper has already responded to these changes by changing the organiza-| 233
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tional structure and centralizing the coordination of the supply chain activities. A central 
supply chain department has the possibility to cut logistics costs by bundling the flows 
of the different manufacturing plants. Beside, the negotiation position of the central 
supply chain management is stronger compared to the negotiation position of each 
single manufacturing plant. The increased complexity of logistics outsourcing does not 
influence the sourcing approach including the set up and content of tender projects; 
only the department that is responsible for the tender projects moves from the logistics 
department at the plant to the central supply chain department.
Purchasing process for European distribution centre
A tender project is used to select the service provider to run the European distribution 
centre (EDC). The project team consists of people from the supply chain management, 
sales and purchasing departments. Besides, an external consultant is hired to guide 
the process and support the team with his knowledge of the service provider’s market. 
The project team reports to the European supply chain manager. The project consists 
of four phases: internal preparation, request for quotation (RFQ), negotiation and final 
selection. The internal preparation phase is used to define the scope of the project. At 
the start of the project, there was a discussion of the selected service provider will also 
be responsible for the inbound and outbound transportation to and from the EDC. The 
project team decides that these transportation activities will be tendered separately to 
decrease the dependency of a certain supplier and to keep the control over the transport 
operation. As a result, the scope of the project is the European warehousing activities, 
including some value added service like labelling and mixing. The internal preparation 
phase is also used to define the criteria that will be used to make the final selection. Sub-
sequently, a list of possible service providers is defined. The internal preparation phase 
ends with drawing up the RFQ document. This RFQ document contains general informa-
tion about the shipper, product information and volumes of the products that needs to 
be handled. The RFQ is send to the pre-selected providers. These providers are asked to 
design and quote the proposed warehousing operation. The responses of the service 
providers are evaluated by the project team. At the end of the evaluation phase, the 
project team defines a top three of possible providers. These three providers are visited 
and after the site visits the final selection is made. For this final selection the following 
criteria are used: 1) costs, 2) commitment asked by the provider, 3) financial position of 
the service provider, 4) confidentiality, 5) trust (opportunistic behavior). The aspects of 
confidentiality are important because also products of the competitors are handled by 
the same service providers. 
A contract of five years is signed by both parties. Five years is chosen to give the service 
provider the possibility to invest in operation specific equipment and to ensure sufficient 234 |
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logistics capacity at acceptable costs for the coming years. These last two aspects create 
stability in the supply chain of the European division.
Type of collaboration
The relationship between shipper and LSP is characterized as bundling at the relation-
ship ladder of Gulati and Kletter. The position of bundling is chosen for three reasons. 
First, the LSP is only responsible for the operational execution of the warehouse activi-
ties. All coordination and orchestration activities are done by the shipper. Second, the 
shipper does not have the intention to extent the scope of operation of this service 
provider, because of fears about dependency and loss of control. Third, the level of trust 
between both organizations is relatively low, because both organizations are reserved 
to share additional information that can improve the current operation. The shipper is 
reserved to share forecasted volumes, because also competitors have stored their prod-
ucts in the warehouse of the LSP. Also the LSP does not take initiative to share the ins 
and outs of the operation, because the LSP is afraid that the shipper takes advantage of 
this information to negotiate lower prices. It needs to be noticed that the commitment is 
relatively long for a relationship that is characterized as bundling. The commitment term 
of five years could be an indication for a different type of collaboration. Nevertheless, 
the reasons identified to choose for this longer commitment are partly related to cost 
saving motives for the own organization and are not related to motives that support the 
development of the relationship. 
Figure 62: Position case F at relationship ladder| 235
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Case G: Site and transport operations
Introduction
Case G is conducted at a global manufacturer and marketer of special chemicals. The 
focus on special chemicals is a strategic choice, because the margins at specialties are 
higher and the sensitivity of specialties for cyclic movements is less compared to com-
modity chemicals. As a result, the commodity divisions are sold to other players in the 
market. The company’s headquarter is based in the United States. 
The case focuses on the European division of the Polyurethanes business unit which is 
headquartered in Belgium. The European division has plants in the Netherlands, Italy 
and Germany. The finished products are stored at the production sites. These stocks 
are used to deliver the customers. For these customer deliveries road transport is used. 
Figure 63 shows the supply chain structure of this case.
Figure 63: Supply chain structure case G
Products of the Polyurethanes division are used by the construction, automotive, foot-
wear and furniture industry. In spite of the fact that the products are characterized 
as specialties, the shipper characterizes the market as a commodity market. There are 
enough other suppliers with comparable products and the possibilities to create com-
petitive advantages are limited to technical marketing, supply chain performance and 
supply chain innovation. Especially supply chain innovation gives possibilities to achieve 236 |
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cost savings that are required to remain competitive and profitable. Since some years 
this is not only the vision of the supply chain management departments, but also ac-
knowledged by other disciplines within the company. As result, supply chain manage-
ment department has a representative in the senior management of the business man-
agement in line with finance and sales departments. The focus on cost savings, service 
improvements and supply chain innovation has resulted in a project for redesigning all 
logistics activities at the sites as well as the outbound transportation activities. For these 
redesign activities a tender process is started, because the activities are outsourced to 
external providers. 
The shipper positions the package of services sourced in this project as a strategic item 
in Kraljic’s purchasing portfolio. The position at the supply risk is relatively high, because 
there are not many suppliers available that can deliver the required services and have 
sufficient knowledge to support the business unit in the redesign process at the same 
time. Also the position on the profit axis is relatively high, because both supply chain 
performance and supply chain innovation are marked as major areas to create competi-
tive advantage in the market.
Figure 64: Position case G in Kraljic’s matrix: respondents’ perception
The case is also positioned in the Kraljic’s matrix by the researcher. This results in figure 
65 and 66. Figure 65 is used to determine the positions at the axis and figure 66 depicts 
the position in the Kraljic matrix. | 237
Appendix
Figure 65: Case G Kraljic valuation procedure
Figure 66: Position case F in Kraljic matrix: researcher’s perception
The involved LSP is one of the three service providers that are selected to run the opera-
tions as sourced in the case. This LSP is started as a transport company and developed to 
a full service 3PL provider. The service provider uses own equipment and subcontractors 
to service their customers. The service provider focuses primarily on the chemical sector 
and the European market. 
Logistics outsourcing
The core competences of the Polyurethanes division are manufacturing and selling prod-
ucts. Therefore, the shipper does not want to invest in logistics assets. All warehousing, 
on site handling activities, transportation, transportation management and inventory 
management activities are outsourced to external providers. Beside, the shipper uses 
external providers for the logistics activities to have a higher level of flexibility in terms 238 |
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of capacity and costs. Supply orchestration activities are not outsourced, because sup-
ply chain performance and supply chain innovation are identified as areas that need 
to be used to create competitive advantage. Besides, the order entry activities are not 
outsourced although these activities are characterized as non-core activities and have an 
operational character. The reason is that these activities are almost entirely automated; 
outsourcing will not bring many advantages in terms of reducing internal work load or 
logistics costs. 
The shipper indicates that the complexity level of logistics outsourcing has increased for 
two reasons. First, a combination of logistics services are more and more outsourced as 
a package of services to a limited number of providers. Second, the shipper experiences 
difficulties in defining requirements for such a package of services. The higher level of 
complexity was one of the reasons to change the sourcing approach and the content 
of the tender process for advanced logistics services. The changed sourcing approach 
focuses more on supply chain concepts and total cost of ownership of these concepts in 
stead of the pricing of each single activity of the supply chain process. Another reason 
for the shipper to change the content of the tender process is the situation at the service 
providers market. The service providers market is characterized by low margins. There-
fore, the possibilities to achieve the required cost savings by a standard tender which 
only focuses on pricing are decreasing. The shipper believes that these required cost sav-
ings can only be reached by organizing the tender process in such a way that the service 
provider is involved in designing the processes and results in a solution that fits better to 
the service providers’ existing network. 
Purchasing process for site and transportation operations
The logistics department is responsible for the tender process described in this case. This 
logistics department is a central staff department that works for all business units in 
Europe. Also the supply chain manager of the Polyurethanes business unit participates in 
the tender project, because he will be responsible for the implementation and contract 
management after implementation. 
The total tender project takes nine months and consists of six phases: internal prepara-
tion, request for information (RFI), evaluation, Request for Quotation (RFQ), negotiation 
and final selection. During the internal preparation the RFI document is defined. The vol-
umes, product flows and future developments are described in this document. During 
the internal preparation phase also a long list of eighteen service providers and the final 
selection criteria are defined. The RFI document is send out to the providers at the long 
list with the request to define solutions for the presented case. The service providers are 
explicitly asked to not present a costing in their response to enforce that both internal 
and external involved parties actively focus on the solutions. Five service providers sub-| 239
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mit a response. These responses are evaluated by the project team of the shipper. Subse-
quently, the RFQ document was defined. This document contains the same information 
as the RFI document; only the provided data are updated and in this document the ser-
vice providers are asked to submit both solutions and costing. The responses to the RFQ 
document are the input for the negotiation process between shipper and service provid-
ers. The project ends with the selection of three providers to run the operation. These 
service providers use both own equipment and subcontractors to run the operation. The 
possible subcontractors are reviewed by the shipper. Three service providers are selected 
for two reasons. First, selecting three in stead of one provider decreases the dependency 
on a single provider. Second, the fragmented character of the service providers market 
makes it difficult to select a service provider that can serve the entire European market. 
The project uses the following selection criteria: costs, service (on time deliveries), cul-
ture (organizational culture), commitment (contract term asked by provider) and trust 
(belief that people involved from the LSP side will promote the interests of the shipper in 
their internal organization) and commitment. The shipper and service providers agreed 
on a contract term of five years to give the service provider the possibility to invest in 
equipment that is needed to implement proposed solutions. Moreover, a term of five 
years gives both organizations the possibility to create a stable supply chain operation. 
The projects has resulted in a supply chain solution using more intermodal transport, 
using floating stock concepts and increasing pay loads per shipments
Type of collaboration
The relationship between the shipper and LSP in this case can be characterized as integra-
tion level at the relationship ladder as defined by Gulati and Kletter (2005). Integration is 
chosen for three reasons. First, the long term character of the relationship. Second, the 
LSP has not only operational but also coordination responsibilities. Finally, the explicit 
involvement of the LSP in defining and implementing improvements. The relationship 
is not marked as strategic partnering, because the shipper does not outsource orches-
tration activities and the required investments are only made by the service provider. 
Besides, there are still fears to be dependent of one of the selected partners and the 
shippers would like to give their approval for the subcontractors used by the providers; 
this makes clear that the level of trust needs to be developed before the relationship can 
be marked as strategic partnering. There are possibilities that the relationship develops 
to the stage of strategic partnering, because the shipper and three LSPs discuss the pos-
sibility to improve horizontal collaboration between the three service providers by creat-
ing independent entity for the collaboration activities. This entity should make it possible 
to define and implement joint actions, make joint investment and share revenues.   240 |
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Company Respondent Title at Business Card SCM/Purchasing Commodities / Specialties
1 1 Logistics Manager SCM Commodities
2 Logistics Manager SCM Commodities
3 Logistic Coordinator SCM Commodities
2 4 Vice President Coprorate Logistics SCM Specialties
5 Vice President Operations SCM Specialties
6 Strategic Purchaser Logistics Purchasing Specialties
3 7 Senior buyer Purchasing Specialties
8 Project Manager Replenishment & Distribution SCM Specialties
4 9 Supply Chain Team Manager SCM Specialties
10 European Supply Chain Manager SCM Specialties
11 Purchasing Manager Land Transport EMEA Purchasing Specialties
5 12 EUAF Land Logistis Manager SCM Commodities
13 Contract Manager Land Logistics SCM Commodities
14 Procurement manager Purchasing Commodities
6 15 European Operations Leader SCM Commodities
16 European Supply Manager Purchasing Commodities
17 Global Supply Chain Director Speciality Plastics SCM Commodities
18 Supply Chain Manager SCM Commodities
19 European Supply Manager Purchasing Commodities
7 20 Transport Manager EMEA SCM Specialties
21 Logistics Manager Europe SCM Commodities
22 European Supply Chain Manager SCM Specialties
23 Purchasing Transport Manager Purchasing Specialties
8 24 Logistics Manager SCM Commodities
25 Procurement Manager Logistics Purchasing Commodities
26 Logistics Manager SCM Commodities
27 Logistics Manager SCM Commodities
9 28 Logistics Manager EMEA SCM Specialties
29 Logistics Procurement Manager Purchasing Specialties
10 30 Logistics Manager SCM Specialties
31 Procurement Manager Purchasing Specialties
11 32 Logistics Coordinator EA SCM Specialties
33 Supply Chain Manager SCM Specialties
12 34 Logistics Manager SCM Specialties
35 Supply Chain Manager SCM Specialties
13 36 Senior Sourcing & Contracting Officer Purchasing Commodities
37 Manager Sourcing & Contracting Purchasing Commodities
38 Senior Sourcing & Contracting Officer Purchasing Commodities
14 39 Transport Coordinator EMEA Purchasing Specialties
40 Logistics Manager SCM Specialties
41 Senior Sourcing Manager Purchasing Specialties
15 42 Logistics Procurement Manager Purchasing Commodities
43 Director Services Supply Europe Purchasing Commodities
16 44 Logistics Director EMEA SCM Specialties
45 Logistics Manager SCM Specialties
17 46 Sourcing Specialist Distribution Purchasing Commodities





	 •   Personal introductions: 
o	 Tasks and responsibilities of the respondent 
o	 Background of the researcher 
	 •   Introduction to the project:
o	 Research topic
o	 Objective of this interview
	 •   Explain structure of the interview. 
o	 Type of questions:  most closed questions to shorten interview time
o	 The interview consists of two parts: 
1) General questions about logistics outsourcing and collaboration
2) Choice experiments that focus on logistics collaboration and outsourc-
ing decisions. Will be introduced in more detail later on. 
o	 Duration of the interview: approximately one and half hour
o	 Confidentiality closure: all information provided during this interview will be 
kept confidential.| 243
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Part 1:  
General questions logistics outsourcing and collaboration
The questions below refer to the logistics outsourcing and contracting situation in your 
organization. 
1.  Which logistics activities are outsourced?  More than one answers possible.
o	 Transport
o	 Customs clearance & brokerage
o	 Forwarding





o	 Supply chain consultancy
o	 Order entry, processing & fulfillment 
o	 Customer service / after sales services
o	 LLP / 4 PL services
o	 Other ...........................................................
2.  How many LSPs are, approximately, contracted to execute the outsourced activi-
ties?
  ...........................................................................................
3.  Do you plan to increase the number of service providers contracted?
o	 Yes
o	 No
4.  Do you plan to reduce the number of service providers contracted?
o	 Yes
o	 No
5.  Do you consider intensifying the collaboration with some of your LSPs?
o	 Yes, because .................................................................................
o	 No, because ..................................................................................244 |
Appendix
6.  Do you expect to outsource more logistics activities in the near future?
  Yes, because of the following reasons. More than one answers possible.
o	 Cost reduction
o	 Improve service level
o	 Focus on core businesses
o	 Avoid investments
o	 Access to emerging markets
o	 Access to new technologies
o	 Access to specialized knowledge
o	 Other, ..............................................................................................
  No, because of the following reasons. More than one answers possible.
o	 Remaining logistics activities are core competences of the organization
o	 Cost would not be reduced
o	 Control would decrease
o	 Required service levels would not be realized
o	 We have more expertise
o	 Corporate philosophy excludes further outsourcing
o	 Capabilities of service providers need improvement
o	 Inability to form trusting relationships
o	 Other,........................................................................................
7.  Do you expect to insource some of the activities that are outsourced at this mo-
ment in time?
  Yes, because of the following reasons. More than one answers possible.
o	 Expected cost levels are not realized
o	 Expected service levels are not realized
o	 Lack of the capabilities of the LSPs
o	 Inability to form meaningful and trusting relationships
o	 Lack of ongoing improvements offered by the LSPs
o	 Activities are (re)defined as core-competences
o	 Change of corporate philosophy
o	 Other,......................................................................................
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8.  Which department is primarily responsible for designing the supply chain struc-
ture?
  ……………………………………………………………….
9.  Which other departments are involved in designing the supply chain structure?
  …………………………………………………………………
10.  Which department is primarily responsible for contracting logistics service provid-
ers?
  ……………………………………………………………………
11.  Which other departments are involved in contracting logistics service providers?
  …………………………………………………………………………….
12.  At which level are the logistics activities organized within your company?
o	 At business unit level 
o	 At national level
o	 At regional level
o	 At European level
o	 Globally
o	 Other ..............................................................................................






o	 Other ………………………………………………………………….246 |
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Part II: Choice experiment 
Customize the experiment
	 •   This part of the interview is used to help us in understanding how practitioners 
evaluate logistics collaboration alternatives proposed by logistics service provid-
ers: LSPs, for short in the remaining of the interview. This part consists of three 
short parts that will be introduced separately. In total there are 21 short ques-
tions.
	 •   To customize the questions in this part of the questionnaire, I would like to have 
some idea about your current logistics cost and service level. I do not need to 
know the exact numbers, but hopefully you would like to give an indication. The 
information given will be processed confidentially and only used as a point of 
reference to customize the questions in this part of the questionnaire. As a result 
the upcoming questions will be placed in more realistic context.  
14.  What are the yearly physical distribution costs? Please select category that is most 
close. Physical distribution costs refer to the cost to deliver products after produc-
tion to your customers. à Use card for respondent to show categories.
o	 €          50.000,-  (50 thousand)
o	 €        100.000,-   (100 thousand)
o	 €        500.000,-  (500 thousand)
o	 €     1.000.000,-  (1 million)
o	 €     5.000.000,-  (5 million)
o	 €   10.000.000,-  (10 million)
o	 €   25.000.000,-  (25 million
o	 €   50.000.000,-  (50 million)
o	 € 100.000.000,-  (100 million)
o	 € 150.000.000,-  (150 million)
o	 € 200.000.000,-  (200 million)
o	 € 300.000.000,-  (300 million)
15.  What is, on average, the current outbound delivery performance? Please enter 
the percentage of orders delivered on time.
  .............................................................................................
16.  Is this percentage generally accepted by the market?
  ..............................................................................................| 247
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17.   Physical distribution costs and service levels can be calculated from different per-
spectives. Please, indicate which perspective you have taken in the previous two 
questions about the current cost and service levels.  






Introduction SP Experiment to respondent: experiment 1
The first choices represent two hypothetical tender proposals from two different LSPs. 




o	 Logistics hub is managed by a LSP and used to deliver customers in Southern-
Europe
o	 The LSP at the hub is responsible for receiving the inbound shipments as well 
as the temporary storage of the products at the hub. 
o	 For all shipments towards the hub road transport is used. The many diffe-
rent subcontractors used for these deliveries are contracted and managed by 
Company X. 
o	 The hub is delivered after receiving a sales order from one of the customers.
o	 Company X controls replenishment of the hub
	 •   The choices presented differ from each other on the following factors à use ex-
ample choice card for respondent
o	 Costs: Refer to the total cost yearly spent on physical distribution: after pro-
duction till delivery to the customer. Inclusive transport, handling and inven-
tory cost. No switching cost / cost for tender procedures. Beside the absolute 
level of the cost also the change in percentages in comparison to your base 
level,<<repeat base level respondent>>, is shown. 
o	 Service: refer to the percentage of orders that will be delivered on time to 
your customers proposed by the LSP. Keep in mind your base level is <<re-
peat base level respondent>>
o	 Commitment: refer to the fact that partners do not have to worry about being 
replaced; expressed in the contract term agreed with the LSP.
	 •   Values for each of these variable vary on the cards shown
	 •   Please assume that any other factors which are not incorporated in the choices 
proposed are the same for both proposals.
Choice cards
	 •   Please look at each option carefully and indicate which you would have preferred. 
We emphasis that there are no correct answers to these questions, we are simply 
interested in what would have been your response if only these options were 
available.| 249
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18.  Which option do you prefer? 
Option A: Basic collaboration
Cost: € 52.500.000 
(+5%)




Option B: Basic collaboration
Cost: € 49.000.000 
(-2%)




  Prefer option A  Prefer option B
Question 19 till 23: another 6 choice options are presented to the respondent 
24.   Were you able to make the comparison in this set of choices?
o	 Yes
o	 No, because.......................................................................
25.   For  each  choice,  did  you  understand  each  of  the  characteristics  that  we  de-
scribed?
o	 Yes
o	 No. Please indicate what was not clear ..........................................................
26.   Which of the following indicates the way you selected the most preferred pro-
posal?
	 • Comparison of all provided information





	 •   Comparison of a combination of two characteristics.
o	 Cost and service
o	 Cost and commitment
o	 Commitment and service
	 •   Random
	 •   Intuition
	 •   Other,.................................................................................................
27.   Do you think the proposals presented are realistic?
o	 Yes
o	 No. Please indicate what was not realistic ……………………………. ...............
..................................................................................................
Introduction SP Experiment to respondent: experiment 2
Introduction 
On the following pages you will be presented again with a number of choices that 
represent two hypothetical tender proposals. Nevertheless there is a difference with the 
choices presented in the previous section. Now there are two proposals of the same LSP. 
Please assume you have decided to renew the contract with one of your LSP, this LSP 
propose two different logistics concepts.
	 •   The two concepts presented by this LSP are called: 
o	 Concept A: Basic collaboration à concept as in the previous experiment. The 
concept where you control replenishment of the hub and contracting of the 
subcontractors
o	 Concept B:  More intensive collaboration. à Use card to explain concept to 
respondent.| 251
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	 • Concept B, more intensive collaboration, represents the following situation:
Characteristics concept B:
o	 The heart of this concept is using different transport modalities in stead of 
only using road transportation to deliver the hub.
o	 Hub replenishment responsibilities are partly shifted to the LSP à to achieve 
economies of scale
o	 In this concept more information need to be shared between Company X and 
the LSP to plan and control the activities. The transit times of the goods incre-
ase, and as a result replenishment of the hub will be based on sales forecast in 
stead of actual received sales orders. The service provider needs sales forecast 
at an aggregated level in order to ensure delivery of the customer orders. 
o	 This concept has the possibility to reduce logistics cost significantly and im-
prove delivery performance, but the responsibility for replenishing the hub is 
transferred from Company X to the LSP. 
Choice variables
	 •   Choosing this concept means that also variables like trust and confidentiality are 
more important. Therefore these elements are incorporated in the choices pre-
sented now.
	 •   The choice cards presented will look like this example à use example card to 
show respondent. 
	 •   Card A: refer to concept A and variables shown are like the cards in the previous 
experiment: cost, service and contract term.252 |
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	 •   Card B: refer to concept B and  differ from each other on the following factors:
o	 Cost: refer to the total cost yearly spent on physical distribution measured in 
Euros
o	 Service: refer to the percentage of orders that will be delivered on time to 
your customers.
o	 Trust: refer to the feelings you have about this LSP. The belief the LSP will (not) 
harm your interests for example in selecting subcontractors. Beside the belief 
there will also be given some information about the possibility to put this as-
pect in the contract. The following four levels will be used during experiment 
à explain four levels.
o	 Confidentiality: Refer to the belief that the LSP will use shared information 
confidentially yes or no. In line with the variable trust, also for this aspect 
there are four different possibilities à explain 4 levels used.
o	 Commitment: refer to the fact that partners do not have to worry about being 
replaced. Expressed in the contract term agreed with the LSP.
o	 Control replenishment: refer to the party who is responsible for replenishing 
the hub. Refer to the two different concepts.
	 •   Again the values for these variables will vary in each choice presented.
	 •   Please assume that any other factors which are not incorporated in the choices 
proposed are the same for both proposals.
	 •   However it is likely that the proposed context differs from the current situation in 
your organization; please assume that you have to deal with the described situa-
tion.
Choice cards
	 •   Please look at each option carefully and indicate which you would have preferred. 
We emphasis that there are no correct answers to these questions, we are simply 
interested in what would have been your response if only these options were 
available.| 253
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28.  Which option do you prefer? 
Concept A: 
Basic collaboration
Cost: € 148.500.000 
(-1%)
Percentage orders delivered on time: 97,0%
Contract term:
1 year
Company X controls replenishment
Concept B: 
More intensive collaboration
Cost: € 138.105.000 
(-7%)
Percentage orders delivered on time: 98,0%
You’re not absolutely certain LSP will not 
harm your interests
You’re convinced and have contractually 





  Prefer Concept A  Prefer Concept B
Question 29 till 36: another 8 choice options are presented to the respondent 
37.   Where you able to make the comparison in this set of choices?
o	 Yes
o	 No, because
38.  In the choice, did you understand each of the characteristics that we described?
o	 Yes
o	 No. Please indicate what was not clear .................................................254 |
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39.   Which of the following indicates the way you selected the most preferred pro-
posal?
	 •   Comparison of all provided information
	 •   Comparison of one of the characteristics. Please select one of the following op-
tions.
o	 Cost




o	 Company X controls replenishment hub
o	 LSP controls replenishment hub
	 •   Comparison of a combination of two or more characteristics. Please select from 
the list below.
o	 Cost




o	 Company X controls replenishment hub
o	 LSP controls replenishment hub
	 •   Random
	 •   Intuition
	 •   Other,................................................................................
40.  Do you think the proposals presented are realistic?
o	 Yes
o	 No. Please indicate what was not realistic ....................................................... | 255
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Introduction SP Experiment to respondent: experiment 3
	 •   In the last questions again some choices are presented. Now the compared pro-
posals are both based on the concept of intensive collaboration. But these are 
proposals of two different LSPs. Thus, the concept where:
o	 Different transport modalities are used.
o	 LSP is responsible for replenishing the hub.
o	 Hub replenishment based on sales forecast in stead of actual orders.
o	 Sales information need to be shared 
Choice variables
	 •   Proposals shown differ from each other on the following factors: à show ex-
ample choice card to respondent. Now the following variable on both cards:
o	 Cost: refer to the total cost yearly spent on physical distribution measured in 
Euros
o	 Service: refer to the percentage of orders that will be delivered on time to 
customers.
o	 Trust: refer to the belief the LSP will not let his own interests prevail in se-
lecting subcontractors. Explain 4 levels used during experiment.
o	 Confidentiality: Refer to the belief that the LSP will use shared information 
confidentially. Explain 4 levels used during experiment.
o	 Commitment: refer to the fact that partners do not have to worry about being 
replaced. Expressed in the contract term agreed
	 •   Please assume that any other factors which are not incorporated in the choices 
proposed are the same for both proposals.
	 •   However it is likely that the proposed context differs from the current situation in 
your organization; please assume that you have to deal with the described situa-
tion.256 |
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41.  Which option do you prefer? 
Option A: 
More intensive collaboration
Cost: Χ 52.500.000 
(+5%)
Percentage orders delivered on time: 97,0%
You’re convinced and have contractually 
agreed LSP will not harm your interests.
You’re convinced LSP kept shared informa-





Cost: Χ 49.000.000 
(-2%)
Percentage orders delivered on time: 93,0%
You’re not absolutely certain LSP will not 
harm your interests.
You’re convinced LSP kept shared informa-
tion like sales forecast  confidential
Contract term:
5 years
  Prefer option A  Prefer option B
Question 42 till 47: another 7 choice options are presented to the respondent 
48.   Were you able to make the comparison in this set of choices?
o	 Yes
o	 No, because.......................................................................
49.   In the choice, did you understand each of the characteristics that we described?
o	 Yes
o	 No. Please indicate what was not clear ..........................................................| 257
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50.   Which of the following indicates the way you selected the most preferred pro-
posal?
	 •   Comparison of all provided information





	 •   Comparison of a combination of two characteristics.
o	 Cost and service
o	 Cost and commitment
o	 Commitment and service
	 •   Random
	 •   Intuition
	 •   Other,.................................................................................................
51.   Do you think the proposals presented are realistic?
o	 Yes
o	 No. Please indicate what was not realistic .......................................................
Part III: Closing
	 •   Ask respondent if there are any remarks or observations in consequence of this 
interview?
	 •   Thank respondent for participation. 
o	 Summary of the first part will be send for review




Collaboration is a required key competence for organizations in nowadays volatile busi-
ness environment where organizations focus on their core competences and outsource 
other activities to specialized providers. Therefore, stronger relationships with other en-
tities in a supply network are needed to achieve and contain competitive advantage. 
This general observation is also applicable for the logistics field. Logistics is one of the 
activities often identified as non-core competence and for that reason outsourced to 
specialized providers. Simultaneously, the complexity of outsourced logistics services has 
been increased over the last decades for two reasons. First, more different services are 
outsourced to logistics service providers (LSPs). Second, these different services are not 
bought in isolation, but as a package of logistics services. As a result, closer collabora-
tion between shipper and logistics service provider is becoming increasingly important. 
Empirically, the potential benefits of closer logistics collaboration in terms of costs and 
service advantages are proved by recent research projects. In practice, collaborative rela-
tionships between shipper and LSP often stand at an operational level, because several 
thresholds exist to intensify the level of collaboration. As a result, the benefits of logistics 
collaboration are not exploited fully. 
Operations research models used to prove the potential benefits of logistics collabora-
tion usually assume that individual decision makers act as a fully rational agent. On the 
other hand, there is abundant evidence in the decision making behavior literature that 
this assumption of full rationality is not correct. Also in the supply chain management 
and logistics field there are publications emphasizing that human factors, like trust and 
commitment, function as a threshold to intensify logistics collaboration. Nevertheless, 
these publications do not quantify the impact of these factors. Therefore, it is the aim of 
this research to identify the factors that function as a threshold in a shipper’s decision 
to intensify collaboration with a LSP and also to quantify the impact of these factors. 
Methodology
The research project starts with a review of three streams of literature: logistics out-
sourcing, collaboration and behavioral decision making. Afterwards, the findings of 
these separated streams are combined, and a cross-section of the theoretical findings is 260 |
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presented. This cross- section is used to solve our research problem from a theoretical 
point of view. 
This literature review is followed by two phases of empirical research: case studies and 
a stated preference experiment. The cases are conducted to validate theoretical findings 
based on practitioners’ knowledge, and through that creating a solid base to design the 
stated preference experiment. The stated preference experiment is used to reach our 
final research objective. The chemical industry is chosen as the focus industry for this 
research. This means the empirical data of this research are collected at companies or 
logistics service providers that are active in the chemical sector. 
Literature review
Logistics outsourcing is a possible decision to reach the overall business strategy. The 
bulk of outsourced logistics activities still have an operational character. As a result, a 
transaction-oriented purchasing approach is typically used to purchase the outsourced 
activities. Literature identifies service and costs, in terms of price, are the dominating 
decision criteria in this process. Nevertheless, literature identifies three areas that in-
crease the complexity of purchasing logistics services: changing business environment, 
increased complexity of outsourced services, and service specification difficulties. As a 
result, some logistics services moved to upper segments of Kraljic’s purchasing portfolio 
and the purchasing approach for logistics services should be more differentiated. The 
transaction-oriented approach is not longer the most preferred approach for all types of 
logistics services, because advanced logistics services require a sourcing strategy with a 
relation-oriented purchasing approach.
Logistics outsourcing results in collaborative relationships between shippers and LSPs. 
The collaboration literature provides quite a few classifications to distinguish between 
different levels of integration in these relationships. Terminology used in these classifica-
tions differs per author, but the distinguished levels are comparable. In general, three 
points may be concluded:
	 •   Levels of integration can range from arm’s length to strategic partnering. 
	 •   Logistics  collaboration  exists  between  two  actors  (bi-lateral)  or  in  a  network 
(multi-lateral). 
	 •   To move to a higher level of collaboration the hard as well as the soft side of a 
relationship needs to be developed.
As a next step, different organization theories are reviewed to identify factors that may 
influence a collaboration decision. Each single theory offers a unique perspective on the 
formation of collaboration relationships. Nevertheless, none of the theories is holistic 
and sufficient to capture the complexity of collaboration decisions. Therefore, the dif-
ferent perspectives should be viewed as complementary. As a result, in this research the | 261
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different organizational theories are used to compose a list of variables that possibly 
influence a collaboration decision. The variables trust, confidentiality and commitment 
are identified as key variables at this list.
As a third stream, the behavioral decision making literature is studied. This literature 
shows that individuals not only derive utility from material benefits, but also from im-
material factors. Besides, the behavioral decision making literature makes clear that indi-
viduals are often reluctant to change and as a consequence they not always respond to 
relative differences in a rational manner. Summarized, the findings in behavioral decision 
making literature indicate that reluctance to change and the aspect of non-full rational-
ity function as thresholds to fully benefit from the economic benefits of more intensified 
logistics collaboration. These findings conflict with the assumptions of neoclassical and 
new institutional economic theory that are often used in the logistics field and assume 
individual decision makers act as fully rational agents. 
The literature section ends with a cross-section of the theoretical findings of the three 
different streams. This cross-section shows that the main decision variables for a lo-
gistics collaboration decision are: costs, service, trust, confidentiality and commitment. 
Next to this, the cross-section shows that the behavioral decision making literature iden-
tifies two thresholds for logistics collaboration that are not identified by the logistics 
outsourcing or collaboration literature: non-full rationality and inertia. These findings 
provide an answer to our research question from a theoretical point of view. Neverthe-
less, the literature does not provide empirical evidence to support this conclusion and 
does not indicate how large the thresholds are. 
Case studies 
Seven case studies have been conducted to dig deeper for nuances and insights about 
the current status of logistics collaboration between shipper and logistics service pro-
vider. Each case represents a collaboration decision between a shipper and logistics ser-
vice provider. Data are collected by means of semi-structured interviews and company 
documents at both the shipper and logistics service provider side. In total 25 interviews 
are carried out. 
The cases confirm a volatile situation at both the shippers’ and LSPs’ market. As a result, 
respondents indicate there is an increased awareness of the need for more intensive 
collaboration to meet the upcoming challenges. Nevertheless, not many shippers have 
already rethought or adapted their logistics strategy to the altering environment. As a 
result, the collaborative relationships between shipper and logistics service provider of-
ten still have an operational character. Shippers are still scared to intensify collaboration 
by transferring more responsibilities to the service provider. Fear about loss of control 
and fear to be dependent of a certain provider are reasons most frequently mentioned 262 |
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to not transfer more responsibilities to a LSP. These findings are in line with the reasons 
found in the literature. 
Our cases confirm the increased complexity of logistics outsourcing as identified in the 
literature. As a result, a differentiated sourcing approach to purchase logistics services 
was expected. This is not confirmed by our cases. The case study results make clear that 
the shippers respond to the increased complexity in a more varied way. Using a dif-
ferentiated sourcing approach is just one of the options, next to changing the logistics 
organization or outsourcing strategy. In addition, the cases show that most shippers 
use a transaction-oriented purchasing approach, independent from the position of the 
purchased service in the Kraljic’s matrix. This means that there is a strong focus on costs 
reduction by yearly rate negotiations with their service providers, instead of a focus on 
establishing relationships to create competitive advantage. The respondents indicate 
that they do not only use costs in terms of price as decision criterion, although price was 
the most often mentioned and dominating criterion. Our respondents also indicated 
service, trust, commitment and confidentiality as important decision criteria. This con-
clusion validates the findings of the literature review.
Stated preference experiment 
A stated preference (SP) experiment is used to reach the final research objective. Stated 
preference research is based on the classical economic concept of individuals deriving 
utility from the consumption of a particular product or service. Utility implies an overall 
value attached to a product or service by an individual and is derived from both material 
and immaterial incentives. In a stated preference experiment different alternatives are 
proposed to a respondent. This respondent is assumed to choose the alternative that 
gives them the highest utility.  In our experiment the proposed alternatives represent 
different levels of collaboration  between shipper and LSP. The proposed alternatives are 
described as bundles of attributes that are expected to impact respondents’ preference. 
The attributes of our alternatives are selected based on the prior conducted literature 
review and case studies. This prior research made clear that the main decision criteria 
in a vertical collaboration decision between shipper and logistics service provider are: 
costs, service, commitment, trust and confidentiality. These attributes are incorporated 
in our experiment.
The heart of our SP experiment is giving respondents the choice to reduce logistics costs 
by implementing a concept that requires more intensive collaboration with logistics serv-
ice providers. To make this choice clear and explicit to the respondents, a standard case 
description is used. In short, the case describes two different logistics concepts of “basic 
collaboration” and “intensified collaboration”. Both concepts have the same logistics 
structure; products are produced in a manufacturing plant owned by the shipper, and | 263
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via a logistics hub owned by a logistics service provider, distributed to the end custom-
ers. The starting point for the respondent is the concept of basic collaboration. This is a 
situation wherein only basic logistics services, such as warehousing and transportation, 
are outsourced. The LSP at the hub is only responsible for the operation activities at the 
hub. Accompanying coordinating and sourcing activities are still done by the shipper. 
The alternative proposed to the respondents is the intensified collaboration concept. 
This concept is characterized by transferring sourcing and replenishment responsibilities 
to the logistics service provider of the hub. In this second concept, the LSP functions as 
a Lead Logistics Provider, this results in a higher degree of mutual dependency between 
both organizations. 
The data of the experiment are collected by interviewing 47 representatives from 17 
different chemical companies. All respondents have a managerial function in supply 
chain management or purchasing management. The results of the experiment can be 
summarized as follows:
	 •   The experiment shows that the attributes costs and service are the most impor-
tant variables in logistics collaboration decisions, but the experiment also proves 
the significant impact of immaterial incentives like trust, commitment and con-
fidentiality. 
	 •   The stated preference data show there are differences in how respondents value 
the five variables in a logistics collaboration decision, because of their responsibil-
ity in the organization or their current costs level. Decision makers with a supply 
chain management or logistics responsibility attach more value to the variables 
costs and service in a logistics collaboration decision than their colleagues with a 
purchasing responsibility. The immaterial aspects, trust, commitment and confi-
dentiality, are valued equally by both subgroups. Besides, respondents with high 
logistics costs measured in absolute numbers  value the attributes costs and trust 
differently from respondents with low logistics costs. The costs and trust varia-
bles are more important in the logistics collaboration decision for the first group. 
	 •   The stated preference experiment confirms the existence of inertia. The existence 
of inertia constrains the intensification of logistics collaboration. The minimum 
cost saving that a shipper needs to switch to a situation that requires a higher 
level of collaboration with LSPs differ per subgroup identified in our sample. 
Summarized, we may conclude that the stated preference results confirm our theoretical 
findings: the existence of inertia and the aspect of non-full rationality of decision makers 
function as a threshold in a shipper’s decision to intensify collaboration with a logistics 
service provider. As a result, profitable collaboration options may remain unexploited in 
practice. Next to this, the results of our experiment quantify the thresholds.264 |
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Contribution and limitation
Our empirical research prove that the thresholds, as identified in the behavioral deci-
sion making literature, also exist in a shipper’s decision to intensify collaboration with 
its LSP.  These results show that the integration of behavioral decision making literature 
within the logistics field is useful to understand why the potential benefits of logistics 
collaboration are not achieved in practice. In addition, our results show that decision 
makers in logistics cannot be seen as fully rational agents. This finding shows that better 
incorporation of human behavior into the existing models, used to prove the potential 
of logistics collaboration, will enhance the precision and rigor of these models and yield 
more realistic results. Next to this, the research uses a stated preference experiment to 
reach the final objective. This method has not been used very often in the logistics field. 
This research shows that selection of a different research method provides a possibility 
to increase the understanding of a specific phenomenon. 
Also from a managerial point of view this research provides a number of opportunities. 
The conducted case studies provide insights, for both shippers and LSPs, of the current 
status of and difficulties with logistics collaboration and purchasing logistics services. 
Subsequently, the research makes clear which factors function as a threshold to fully 
benefit from closer logistics collaboration and shows how large these thresholds are. 
These insights can be used to provide actions for removing or at least reducing these 
thresholds.  
Despite the merits of this research, a few critical comments need to be raised as well. 
A first limitation can be found in the fact that our data collection was limited to com-
panies in the chemical sector. Therefore, our findings cannot be directly generalized 
to other industries. This can be accomplished through additional empirical verification. 
Concerning data collection, also another limitation arises because the data of the stated 
preference experiment are only collected at the side of the shipper, because the shipper 
is the purchasing and thus leading actor in a collaboration decision between shipper 
and LSP. Including the logistics service providers’ side in further research may result in 
additional insights. Furthermore, in our stated preference experiment a standard case 
description with a specific collaboration situation between shipper and LSP is used. As 
a consequence, the results cannot be directly generalized to collaborative relationships 
between shipper and LSP in general. This could be accomplished through additional 
empirical verification.
Continuing along the lines of research employed in this dissertation, future research 
could also be aimed at obtaining a more detailed understanding of how the identified 
thresholds can be reduced. | 265
Samenvatting (summary in Dutch)
Introductie
De laatste decennia concentreren bedrijven zich in toenemende mate op kun kernacti-
viteiten. Niet-kernactiviteiten worden vaak uitbesteed aan derden. Door het uitbeste-
den van deze activiteiten wordt samenwerking met andere bedrijven belangrijker om 
concurrentievoordeel te behalen en te behouden. Logistiek is één van de activiteiten 
die vaak wordt uitbesteed aan een gespecialiseerde dienstverlener. Tegelijkertijd is de 
complexiteit van logistieke uitbesteding de afgelopen decennia toegenomen. Hiervoor 
zijn twee redenen aan te wijzen. Allereerst worden er meer verschillende soorten logis-
tieke diensten uitbesteed aan een logistieke dienstverlener (LSP) dan in het verleden. 
Daarnaast worden deze verschillende diensten niet afzonderlijk ingekocht maar als een 
gecombineerd pakket van diensten. Deze beide ontwikkelingen maken intensievere sa-
menwerking tussen verlader en LSP steeds belangrijker. 
De potentiële kosten en service voordelen van intensievere logistieke samenwerking tus-
sen verlader en LSP zijn aangetoond in diverse onderzoeksprojecten. Desondanks blijft 
in de praktijk de samenwerking tussen beide partijen vaak steken op een operationeel 
niveau. Er bestaan drempels die een intensievere vorm van samenwerking tegenhouden. 
Het gevolg is dat de voordelen van logistieke samenwerking in de praktijk niet ten volle 
worden benut. 
Om de potentiële voordelen van logistieke samenwerking aan te tonen wordt vaak ge-
bruik gemaakt van operations research modellen. Deze modellen zijn meestal gebaseerd 
op aannames die veronderstellen dat een individu volkomen rationeel handelt. Er is 
echter voldoende bewijsvoering in de besluitvormingsliteratuur die aantoont dat deze 
aannames niet realistisch zijn. Ook binnen de vakgebieden supply chain management en 
logistiek zijn er publicaties die benadrukken dat menselijke factoren, zoals vertrouwen 
en commitment, ervoor zorgen dat individuen niet volkomen rationeel handelen. Deze 
factoren kunnen de besluitvorming van een individu beïnvloeden en daardoor een be-
lemmering vormen om logistieke samenwerking te intensiveren. De publicaties kwantifi-
ceren de impact van deze factoren echter niet. Het is daarom het doel van dit onderzoek 
om enerzijds de factoren te identificeren die belemmerend werken in een beslissing van 
een verlader om intensiever samen te werken met een LSP. Anderzijds heeft dit onder-266 |
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zoek ook ten doel om te bepalen in welke mate deze factoren een dergelijke beslissing 
beïnvloeden.
Methode
Dit onderzoek start met een literatuurstudie. In deze literatuurstudie staan drie thema’s 
centraal: logistieke uitbesteding, samenwerking en besluitvormingsgedrag. Nadat deze 
thema’s zijn bestudeerd, worden de afzonderlijke bevindingen per thema vergeleken. 
Deze vergelijking resulteert in een doorsnede van de theoretische bevindingen. De door-
snede wordt gebruikt om vanuit een theoretisch perspectief een antwoord te formuleren 
op de onderzoeksvragen De literatuurstudie wordt gevolgd door empirisch onderzoek. 
Dit empirisch onderzoek bestaat uit twee delen: case studies en een stated preference 
experiment. De case studies worden gebruikt om enkele theoretische bevindingen te 
valideren in de praktijk. Deze validatie is nodig om een solide basis te creëren voor het 
ontwerp van het beoogde stated preference experiment. Het stated preference experi-
ment wordt uitgevoerd om het uiteindelijke onderzoeksdoel te realiseren. Beide delen 
van het empirisch onderzoek worden uitgevoerd in de chemische industrie. Dit betekent 
dat alle data zijn verzameld bij producenten (verladers) of logistieke dienstverleners die 
actief zijn in de chemie.
Literatuurstudie
Het merendeel van de logistieke activiteiten die worden uitbesteed, hebben een ope-
rationeel karakter. Het gevolg is dat de inkoopmethode die wordt gehanteerd om deze 
diensten in te kopen, ook vaak een sterk transactioneel karakter heeft. Service en kosten 
worden geïdentificeerd als dominante selectiecriteria tijdens het inkoopproces. Daar-
naast beschrijft de literatuur drie redenen die ervoor zorgen dat de complexiteit van 
het inkopen van logistieke diensten toeneemt: veranderende ondernemingsomgeving, 
toenemende complexiteit van het uitbesteden van diensten en de moeilijkheden met het 
specificeren van de ingekochte diensten. Het gevolg van deze toenemende complexiteit 
is dat de positie van logistieke diensten in de Kraljic matrix is veranderd. Er is een geva-
rieerd beeld ontstaan met als gevolg dat logistieke diensten in diverse kwadranten van 
de Kraljic matrix zijn terug te vinden. Dit betekent dat de transactionele benadering voor 
het inkopen van logistieke diensten niet langer toereikend is voor het inkopen van alle 
logistieke diensten. De complexere diensten vereisen, op basis van hun plaats in de Kral-
jic matrix, een inkoopbenadering die zich meer richt op de ontwikkeling van de relatie 
met de LSP.
Logistieke uitbesteding resulteert in een samenwerkingsverband tussen verlader en lo-
gistieke dienstverlener. De literatuur over samenwerking beschrijft een aantal classifica-
ties die gebruikt kunnen worden om verschillende niveaus van integratie in dergelijke | 267
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samenwerkingsverbanden te onderscheiden. Op basis van deze classificaties kan het 
volgende worden geconcludeerd:
	 •   Het niveau van integratie kan variëren van puur transactioneel tot een strategisch 
partnerschap.
	 •   Logistieke samenwerking kan bestaan tussen twee actoren (bilateraal) of in een 
netwerk van actoren (multilateraal).
	 •   Om een relatie te ontwikkelen naar een hoger niveau van samenwerking moeten 
zowel de harde als de zachte kant van de relatie ontwikkeld worden.
Vervolgens zijn een aantal organisatietheorieën bestudeerd om factoren te identificeren 
die een beslissing tot samenwerking mogelijk beïnvloeden. Elke theorie geeft een unieke 
visie op de vorming van samenwerkingsverbanden, maar geen van de theorieën geeft 
een holistische benadering die toereikend is om de veelzijdigheid van complexe samen-
werkingsverbanden te beschrijven. Daarom worden in dit onderzoek de verschillende 
theorieën complementair gebruikt om tot een lijst te komen van variabelen die een 
samenwerkingsbeslissing mogelijk beïnvloeden. De variabelen vertrouwen, commitment 
en geheimhouding worden in de literatuur aangemerkt als belangrijkste variabelen in 
deze lijst.
Besluitvormingsgedrag  is  het  derde  thema  dat  bestudeerd  wordt.  Besluitvormingsli-
teratuur toont aan dat individuen niet enkel worden gedreven door materiële motie-
ven, maar dat ook immateriële motieven een rol spelen in het besluitvormingsproces. 
Daarnaast maakt de besluitvormingsliteratuur duidelijk dat individuen vaak weerstand 
hebben tegen verandering. Het gevolg is dat ze niet altijd rationeel kiezen en dus niet 
altijd kiezen voor het alternatief dat economisch gezien als beste wordt aangemerkt. 
Samenvattend kan gesteld worden dat de weerstand tegen verandering en het feit dat 
individuen niet volkomen rationeel handelen, het besluitvormingsgedrag van individuen 
beïnvloeden. Beide factoren kunnen een belemmering vormen om de potentiële econo-
mische voordelen van intensievere logistieke samenwerking te kunnen benutten. Deze 
bevindingen conflicteren met de aannames van de neoklassieke en nieuw institutionele 
economie. Deze economische stromingen liggen vaak ten grondslag aan modellen die 
worden gebruikt om de voordelen van logistieke samenwerking aan te tonen en veron-
derstellen dat individuele besluitvormers wel volkomen rationeel handelen. 
De literatuurstudie eindigt met een doorsnede van de bevindingen uit de drie stromin-
gen. Deze doorsnede toont de belangrijkste variabelen die een logistieke samenwer-
kingsbeslissing beïnvloeden: kosten, service, vertrouwen, commitment en geheimhou-
ding. Daarnaast toont de doorsnede aan dat de besluitvormingsliteratuur twee factoren 
beschrijft die een drempel kunnen vormen voor intensievere logistieke samenwerking 
die niet worden beschreven in de logistieke uitbestedings- en samenwerkingsliteratuur. 268 |
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Deze twee factoren zijn: beperkte rationaliteit van besluitvormers en weerstand tegen 
verandering. Deze bevindingen geven een antwoord op de onderzoeksvragen vanuit een 
theoretisch perspectief. De literatuur verschaft echter geen empirische bewijsvoering 
om deze conclusie te onderschrijven en kwantificeert de invloed van beide aspecten 
evenmin.
Case studies
Zeven case studies zijn uitgevoerd om meer inzicht te krijgen in de huidige status van 
logistieke samenwerking tussen verladers en logistieke dienstverleners in de chemische 
industrie. Elke case beschrijft een tenderproces waarbij een aantal logistieke diensten 
worden ingekocht. De data voor de case studies zijn verzameld door gebruik te maken 
van semi-gestructureerde interviews en bedrijfsdocumenten aan zowel de zijde van de 
verladers als aan de zijde van de LSPs. In totaal zijn er vijfentwintig interviews gehouden.
Zowel de verladers als de LSPs bevestigen in interviews dat zij voortdurend te maken 
hebben met een sterk veranderende markt. Dit maakt zowel de verladers als de LSPs 
bewust van de noodzaak om intensiever met elkaar samen te werken. Toch zijn er nog 
maar weinig verladers die ook daadwerkelijk hun strategie hierop aangepast hebben. 
Verladers blijken terughoudend om samenwerking met dienstverleners te intensiveren 
en aldus meer verantwoordelijkheden over te dragen aan de dienstverleners. Het gevolg 
is dat de samenwerkingsverbanden tussen verlader en LSP in de praktijk vaak een sterk 
operationeel karakter hebben. Deze constateringen komen overeen met de bevindingen 
in de literatuur. 
De cases bevestigen de toegenomen complexiteit van logistieke uitbesteding zoals be-
schreven in de literatuur. De verwachting dat dit direct leidt tot een gevarieerdere manier 
van inkopen van logistieke diensten wordt niet bevestigd door de cases. In de praktijk 
hebben verladers namelijk ook andere manieren om te reageren op de toegenomen 
complexiteit van logistieke uitbesteding. Een gevarieerdere inkoopstrategie is namelijk 
slechts één van de mogelijkheden. Daarnaast zijn er verladers die als reactie op de toe-
genomen complexiteit hun uitbestedingstrategie veranderen of de organisatie van de 
logistieke activiteiten wijzigen. De cases laten bovendien zien dat de meeste verladers 
een transactionele benadering hanteren voor het inkopen van logistieke diensten, onaf-
hankelijk van de positie die deze diensten innemen in de Kraljic matrix. Dit resulteert in 
een zeer sterke focus op de kosten en het veelvuldig tenderen in plaats van het creëren 
van concurrentie voordeel door het versterken van een relatie met de LSP. 
Het criterium kosten vormde het meest dominante besluitvormingscriterium in de on-
derzochte cases. Kosten werden niet alleen het vaakst genoemd als criterium dat werd 
meegenomen in de samenwerkingsbeslissing, het criterium kosten werd daarnaast vaak 
als eerste genoemd. De cases laten ook zien dat alle verladers een set van criteria gebrui-| 269
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ken om hun samenwerkingsbeslissing te nemen. Andere belangrijke criteria die werden 
gebruikt in de cases waren: service, vertrouwen, commitment en geheimhouding. Deze 
bevindingen bevestigen het beeld zoals verkregen op basis van de literatuur.
Stated preference experiment
Een stated preference (SP) experiment wordt uitgevoerd om het uiteindelijke onder-
zoeksdoel te bereiken. Stated preference onderzoek is gebaseerd op het klassieke econo-
mische principe dat individuen nut ontlenen aan de consumptie van een bepaald goed 
of dienst. Nut wordt gedefinieerd als de totale waarde die een individu toekent aan een 
bepaald product of dienst. Deze waarde wordt bepaald door zowel materiële als im-
materiële prikkels. In een SP experiment worden aan de respondenten in een interview 
of enquête diverse alternatieven voorgelegd. De respondenten worden verondersteld 
het alternatief te kiezen waaraan zij het meeste nut ontlenen. In ons experiment betref-
fen deze alternatieven twee verschillende vormen van samenwerking tussen verlader 
en LSP. Elk alternatief wordt gekenmerkt door een aantal variabelen. De variabelen die 
gebruikt worden in ons experiment zijn geselecteerd op basis van de resultaten van de 
literatuurstudie en de case studies. Deze studies hebben aangetoond dat in een verticale 
samenwerkingsbeslissing tussen verlader en LSP de belangrijkste besluitvormingsvaria-
belen zijn: kosten, service, vertrouwen, commitment en geheimhouding. Deze variabe-
len, ook wel attributen genoemd, zijn opgenomen in het stated preference experiment.
De kern van het SP experiment is dat respondenten de keuze hebben om hun logis-
tieke kosten te verlagen door een intensievere vorm van samenwerking aan te gaan met 
een LSP. Om deze keuze uit te leggen aan de respondent wordt tijdens de interviews 
een standaard case beschrijving gebruikt. Samengevat beschrijft deze standaard case 
twee verschillende logistieke concepten: “basis samenwerking” en “intensieve samen-
werking”. Beide concepten hebben dezelfde logistieke structuur. De producten worden 
geproduceerd in een fabriek van de verlader. De producten worden vervolgens opgesla-
gen op een logistieke hub van een LSP en tenslotte worden de producten door diverse 
dienstverleners gedistribueerd naar de klant. Het vertrekpunt voor de respondent is de 
situatie van basis samenwerking. Dit is een situatie waarin basis logistieke diensten, 
zoals opslag en transport, zijn uitbesteed door de verlader. De LSP van de hub is alleen 
verantwoordelijk voor de operationele uitvoering van de activiteiten op de hub. De coör-
dinatie ten aanzien van de hub bevoorrading, coördinatie van de distributie activiteiten 
naar de klanten als ook het contracteren van de LSPs die de distributie verzorgen, is de 
verantwoordelijkheid van de verlader. Het alternatief dat de respondent krijgt gepre-
senteerd, is het concept van intensieve samenwerking. In dit concept zijn een aantal 
verantwoordelijkheden verschoven van de verlader naar de LSP. De LSP van de hub wordt 
nu tevens verantwoordelijk voor het bevoorraden van de hub en het contracteren van 270 |
Samenvatting
subcontractors die de leveringen naar de klanten verzorgen. In dit tweede concept krijgt 
de LSP die de hub beheert, de rol van lead provider. Het tweede concept resulteert in een 
hogere mate van wederzijdse afhankelijkheid.
Voor het experiment zijn 47 respondenten van 17 verschillende chemische bedrijven 
geïnterviewd. Al deze respondenten hebben een management functie binnen supply 
chain management of inkoop. De resultaten van het experiment kunnen als volgt wor-
den samengevat:
	 •   Het experiment laat zien dat de variabelen kosten en service de belangrijkste 
besluitvormingscriteria zijn in de logistieke samenwerkingsbeslissing van een ver-
lader. Daarnaast laat het experiment zien dat ook immateriële prikkels als vertrou-
wen, commitment en geheimhouding een significante invloed hebben op het 
besluitvormingsgedrag van de verlader.
	 •   Het experiment toont aan dat de verantwoordelijkheden van een respondent in 
een organisatie en zijn huidige logistieke kostenniveau in absolute zin, bepalen 
hoe hij de verschillende besluitvormingsvariabelen waardeert. Besluitvormers met 
een supply chain management of logistieke verantwoordelijkheid vinden de vari-
abelen kosten en service belangrijker in een logistieke samenwerkingsbeslissing 
dan hun collega’s met een inkoopverantwoordelijkheid. De immateriële variabel-
en, zijnde vertrouwen, commitment en geheimhouding, worden gelijk gewaard-
eerd door de twee subgroepen. Daarnaast waarderen respondenten met hoge lo-
gistieke kosten de variabelen kosten en vertrouwen anders dan de respondenten 
met lage logistieke kosten. De variabelen kosten en vertrouwen zijn belangrijker 
voor de eerste groep.
	 •   Het experiment bevestigt en kwantificeert de weerstand tegen verandering bij 
individuele  besluitvormers.  Deze  weerstand  tegen  verandering  beïnvloedt  de 
beslissing van een verlader en vormt daardoor een drempel om logistieke samen-
werking te intensiveren. Het minimale kostenvoordeel dat behaald moet worden 
voordat een verlader bereid is over te stappen naar een intensievere vorm van 
samenwerking is afhankelijk van de functie van de respondent en zijn huidige 
logistieke kostenniveau.
Samenvattend kan geconcludeerd worden dat het stated preference experiment de the-
oretische bevindingen bevestigt. De weerstand tegen verandering en het feit dat indivi-
duen niet volledig rationeel handelen, vormen een drempel om de potentiële voordelen 
van logistieke samenwerking volledig te benutten. Het gevolg is dat economisch interes-
sante opties tot samenwerking onbenut blijven. Daarnaast wordt de invloed van beide 




De resultaten van dit onderzoek bewijzen dat de drempels zoals geïdentificeerd in de 
besluitvormingsliteratuur ook van toepassing zijn in een beslissing van een verlader om 
samenwerking met logistiek dienstverleners te intensiveren. Door deze constatering mo-
gen we concluderen dat de integratie van besluitvormingsliteratuur in het logistieke 
vakgebied bijdraagt aan de vergroting van kennis over logistieke samenwerking. Daar-
naast tonen de resultaten aan dat ook besluitvormers in de logistiek niet gezien kunnen 
worden als rationele besluitvormers. Het integreren van dit aspect in de bestaande mo-
dellen die gebruikt worden om het potentieel van logistieke samenwerking te bepalen, 
kan de uitkomsten van deze modellen realistischer maken. Tenslotte maakt dit onder-
zoek gebruik van een stated preference experiment om het onderzoeksdoel te bereiken. 
Deze onderzoeksmethode wordt niet vaak gebruikt binnen het logistieke vakgebied. Dit 
onderzoek laat echter zien dat het gebruik van onderzoeksmethoden die minder gang-
baar zijn binnen een specifiek vakgebied, een mogelijkheid bieden om onbeantwoorde 
vragen te beantwoorden.
Ook hebben de resultaten van dit onderzoek een praktische relevantie. De resultaten van 
de case studies geven zowel verladers als logistieke dienstverleners inzicht in de huidige 
status en moeilijkheden ten aanzien van de inkoop van logistieke diensten. Bovendien 
toont het onderzoek aan welke factoren een drempel vormen om de voordelen van 
intensievere logistieke samenwerking te benutten en kwantificeert het onderzoek deze 
drempels. Deze inzichten kunnen benut worden om acties te definiëren die deze drem-
pels kunnen wegnemen of verlagen.
Ondanks de inzichten die dit onderzoek heeft verschaft, zijn er ook een aantal kante-
keningen te plaatsen. Een eerste kantekening is het feit dat de dataverzameling in dit 
onderzoek zich heeft beperkt tot de chemische sector. Als gevolg hiervan kunnen de be-
vindingen niet direct gegeneraliseerd worden naar andere sectoren. Hiervoor is aanvul-
lend onderzoek nodig. Ten aanzien van de dataverzameling voor het stated preference 
experiment moet tevens opgemerkt worden dat de data alleen bij verladers zijn verza-
meld. Deze keuze is gemaakt omdat de verladers de inkopende partij zijn en daarmee 
leidend zijn in de besluitvorming. Het ontwikkelen en uitvoeren van een experiment voor 
dataverzameling aan de kant van de LSPs zou kunnen leiden tot aanvullende inzichten. 
Ten derde is tijdens de interviews voor ons stated preference experiment een standaard 
case beschrijving gebruikt. Deze case beschrijft een specifieke situatie van een samen-
werking tussen een verlader en een LSP. Het gevolg hiervan is dat de resultaten van het 
experiment niet direct gegeneraliseerd kunnen worden naar alle vormen van samenwer-
king. Hiervoor is aanvullend onderzoek nodig. Vervolgonderzoek zou zich tenslotte ook 
nog kunnen richten op de mogelijkheden om de geïdentificeerde drempels te verlagen. 272 || 273
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